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T he 1977 survey period included an enormous number of real property
decisions, but the courts were even more prolific in the 1978 survey
period.' This Article discusses more than 150 of the real property cases
reported during the 1978 survey period. Like the 1977 Property Article many
of these cases provide little more than a review of basic real property law;
significant new developments, however, did occur in such areas as title
insurance, contracts, mortgages, usury, mechanic's and materialmen's
liens, and landlord and tenant law. Additionally, a considerable amount of
new legislation of interest to real estate lawyers is reviewed in this Article.
The basic format used in the Survey articles of the previous four years has
been followed. 2 Topics such as homestead and community property, oil and
I. The Board of Editors of the Journal has designated Oct. 15, 1977, as the end of the
survey period for purposes of this Article. This period includes cases reported in South Western
Reporter to 544 S.W.2d 861. A few noteworthy cases reported subsequent to that date,
however, are discussed.
2. Heath & Bentley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 21 (1977)
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1977 Property Article and cited as Heath & Bentley(1977)]; Wallenstein & St. Claire, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28 (1976)[hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1976 Property Article and cited as Wallenstein & St.
Claire (1976)]; Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 29 (1975)
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gas, and ad valorem taxation, which constitute major portions of other
articles in this issue, are omitted from this Article. 3 Further, due to the
wealth of topics worthy of significant discussion, and in keeping with the
previously established format, no discussion of cases concerning eminent
domain is included.
I. TITLE PROBLEMS
A. Ownership and Boundary Disputes
Of the generally recognized methods of proving title,4 proof of title by
adverse possession 5 and proof of prior possession6 received the most atten-
tion in litigation during the survey period. The court in Bradley v. Bradley7
reaffirmed the general rule that possession by a life tenant is not adverse to
the remainderman since the remainderman has no immediate right to posses-
sion of the property. Additionally, the possession by a tenant generally will
not be adverse against his landlord; limitations, however, will begin to run in
favor of a tenant when (1) the tenant repudiates the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, and asserts a claim of right adverse to the owner, and (2) notice of the
repudiation and adverse claim is given to the owner.8 In Cleveland v. Hens-
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1975 Property Article and cited as Wallenstein (1975)];
Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 27 (1974) [hereinafter referred
to in the text as the 1974 Property Article and cited as Wallenstein (1974)].
3. See, e.g., Burke, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 435 (1977) (ad
valorem taxes); McKnight, Family Law-Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31
Sw. L.J. 105 (1977) (homestead and community property); Roach, Oil and Gas-Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 155 (1977) (mineral rights).
4. The four generally recognized methods of proving title are (1) proof of a regular chain
of conveyances of the land from the sovereign to one of the litigants; (2) proof of a superior title
in one litigant traced from a common source acknowledged by both litigants; (3) proof of
adverse possession by one litigant for the applicable period of limitations prescribed by statute;
and (4) if neither litigant can prove superior title by one of the first three methods, then proof of
one litigant's prior possession combined with proof that such possession has not been aban-
doned. See Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 28.
5. Texas has several statutes which provide for the vesting of title in the adverse claimant:
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507, 5509, 5510, 5518, 5519, 5519a (1958). Article 5507
requires a claimant to be in peaceable and adverse possession "under title or color of title" for
three years. Article 5509, the five-year statute, requires a claimant to prove peaceable and
adverse possession which includes cultivation, use or enjoyment, under "a deed or deeds duly
registered," and payment of property taxes. Article 5510, the ten-year statute, requires cultiva-
tion, use or enjoyment by the adverse possessor, plus "some written memorandum of title" if
the adverse possessor claims more than 160 acres. Article 5518, one of the three 25-year
statutes, bars suit by a record owner despite any disabilities, such as age, mental incapacity, or
military service, if not commenced within 25 years after the cause of action has accrued. Article
5519, a second 25-year statute, bestows good and marketable title on a good faith adverse
possessor under a claim of right, such as a recorded deed or similar instrument, after such a
period. Article 5519a, the third 25-year statute, unlike the prior articles, merely gives the
adverse claimant a prima facie case and is not totally irrebuttable. The adverse claimant is
required to show that he has exercised dominion over the land and paid all property taxes on the
land for 25 years and that the record owner has failed to exercise dominion or pay taxes in at
least one of the prior 25 years. See generally Note, Adverse Possession: The Three, Five, and
Ten Year Statutes of Limitation, 7 ST. MARYS L.J. 78 (1975). See also Larson, Limitations on
Actions for Real Property; the Texas Five-Year Statute, 18 Sw. L.J. 385 (1964); Larson, Texas
Limitations; The Twenty-Five Year Statutes, 15 Sw. L.J. 177 (1961).
6. This method of proof is actually a presumption which may be rebutted. See Reiter v.
Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 382 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1964); Whited v. Mullins, 515 S.W.2d
159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ).
7. 540 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
8. Killough v. Hinds, 161 Tex. 178, 338 S.W.2d 707 (1960). Notice may be either construc-
tive or proved by circumstantial evidence. See Brown v. Bickford, 237 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ley 9 the court reversed the trial court's judgment that the tenant had perfect-
ed a limitation title under the ten-year statute,10 remanded the cause for a
new trial, and held that there was no direct evidence of repudiation or notice
of an adverse claim and that the jury's finding of repudiation and notice was
contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 'I
In Markgraf v. Salem Cemetery Association'2 suit was brought claiming
title by adverse possession to a tract of land, the record title to which was
held by a cemetery association. The court held that since the tract in dispute
was part of a public cemetery and had not been abandoned, 3 adjoining
landowners could not perfect title by adverse possession.
Adverse possession need not be continuous in the same person, but may
be held by different persons successively where there is a privity of estate
between them.' 4 In Doyle v. Ellis 5 the court held that the running of the ten-
year statute of limitations was not interrupted by the claimant's sale of the
tract to a third party and the subsequent foreclosure and repossession of the
tract after the third party failed to pay the full purchase price. 6 One of the
issues in McShan v. Pitts'7 concerned the tacking of the possessions of three
of the defendant's predecessors in title. One of the defendant's predeces-
sors never occupied the land, but had leased the land to another party who
did occupy it. The court held that possession by a tenant is considered
possession by his landlord for the purpose of maturing title by limitations.
A limitation claimant under article 5510,18 the ten-year statute, satisfies
the requirement of cultivation, use, or enjoyment by putting the land to a use
for which the land is adaptable and capable of being used. In a proper case
use of the land as a pasture for grazing and raising horses and cattle is a
sufficient use.' 9 When, as in McShan v. Pitts, however, an adverse claimant
relies upon grazing as his only adverse use and possession, the claimant
generally must show that the land in dispute was "designedly fenced." 20
Although the defendant was permitted to tack the successive possessions of
his predecessors in title, the defendant was unable to establish that during
the ten-year period the strip of land in dispute was designedly fenced. The
court, however, indicated that there may be an exception to the designedly
9. 548 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
10. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
11. The court found that a landlord and tenant relationship existed because the owner had
consented to entry by the tenant, and the tenant entered the property in recognition of the
owner's title. 548 S.W.2d at 475. See Emporia Lumber Co. v. Tucker, 103 Tex. 547, 131 S.W.
408 (1910).
12. 540 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
13. Once land is dedicated as a cemetery and the existence of graves is indicated, as long as
such land is recognized by the general public as a graveyard, it cannot be abandoned. Andrus v.
Remmert, 136 Tex. 179, 146 S.W.2d 728 (1941).
14. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5516 (Vernon 1958).
15. 549 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
16. The seller had retained a vendor's lien to secure payment of a promissory note given as
part payment of the purchase price. When a default occurred, the seller obtained judicial
foreclosure of the lien. The court held that this constituted a sufficient privity of estate between
the seller and purchaser to continue possession in the seller for limitations purposes. Id. at 64.
17., 554 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
18. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958).
19. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ellis, 549 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
20. Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281, 267 S.W.2d 781 (1954). See McDonnold
v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1971).
[Vol. 32
REAL PROPERTY
fenced rule if there is sufficient evidence of "active and total use to the
limits of a pasture's capacity and to the exclusion of all others, with a
claimant's livestock continuously present and visible." 2' The court found
that the defendant established merely occasional grazing on the disputed
strip. Accordingly, the defendant failed to establish adverse possession
sufficient to overcome the plaintiff's proof of record title.
In Fant v. Howel 2 2 the Texas Supreme Court held that when adverse
possession ripened after the execution of a contract for deed, but before the
execution and delivery of the deed, the purchaser was entitled to partial
specific performance of the contract, with a reduction in the purchase price
and a return of a pro rata portion of the interest paid by the purchaser.
Prior possession is sufficient proof of title when neither litigant is able to
prove superior title under a regular chain of title or by adverse possession. 23
Four cases decided during the survey period concerned the doctrine of prior
possession. In Howland v. Hough24 the court held that in order to establish
title by prior possession prior, exclusive, and peaceable actual possession
must be shown.2 5 In Spinks v. Estes26 the holder of record title to a tract of
land brought suit to recover possession, alleging that he had been wrongfully
dispossessed. The court held that the plaintiff's prior possession of the
property was sufficient since the defendants failed to prove title by limita-
tions or otherwise. Phillips v. Wertz 27 involved a dispute between neigh-
boring landowners over a narrow strip of land between their properties, title
to which stood in the name of the original developer of the subdivision. The
jury found that the plaintiff was in possession of the land in question prior to
the defendants, and additionally that the plaintiff had peaceful adverse
possession of the strip continuously for ten years before the suit was filed.
The case was remanded for a determination of the damages suffered by the
plaintiff. Exemplifying the rule that continuous possession is essential to a
claim of title by prior possession is the decision in F.L.R. Corp. v.
Blodgett. 28 The mortgagor F.L.R. brought suit in trespass to try title, claim-
ing title to two tracts of land against its mortgagee who had purchased the
tracts at a foreclosure sale. F.L.R. attempted to show title to a 167-acre tract
under the doctrine of prior possession. The court, however, held that prior
possession of the tract could not be established because, before the foreclo-
21. 554 S.W.2d at 763. In McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1971), Justice
Pope argued in dissent that the general rule should not be applied when these factors are
present. Id. at 144.
22. 547 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1977). The court reversed the decision of the Austin court of civil
appeals in Fant v. Howell, 537 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976). See Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 30, 51, for a discussion of the court of civil appeals' opinion.
Fant v. Howell is further discussed at notes 262-264 infra and accompanying text.
23. The rationale for this rule is that one in prior possession of property should not be
disturbed, except by one with better title. Reiter v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 382
S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1964).
24. 553 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ granted). Writ of error was
granted on three points, including whether the plaintiff had conclusively proved title from the
sovereign. 21 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 84 (Dec. 3, 1977).
25. The leading case is Land v. Turner, 377 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1964).
26. 546 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. 546 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. 541 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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sure and dispossession of F.L.R. by the mortgagee, F.L.R. had conveyed
the property to a third party and placed the third party in possession.
F.L.R. Corp. v. Blodgett also involved an attempt by F.L.R. to prove title
to a 541-acre tract by tracing the title to a common source and showing that
the mortgagee who purchased at the foreclosure sale held title under
F.L.R.29 F.L.R. offered as proof the deed of trust given to the mortgagee
covering the tract in question and the substitute trustee's deed which stem-
med out of the foreclosure under the deed of trust. These instruments,
however, were offered for the limited purpose of proving a common source
of title and "not for proof of title." ' 30 An instrument showing a common
source of title generally will not be considered for the purpose of showing
title, unless offered by the claimant as evidence of title. 3' Accordingly, the
court concluded that, although the evidence did prove F.L.R. parted with
title to the tract, the trustee's deed offered for a limited purpose failed to
establish title in the mortgagee. The court further held that a mortgagee who
has purchased the land at a foreclosure sale, whether or not such sale was
irregular or void as to the mortgagor or one claiming under the mortgagor,
and who has taken possession in reliance upon such foreclosure and pur-
chase, is entitled to retain possession against the mortgagor, or one claiming
under the mortgagor, until the mortgagor's debt is paid. 32 Since F.L.R. had
not paid or offered to pay the indebtedness, the mortgagee was entitled to
retain possession.
In Allen v. Linam33 the plaintiffs brought a trespass to try title action
against the defendants who claimed under a sheriff's deed stemming out of a
1928 judgment in a suit by the State of Texas for delinquent taxes. The
plaintiffs challenged the regularity of the 1928 proceedings, alleging impro-
per citation and failure to join necessary parties.34 The court held that, since
the file in the 1928 case had been lost, it must be presumed that the
proceedings were regular and that the statutory procedures for service were
followed. 35 The plaintiffs additionally claimed that, since the 1928 suit
named as defendants the "heirs of the estate of Genie Allen" instead of the
"heirs of Genie Allen," the proceeding was void. The court rejected this
29. See Jones v. Parker, 193 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1946, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). When the claimant shows that the other party holds title under the claimant, the burden
shifts to the other party to prove title superior to the claimant's. Howard v. Masterson, 77 Tex.
41, 13 S.W. 635 (1890).
30. 541 S.W.2d at 213.
31. See Davis v. Gale, 160 Tex. 309, 330 S.W.2d 610 (1960); Tate v. Johnson, 140 S.W.2d
288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
32. 514 S.W.2d at 214; see Willoughby v. Jones, 151 Tex. 435, 251 S.W.2d 508 (1952);
Jasper State Bank v. Braswell, 130 Tex. 549, 111 S.W.2d 1079 (1938); Whalen v. Etheridge, 428
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1%8, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. 551 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. The defendants relied on two statutes in effect at the time of the proceeding, both of
which have been repealed. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2040 (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1977),
which has been replaced by TEX. R. Civ. P. 11, which provided that where property has passed
to the heirs of any deceased person, and the names of such heirs are unknown to such claimant,
anyone having a claim relating to the property may bring an action naming the heirs of the
decedent as the defendants, and may effect service by publication. Additionally, Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7342 (Vernon 1960) (repealed 1977), which has been replaced by TEX. R.
Civ. P. 117a, provided for service on unknown heirs by publication in suits pertaining to
foreclosure on land to collect taxes.
35. See Harvey v. Peters, 227 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1950, no writ).
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contention and held that the two phrases were equivalent for purposes of
satisfying the requirements of article 2040 which has been repealed. 36
In Root v. Mecom 37 the defendant attempted to establish title under the
doctrine of parol gift of land. 3 The purported donor, however, had executed
a deed conveying the land in question to the plaintiff-trustee to be held in
trust for the benefit of the defendant; the defendant knew of this convey-
ance and had accepted the benefits of the trust. The court held that in order
to establish a parol gift of land the donee must show his possession was
exclusive and adverse to the donor's title, and there was a complete surren-
der of possession by the donor.39 Since the defendant knew of the deed to
the trustee and accepted the benefits of the trust, the defendant's possession
was found insufficient to satisfy the requirements of a parol gift. Additional-
ly, the court held that the defendant could not recover the value of im-
provements made on the land under the doctrine of mistaken improver,'
because the defendant, as beneficiary of the trust, was charged with
constructive notice of the trustee's record title,41 and because the defendant
had actual notice of the trustee's title.
Slim v. Zobe142 exemplifies some of the problems of proof which often
face a plaintiff in a trespass to try title case. The trial court entered an
instructed verdict that the plaintiffs had established title to the land in
question. The court of civil appeals, however, held that the evidence had
failed to prove the identities of the original patentees as a matter of law, and
that the plaintiffs had failed to discharge their burden of properly identifying
the land by establishing its location on the ground. The court held that as a
matter of law expert testimony regarding the location of the disputed land
was insufficient to establish its location. Additionally, the plaintiffs' chain
of title contained several deeds which recited that certain tracts of land were
excepted. The court held that since in a trespass to try title case the plaintiff
must recover on the strength of his own title,43 it was incumbent on the
36. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2040 (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1977). The present version
is TEX. R. Civ. P. 111.
37. 542 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
38. The doctrine of parol gift of land is based on estoppel and the prevention of fraud. The
elements needed to establish a parol gift of land are: (1) a gift of land; (2) possession by the
donee with the donor's consent; and (3) permanent and valuable improvements made by the
donee with the knowledge and consent of the donor. When no improvements are made,
however, a parol gift may be established if the donee shows facts which would make the
transaction a fraud on the donee were a gift not recognized. Hooks v. Bridgewater, 11 Tex.
122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921). See also Clifton v. Ogle, 526 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. 542 S.W.2d at 880. See generally Thurmon v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 336 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. See generally Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 42-43. See also Whelan v.
Killingsworth, 537 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
41. See Miller v. Gasaway, 514 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
42. 552 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
43. Heji v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609, 343 S.W.2d 226 (1961); Walters v. Pete, 546 S.W.2d 871
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gillum v. Temple, 546 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This burden of proof often places the
plaintiff in a trespass to try title action in the difficult position of losing title to the property for
failing to come forth with adequate proof of title. For this reason plaintiffs often bring claims of
title under such other procedures as a declaratory judgment action. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965); see Blackmon v. Parker, 544 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976), aff'd, 553 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1977). Plaintiffs often bring suit to remove a cloud from a
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plaintiffs to prove that the land claimed did not fall within any of the
exceptions." The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that
the disputed land was not included in any of the exceptions. Accordingly,
since the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proving title, the court
reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for the
defendant.
Ownership and boundary disputes often arise in the context of suits for
partition of real property. In Bunting v. McConnel15 the court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court that five children had entered into an oral
agreement"6 for the partition of a fifty-acre tract of land devised to them by
their mother. In Westhoff v. Reitz47 the controversy concerned certain
partition deeds. The facts stated in the opinion are sketchy, but apparently
the land in question was originally partitioned in 1921, and then repartitioned
in 1948. A dispute arose between the heirs at law of one of the parties to both
the 1921 and 1948 partitions, and the purchasers of a portion of the land. The
court held that the partition deeds did not alter the character of the property
as separate property of the decedent, and that the purchasers of the property
were required to look beyond the 1948 partition deed to the decedent in
order to ascertain the true status of title as it was affected by the 1921
partition. 48 Finally, in Ventura v. Hunter Barrett & Co. 49 the court held that
the common elements in a condominium development are owned by the
condominium owners as tenants in common. 50
B. Easements and Other Rights
1. Easements by Operation of Law.
Of the various methods of establishing an easement or right of way by
operation of law,"1 proof of an easement by prescription 52 and proof of an
title; see, e.g., Garcia v. Ramos, 546 S.W_.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no
writ); Jones v. Ogletree Lumber, 541 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); or to quiet title; see, e.g., Terry v. Howard, 546 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1976, no writ); Schuster v. Reid, 544 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
44. See Mills v. Pitts, 121 Tex. 196, 48 S.W.2d 941 (1932).
45. 545 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). Other partition
cases include Hudson v. Gooden, 546 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ);
McDade v. Sams, 545 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ);
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
46. Common owners of land may effect an oral partition which segregates their possession
and use. Houston Oil Co. v. Kirkindall, 136 Tex. 103, 145 S.W.2d 1074 (1941). When several
parcels are owned in common, the common owners may agree to partition their lands so that
each owner receives a separate tract. Aycock v. Kimbrough, 71 Tex. 330, 12 S.W. 71 (1887).
See generally Comment, Misconceptions of Parol Partitions in Texas in Light of Statute of
Frauds Requirements, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 75 (1971). The agreement, however, must be a
binding contract for the partition, not the sale, of the land. See Estate of Eberling v. Fair, 546
S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. 554 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. The court stated that the peculiar terminology of the 1948 partition deed to the decedent
was sufficient notice to cause a prudent person to look further down the chain of title for
conveyances affecting title. The court noted that the purchasers were required to look not only
in the chain of title, but also for conveyances so closely connected with the chain of title that
the purchasers were charged with notice thereof.
49. 552 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1977, writ dism'd).
50. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
51. The generally recognized methods for proving an easement by operation of law are by:
(I) prescription; (2) implied easement or way of necessity; (3) estoppel; and (4) implied
dedication to the public. See Davis v. Carriker, 536 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 31-32.
52. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
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implied dedication to the public 53 received substantial attention during the
survey period. Wiegand v. Riojas54 and City of Houston v. Church5 exem-
plify the general rule that establishment of a prescriptive easement requires
a showing that the use of the easement was open, notorious, hostile, ad-
verse, uninterrupted, and exclusive for a period of ten years or more. 56 In
Wiegand v. Riojas the evidence established that the claimant had commenc-
ed his use of the easement with the permission of the servient owner, and
not until 1973 or 1974 was this permission withdrawn. Permissive use cannot
ripen into a prescriptive right unless there is "a distinct and positive asser-
tion of a right which is brought home to the servient owner's attention and
which is hostile to the owner's rights. ", 57 The court found that the claimant
had failed to establish all the elements necessary to show a prescriptive
easement, and that under the facts, even if the permissive use was trans-
formed into an adverse use, the ten-year period could not have run by the
time of the trial in 1975. In City of Houston v. Church a city water line broke
under a building and caused flooding and property damage. The city had no
express easement for the pipeline but sought to establish a prescriptive
easement. The court held that the city had failed to establish the elements of
a prescriptive easement, and that operation of the pipeline was a direct and
continuous trespass.
Robinson Water Co. v. Seay5 concerned the establishment of a road by
prescription. A forty-five foot wide private roadway easement extended
across two tracts owned by the defendants, who had placed a chain link
fence across a portion of the easement, and had used that fenced portion as
part of their front yard continuously since 1961. The court held that the
defendants had occupied that portion of the easement inside the chain link
fence openly, peaceably, and notoriously for more than ten years so that the
private roadway easement inside the chain link fence was extinguished
under the ten-year statute of limitations. 59 The court, however, also found
that the public had acquired a prescriptive right in the remainder of the
roadway easement outside the chain link fence which was effective to
53. An implied dedication to the public is established by showing that the road in question
was expressly or impliedly thrown open to the public, the public accepted the dedication by
general and customary use, and the public will lose valuable rights if the road is closed. See
O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960). See generally 2 G. THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 369-374 (repl. ed. 1961).
54. 547 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. 554 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. See, e.g., Steahr v. Clark, 535 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ);
Dailey v. Alarid, 486 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The burden
rests on the party seeking to establish an easement by prescription to prove all of the requisite
elements; failure to prove any element defeats the claim. Wiegand v. Riojas, 547 S.W.2d 287,
289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ); Davis v. Carriker, 536 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The servient owner must have actual or constructive
notice of the adverse claim, and the prescriptive period does not begin to run until the servient
owner has such notice. Wiegand v. Riojas, 547 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977,
no writ); Gooding v. Sulphur Springs Country Club, 422 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1967, writ dism'd). See generally 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 53, §§ 335-350.
57. 547 S.W.2d at 290; see Cleveland v. Hensley, 548 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977, no writ), discussed at notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
58. 545 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
59. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art 5510 (Vernon 1958). A private easement may be lost by




extinguish that portion of the private easement and establish a public road-
way. Additionally, the court held that the public roadway by prescription
should not be limited to the beaten path, but should be extended to include
sufficient land for drainage ditches, repairs, and the convenience of the
traveling public. 6°
The case of Garza v. Garza6' provides a virtual guidebook to the theories
of implied dedication. In that case the landowner had previously requested
the county to lane and fence part of a private road on his land, which the
county agreed to do. Later, the landowner asked the county to close the
road, but the county declined. The road was maintained with county funds
continuously for twenty-five years, used by county school buses, and gener-
ally was openly, visibly, and continuously used and recognized by the public
for over twenty-five years. The court held that the road was a public road by
reason of an implied dedication, 62 noting that the act of throwing open
property to public use, without any particular formality, is sufficient to
establish a dedication to the public; if individuals in consequence of such a
dedication acquire an interest in having the property remain open to the
public, the owner cannot resume his possession.6
3
One common situation where an implied dedication could be established,'
which could also give rise to an easement by estoppel, was exemplified in
Barron v. Phillips,65 which stated the general rule that when a purchaser
buys a lot with reference to a map or plat showing an abutting street or
roadway, the purchaser acquires a private easement in such street regardless
of whether the street has ever been opened or dedicated to the public. 66 By
virtue of such private easement, the purchaser has the right to keep the
street open and to make reasonable use of it.
In MGJ Corp. v. City of Houston67 the city attempted to establish an
easement under several theories. A theatre owner held an easement over an
adjacent parking lot under a deed from the grantor who had conveyed
another lot adjacent to such parking lot to a third party, who in turn had
conveyed the lot to the city. No easement in the parking lot, however, was
granted in the chain of conveyances to the city. The court held that the city
had acquired no easement for use of the parking lot under the deed to the
theatre owner, and, because the city was a stranger to the transaction
between the original grantor and the theatre owner, the city could not claim
60. See Nonken v. Bexar County, 221 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1949, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 552 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
62. See O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960); Dunn v. Deussen, 268
S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The theory of implied
dedication is based on the notion that the owner consented to the use of his land as a public
road. See Mallett v. Houston Contracting Co., 388 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503, 251 S.W.2d 957 (1952). See Heath & Bentley (1977),
supra note 2, at 32.
64. See Inman v. Padrezas, 540 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ).
65. 544 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
66. Dykes v. City of Houston, 406 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1966); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch,
Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1962); Doss v. Blackstock, 466 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 30 (3d ed. 1965).
67. 544 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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an easement by estoppel. 68 Finally, the city was unable to prove an implied
easement appurtenant since the original grantor, who had conveyed the
easement to the theatre owner, had retained title to the tract ultimately
conveyed to the city. An implied easement appurtenant requires that there
be a dominant and a servient estate in tracts of land owned separately by two
or more individuals.69
2. Express Easements.
A recurring theme in litigation involving express easements is the scope
and extent of rights granted in an express easement. In Reeves v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co. 70 a pipeline easement granted the company a right of way
"to lay, maintain, alter, repair, operate and remove pipe lines .... "71 The
company was engaged in replacing the original pipeline and laying a new line
approximately ten feet from the old line, when the landowners blocked the
company's access to the easement. The company sued and successfully
enjoined the landowners from interfering with the construction of the
pipeline. On appeal, the court held that by using the word "lines," the
easement contemplated more than one line, and thus the trial court had not
abused its discretion by issuing a temporary injunction. 72 In Phillips Pipe
Line Co. v. Clear Creek Properties, Inc. 73 the court held that a twenty-foot
pipeline easement which gave the defendant the right to "lay, construct,
reconstruct, replace, renew, maintain, repair, change the size of, and re-
move pipes and pipe lines . . . " and also granted "rights of ingress and
egress to and from" the pipelines, 74 did not authorize the defendant to clear
vegetation or otherwise use land outside the twenty-foot strip, except for
ingress and egress.7 5
Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Authority7 6 reaffirms the rule that an
express easement must contain a legally sufficient description of the ease-
ment." Here the description merely stated that the easement covered "1 11.0
acres, more or less, out of a 250.5 acre tract .... ," and then went on to
68. The court cited Cone v. Cone, 266 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953), writ
dism 'd per curiam, 153 Tex. 149, 266 S.W.2d 860 (1954).
69. See Fleming v. Adams, 392 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
70. 553 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
71. Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 21.
73. 553 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 391.
75. Id. at 392. Additionally the pipeline company claimed that it had the power of eminent
domain to condemn land for "temporary working space" under TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art.
2.01(B)(3)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) and TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6022 (Vernon 1962). The
court rejected this contention and held that neither statute authorized the condemnation of land
for "temporary working space." 553 S.W.2d at 392-93.
76. 545 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
77. There must be a description sufficient to enable a surveyor to locate the easement.
Compton v. Texas S.E. Gas Co., 315 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). It has long been established, however, that certain unlocated easements are valid. See
Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 81 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd). The
property, of course, must be sufficiently described; when the facility is installed, the easement
is located and becomes limited in scope. Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662
(Tex. 1964). The rationale for permitting unlocated easements is that the right to select a
location for the facility makes unnecessary the determination of location of the easement. See
Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 81 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd).
78. 545 S.W.2d at 54.
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more fully describe the 250.5 acre tract by reference to other instruments.
The court held that the easement was void for lack of a sufficient descrip-
tion.
Saunders v. Alamo Soil Conservation District79 involved a suit to set aside
a contract for an easement over the plaintiffs' land because of fraud. The
court held that fraud does not render an agreement void, but merely voidable
at the instance of the defrauded party.80 Since the suit was not filed until
more than eight years after the fraud should have been discovered, the suit
was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. 8 The plaintiffs also
contended that the easement had terminated automatically because of the
defendant's failure to commence construction of certain improvements
within five years as required by the contract, and that, accordingly, the
defendant was trespassing on the plaintiffs' land. The court stated that in
order for the failure of the condition to bring about an automatic termination
of the easement without any action by the plaintiffs, the clause must be
construed to have created a special limitation on the interest created. The
court, however, held that since the instrument imposed an obligation on the
grantee to see that the stated condition did not occur, the clause was a
condition subsequent and not a special limitation. 82 In order to terminate the
easement, the grantor must reenter or take some equivalent action. 83 The
plaintiffs failed to do this, and, thus, the easement continued and the
defendant's actions could not be a trespass.1
The rededication of a street was the subject of Waterbury v. City of
Katy.8 '5 The original plat of the subdivision showed the street in question,
but it had never been constructed or used by the public, and the plat had
been cancelled by the Harris county commissioners in 1912. The plaintiff
landowner brought suit seeking a temporary injunction enjoining the city
from constructing or using the street across the plaintiff's property. The city
argued that the 1969 deed to the plaintiff, describing the plaintiff's property
by reference to the cancelled recorded plat, constituted a rededication of the
street as shown on the plat.8 The court stated that a reference to a plat for
the purpose of describing the property conveyed does not constitute a
79. 545 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. Id. at 251.
81. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958). See McMullen Oil & Royalty Co.
v. Lyssy, 353 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1%2, no writ).
82. 545 S.W.2d at 252. For a general discussion of the distinction between conditional
limitations and conditions subsequent, see Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 34. In cases
of doubt a construction giving rise to a condition subsequent will be favored as less burdensome
on the grantee than a conditional limitation. Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d
887 (Tex. 1962).
83. See Zambrano v. Olivas, 490 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). The court in Saunders specifically disapproved of the statement in Guinn v. Clay, 324
S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), that a breach of a condition
subsequent reinvests the grantor with full title.
84. 545 S.W.2d at 253.
85. 541 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
86. The city cited Adams v. Rowles, 149 Tex. 52, 228 S.W.2d 849 (1950); City of Corsicana
v. Zorn, 97 Tex. 317, 78 S.W 924 (1904). The plaintiff argued that these cases were not in point
because there was no privit, between the parties. The plaintiff also argued that the reference in
the deed to the original plat was solely for descriptive purposes and not intended to rededicate
the street. 541 S.W.2d at 655.
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rededication unless it was so intended. 7 The court held, however, that the
reference in the deed to the original plat constituted some evidence of intent
to rededicate the street, and thus the trial court's implied finding of rededi-
cation was supported by sufficient evidence so that the denial of a tempo-
rary injunction was held not to be an abuse of discretion.
3. Subsidence and Water Rights.
In Port Acres Sportsman's Club v. Mann8 a portion of the plaintiff's
property, submerged with shallow waters from a navigable stream,89 had
been used by the defendants for fishing. The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin
the defendants from fishing those waters. The court held that, although the
plaintiff retained title to the submerged lands, 90 the plaintiff could not block
the public's access to free use of the waters from a navigable stream. 91
Langford v. Kraft' concerned the measure of damages for the wrongful
diversion of surface water onto the lands of another, temporarily damaging
the land, and the liability of the engineer who drew the plans for the
development. The court held that the proper measure of damages was the
cost of restoration plus compensation for loss of use,93 and considered the
circumstances under which liability for such damages would attach. The
court stated that if there was an unintentional but substantial invasion of
another's land because of interference with the flow of surface water,
liability would depend on whether the conduct was negligent, reckless, or
ultrahazardous. 94 On the other hand, if the invasion was intentional, liability
would turn on whether the invasion was unreasonable. 95 The court decided
that a professional engineer engaged in the planning of the venture for a fee
could be held liable under these rules for diversion of water caused by the
implementation of his plans.%
The first case in Texas regarding liability of a landowner for damages for
subsidence of another's lands caused by the withdrawal of underground
waters was reported during the survey period. In Smith-Southwest Indus-
tries v. Friendswood Development Co. 9 the controversy centered around the
87. See McCarver v. City of Corpus Christi, 155 Tex. 153, 156, 284 S.W.2d 142, 142-43(1955).
88. 541 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
89. The jury found that the bayou flowing through the property was a navigable stream
within the meaning of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (Vernon 1962).
90. See Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. York, 532 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1976), discussed in
Heath &.Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 31, and noted in 30 Sw. L.J. 943 (1976). See also
Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935). See generally Davis,
Subsidence: Settling Down Within the Laws of Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Submerg-
ence, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 319 (1976).
91. The plaintiffs also contended that the Relinquishment Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5414a (Vernon 1962), confirmed in the plaintiffs not only title to the land, but also the
exclusive right to fish the waters on the land. The court, however, held that even if art. 5414a
had confirmed plaintiff's title, it had not granted the plaintiffs such fishing rights. 541 S.W.2d at
850.
92. 551 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
93. Bradley v. McIntyre, 373 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
94. City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. 1968).
95. Id.
96. The court applied the doctrine of strict liability in tort to the engineer. 551 S.W.2d at
396-97.
97. 546 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, writ granted).
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rights of a landowner to extract and use percolating waters beneath his
land." Under the so-called "American" rule a landowner is restricted to a
reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable use of his property,
with due regard for the rights of others. 99 Under the "common law" or
"English" rule, however, the landowner's rights are absolute and he may
withdraw ground water to any extent.100 The court of civil appeals ruled that
although Texas follows the English rule of absolute ownership, l0 this rule
does not sanction negligent conduct by a landowner or the maintenance of a
nuisance in fact 10 2 in the withdrawal and use of ground water. 103 The court
stated:
Because of a landowner's absolute right to take all of the water which
he can produce from his land, the fact that this taking causes the land of
others to subside will not, standing alone, give them a cause of action.
But if the landowner is negligent in the manner by which he produces
the water, and the negligence is a proximate cause of the subsidence of
another's land, the fact that he owns the water produced will not
insulate him from the consequences of his negligent conduct.'°4
Accordingly, the court of civil appeals held that the plaintiffs had stated a
cause of action under the theories of negligence and nuisance in fact, and
remanded the case for trial on these issues. The Texas Supreme Court has
granted writ of error in this case.10 5
City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces County Water Control & Improvement
District No. 310 involved a suit for declaratory judgment for construction of
the various water rights of the parties. The facts are extremely complex and
raise a multitude of issues regarding the extent of the appropriative rights' °7
of the various parties under certain permits and certified filings issued under
the Burgess-Glasscock Act of 1913.11 In addition to rights under the various
permits and filings the city of Corpus Christi claimed that certain water
rights had been acquired by prescription. A prescriptive right to the use of
water may be acquired only through continuous, adverse, and hostile use of
the water, or use of an open and notorious character. Such use must
continue without interruption for the entire prescriptive period,"°9 and the
owner whose rights are involved"0 must receive actual or constructive
98. As a general rule a landowner owns all ordinarysprings and waters arising on his land as
well as the water beneath the surface. Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2 at 31. This
rule, however, does not apply to subterranean streams or the underflow of rivers. TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 52.001(3) (Vernon 1972).
99. The court cited 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 158, at 607 (1975).
100. Acton v. Blundell, 12 Meeson & Welsby 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843). See also
Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968).
101. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801
(1955).
102. See Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (1950).
103. 546 S.W.2d at 897.
104. Id.
105. 20 TEx. SuP. CT. J. 413 (July 9, 1977).
106. 540 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
107. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.025 (Vernon 1972).
108. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 171, § 1, at 358.
109. A three-year limitation period is applicable to the acquisition of permanent water rights
under TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.029 (Vernon 1972). The period for an adverse user is ten
years after the cause of action accrues. Martin v. Burr, I I 1 Tex. 57, 228 S.W. 543 (1921).
110. See Stratton v. West, 201 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, no writ). One
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notice. Additionally, there must be such an invasion of another's water
rights as to give rise to a cause of action.' This prescriptive right involves
hostility to the rights of the lawful owner and results in injury and detriment
to the owner whose right is prescribed. 12 The court stated that there was no
evidence of such hostility by the city resulting in injury to the other party.
The court also held that prescription does not run upstream, and, since the
city's diversion point was downstream from that of the other party, a
prescriptive right could not exist. 3
C. Effect of Conveyances
The meaning of the term "other minerals""' 4 which often appears in
mineral reservations in deeds was the subject of judicial construction during
the survey period. The Austin court of civil appeals in DuBois v. Jacobs"5
followed the 1971 Texas Supreme Court decision of Acker v. Guinn 116 and
held that when a deed reserves "oil, gas and other minerals," no interest will
be reserved "in substances that must be produced in such manner as to
destroy, deplete, consume, or substantially impair the surface."" 7 In Reed
v. Wylie"18 the Texas Supreme Court clarified and expanded the rule of
Acker v. Guinn, holding that the surface owner would be entitled to the coal
and lignite on or under the land only if he could prove that, as of the date of
the instrument in question, the only commercially feasible method of pro-
ducing the substance at or near the surface depths would have consumed or
depleted the surface estate. Chief Justice Greenhill concurred in the result in
Reed v. Wylie, but stated that a better rule would have been that a substance
is not a mineral if any reasonable method of production would destroy or
deplete the surface estate. " 9 Justice Daniels dissented, stating that he would
hold that substances such as sand, gravel, limestone, iron ore, and near-
surface lignite are not minerals because they form so much a part of the soil
that they are a part of the surface. 20
The effective date of a deed was the issue in Rogers v. Gunn.'21 The deed
was executed and dated when the grantee was single, but was not acknowl-
edged by the grantor and her husband until after the marriage of the grantee.
The court held that, when a deed has one date and the acknowledgment a
who asserts a water right by virtue of adverse use must prove satisfactorily and unequivocally
the elements that constitute adverse use. 60 TEX. JUR. 2d Waters § 123 (1964).
111. See Houston Transp. Co. v. San Jacinto Rice Co., 163 S.W. 1023 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1914, no writ).
112. Toyaho Creek Irrigation Co. v. Hutchins, 52 S.W. 101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ ref'd).
113. 540 S.W.2d at 376. See Mud Creek Irrigation, Agriculture & Mfg. Co. v. Vivian, 74
Tex. 170, 11 S.W. 1078 (1889). In a related issue the court held that the city had failed to show
an abandonment of the water rights. The court noted that an essential element of abandonment
is the intention to abandon. 540 S.W.2d at 376. See Lower Nueces River Water Supply Dist. v.
Cartwright, 274 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. See generally Comment, Is Coal Included in a Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas or
Other Minerals "?, 30 Sw. L.J. 481 (1976).
115. 551 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
116. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
117. 551 S.W.2d at 150.
118. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977). See Maroney, Oil& Gas Interests, 28 Sw. LEGAL FOUNDA-
TION 77 (1977).
119. 554 S.W.2d at 174.
120. Id. at 182.
121. 545 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
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different date, the deed is presumed to have been delivered on the date of its
execution,'22 in the absence of actual proof showing a different date of
delivery. The plaintiffs also argued that under article 1299,123 now repealed
but in effect at the time of the conveyance, the deed was not effective until
acknowledged by the married grantor. The court rejected this argument,
holding that when the privy acknowledgement was made the title related
back to the date of execution and delivery of the deed. 1
24
In Pebsworth v. Behringer 25 the court restated the rule that a deed to land
abutting a railroad right-of-way is construed as intending to convey title to
the center line of the right-of-way, unless a contrary intention is expressed
in the instrument. 126 Reformation of a deed will not be granted when the
rights of a bona fide purchaser would be disturbed. 127 Additionally, as
exemplified by Walters v. Pete,128 the burden of proof is on the party
attacking the legal title, and asserting a superior equity because of a mistake
in a prior deed, to show that the holder of legal title is not a bona fide
purchaser. 2 9 The four-year statute of limitations 30 is also applicable to
actions for reformation of deeds. 13' The statute does not run against a
purchaser in actual possession; he may have a mistaken description reform-
ed to conform to the original intent of the parties. 32 Where a party is
dispossessed of the property, however, the period of limitations commences
to run, and the failure to file suit within four years bars a claim for ref orma-
tion. 133
Olivas v. Zambrano 3 4 concerned the termination of a fee simple estate on
condition subsequent 35 relating to the furnishing of water and the operation
and maintenance of a water works system for a period of three years. The
grantor had taken a deed to the property back from the grantee prior to the
expiration of the three-year period of the grant because of a failure of the
condition subsequent. The remaindermen later brought suit for title and
possession, arguing that there had never been a reentry by the grantor. The
court rejected this contention and held that when the grantor took the deed
122. See Bell v. Smith, 532 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ); Heath
& Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 35. See also Popplewell v. City of Mission, 342 S.W.2d 52
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd N.R.E.). See generally 8 G. THOMPSON, supra
note 53, § 4239 (repl. ed. 1963).
123. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1299 (1962) (repealed 1963). This statute provided in part
that no conveyance by a married woman "shall take effect until . . .acknowledged by her
privily and apart from her husband... i
124. See Halbert v. Hendrix, 26 S.W. 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref'd). See also Fuqua
v. Fuqua, 528 S.W.2d 8% (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Heath
& Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 36.
125. 551 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
126. See Angelo v. Biscamp, 441 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1969); State v. Fuller, 407 S.W.2d 215
(Tex. 1966).
127. Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959).
128. 546 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959).
130. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
131. See Mathis v. Stockdick, 189 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1945, writ ref'd).
132. See Gage v. Owen, 435 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
133. 546 S.W.2d at 875.
134. 543 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso 1976, no writ).
135. See generally Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 34.
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back from the grantee, there was a merger of two estates which destroyed
the contingent remainder. 3 6
The doctrine of resulting trust 3 ' was again the subject of litigation during
the survey period. 3 8 In Hernandez v. Simbeck 39 a father brought an action
against his daughter to impress a resulting trust on a certain lot which he had
purchased in her name at a sheriff's sale, ostensibly for the purpose of
keeping the property out of his community estate and to avoid estate and
inheritance taxes upon his death. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that the father had made a-gift of the lot of his daughter, and
thus there could be no resulting trust. 40
A constructive trust usually arises out of fraud or overreaching, Such a
trust may be impressed on property in order to hold the owner accountable
as trustee, thus preventing him from personally retaining an advantage
gained through a fiduciary relationship, and preventing unjust enrichment.' 4'
Douglas v. Neill 42 involved two long-standing friends who had decided to
purchase jointly a tract of land. At what Douglas believed to be the closing
of this transaction, and without reading or otherwise examining the instru-
ment, Douglas signed and acknowledged what he later discovered was a
general warranty deed by which he had conveyed a tract of land he owned to
Neill. When Douglas later discovered what had occurred, he brought suit
seeking cancellation of the deed and the imposition of a constructive trust.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and entered a take
nothing judgment. The court of civil appeals, however, reversed and re-
manded, holding that there were fact questions for the jury concerning
whether the relationship between Douglas and Neill was that of joint ventur-
ers, thereby creating a confidential relationship. 43 Additionally, the court
held that since Douglas had alleged that he had received no consideration for
the deed, an offer to restore the benefits received was not a prerequisite to a
suit for cancellation of the deed.'" This result should be contrasted with the
136. 543 S.W.2d at 182. Although merger cannot destroy a vested remainder, the court
found that, since the deed-back occurred before the three years had passed and before the
obligation had been completed, no estate had vested in the remaindermen. Id.
137. A resulting trust may arise when a party purchases land, but takes title in the name of
another, and in other limited circumstances. See Sheldon Petroleum Co. v. Peirce, 546 S.W.2d
954 (Tex., Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). See generally Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2,
at 36.
138. During the previous survey period this doctrine was the focal point of Bell v. Smith, 532
S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ). See the discussion of Bell in Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 36-37.
139. 553 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
140. Id. at 15.
141. See generally Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, no
writ). For a thorough discussion of the distinctions between a constructive trust and a resulting
trust, see Sheldon Petroleum Co. v. Peirce, 546 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ).
142. 545 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. See Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557 (1962); Mills v. Gray, 147 Tex.
33, 210 S.W.2d 985 (1948).
144. 545 S.W.2d at 907. The court also held that there was a jury question as to whether Neill
had abused the confidential relationship of a joint venture" with such artifice and concealment
to toll the statute of limitations which would have otherwise run. The court noted, however,
that the existence of a confidential relationship does not free a defrauded person from exercis-
ing diligence to discover fraud. Reasonable diligence is ordinarily a question of fact for a jury.
See Brownson v: New, 259 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1953, writ dism'd).
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general rule, stated in Finch v. McVea, 45 that a party will not be permitted
both to repudiate an instrument because of fraud and also to retain the
benefits received under such instrument. 46 In Glasscock v. Citizens Nation-
al Bank'47 the court held that section 24.02(a) of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code,'148 regarding fraudulent conveyances, clearly provided two
distinct grounds of recovery. Consequently, a jury finding that a convey-
ance had been made with intent to hinder or delay the creditor was not in
conflict with another finding that the conveyance had been made with intent
to defraud the creditor.
D. Title Insurance
There were three important decisions in the area of title insurance during
the survey period; each concerned the measure of liability of the title
insurer. The disposition by the Texas Supreme Court in Stone v. Lawyers
Title Insurance Corp. '9 left unanswered many of the questions raised in the
court of civil appeals' decision'5" which was discussed in the 1977 Property
Survey Article.15' In that case the purchaser of a tract of land sued the title
insurer, the title insurance agency, its president, and the real estate broker,
but not the grantor, to recover damages resulting from certain gas pipeline
easements which, although listed as exceptions in the title report prepared
for the title insurance agency, were not listed in the owner policy issued by
Lawyer's Title. The supreme court agreed with the court of civil appeals
that the insured was entitled to recover a portion of the whole liability based
on the ratio of the value of the adverse claim to the value of the entire estate
without regard to such title exceptions."I The purchaser, however, also
claimed that the title insurance agency and its president were negligent and
had committed fraud in failing to inform the purchaser of the contents of the
title report. The court of civil appeals had affirmed a take nothing judgment
on these issues, holding that there was no duty on the part of the agency or
its president to disclose title defects to the purchaser, that there was no
evidence supported by the pleadings that the status of title of the property
had been misrepresented, and that no cause of action had been stated. The
Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded on these points. The court
stated that there was some evidence of misrepresentation, and that a cause
of action had been alleged against the agency and its president for fraud in
145. 543 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. The court stated that the primary purpose of a suit to cancel an instrument obtained byfraud is to "undo" the fraud and place the parties in their original positions. Id. at 452. The
court cited Howard v. Burkholder, 281 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1955, writ
dism'd). Therefore, if relief is to be granted, any benefits received must be restored in order to
return the parties to their original positions. See Freyer v. Michels, 360 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ dism'd); Arnold v. Wheeler, 304 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1957, writ-ref'd n.r.e.).
147. 553 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14 ,. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02(a) (Vernon 1968).
149. 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977).
150. 537 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976).
151. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 37-39.
152. For example, if the amount of the policy equals the value of the estate insured, the loss
recoverable is simply the value of the outstanding interest. See Southern Title Guar. Co. v.
Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1973).
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knowingly and recklessly misrepresenting that the property was free of
pipeline easements. In so holding, the Texas Supreme Court did not
comment on the statement of the court of civil appeals that the title insur-
ance agency had no duty to disclose the known title defects."'
A case which clarifies the method for determining the value of outstand-
ing interests and the extent of the liability of the title insurer, in addition to
presenting some other interesting issues, is Southwest Title Insurance Co. v.
Plemons. 154 The insureds purchased certain property in Hunt County, Tex-
as, and obtained an owner policy from Southwest Title. Shortly thereafter
the insureds entered into a contract of sale with a third party; the sale,
however, was never closed because of the disclosure of the existence of two
drainage easements. These easements were not listed as exceptions in the
owner policy. The insureds brought suit against the title insurance company
and recovered a judgment for $77,440 based on the formula set forth in
Southern Title Guaranty Co. v. Prendergastt" and reiterated in Stone v.
Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. 1 56 The title insurance company, however,
argued that, in applying the formula, the value of the outstanding easements
should be determined apart from the rest of the property. The court disag-
reed and held that the value is the difference between the market value of
the property without the easements and market value with the easements.' 57
The standard owner policy used in Texas provides that title defects known
to the insured at the date of the policy are exceptions to the coverage. The
title insurance company argued that the insureds knew or should have
known of the outstanding drainage easements. Both the deed to the insureds
and the title report, however, failed to mention the easements, and there was
testimony that the easements were not visibly apparent on the surface of the
property.'58 Accordingly, the court rejected this contention of the title
insurer and held that there was no evidence of either actual or constructive
notice. Another issue concerned the recovery of attorney's fees. The stan-
dard owner policy literally permits recovery of attorney's fees only in
actions against third parties in which the insurer is obligated to defend. The
Texas Supreme Court, however, has held that, despite the actual wording of
the owner policy, an insured is entitled to attorneys' fees in a suit against the
insurer for failure to cure defects. 59 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
trial court's award of $25,000.00 in attorney's fees. Finally, the court mod-
ified the award of damages since one of the original insureds had conveyed
one-half of his interest to another party. The standard owner policy provides
153. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of civil appeals on all other
points. This included the holding that, as to the real estate agent, the case should be remanded
for a jury determination of whether he recklessly represented to the purchaser that no pipeline
easements existed and whether any such representation was made with the intent that the
purchaser rely thereon.
154. 554 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
155. 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973).
156. See notes 149-53 supra and accompanying text.
157. The court stated that this measure prevailed over the mere valuation of the easements
because channel or drainage easements are not susceptible to market valuation. 554 S.W.2d at
736.
158. Easements must be open and visible to an observing purchaser in order to place him on
notice. Shaver v. National Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1962).
159. Id. at 871.
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that on the sale of the insured's interest the policy converts to a warrantor's
policy. Since no claim was made on a warrantor's policy, the amount of the
owner policy coverage was reduced by the value of the interest conveyed.
In Southwest Title Insurance Co. v. Northland Building Corp. 160 the Texas
Supreme Court considered the liability of a title insurer under a mortgagee
policy because of additional indebtedness secured by a prior lien under a
"dragnet" or "other indebtedness" clause in a prior deed of trust. The facts
indicated that Northland had made a loan to a third party which was secured
by a junior lien on certain real property. Among the conditions to the closing
of the loan was the requirement that the borrower furnish "estoppel" letters
from the holders of indebtedness secured by prior liens, specifying the
current balances of such indebtedness. At the closing the borrower de-
livered two estoppel letters which later proved to be forgeries. When the
borrower later defaulted, Northland learned that the estoppel letters had
been forged, and that as a consequence of the dragnet clause the outstanding
indebtedness secured by a prior deed of trust lien was considerably more
than the amounts stated in the forged estoppel letters. Northland brought
suit claiming that the title insurance company and the attorney who had
closed the loan were liable for dispensing the loan funds in violation of the
condition that valid estoppel letters be furnished. Northland also claimed
that the title insurance company was liable for failure to disclose the exist-
ence of the dragnet clause in the prior deed of trust, and, additionally, under
the mortgagee policy on the theory that the policy insured against the
existence of any prior secured indebtedness other than the listed exceptions.
The court of civil appeals held that Southwest Title was liable to North-
land for releasing the loan funds without obtaining valid estoppel letters.161
The Texas Supreme Court, however, disagreed and stated that, even if the
loan conditions had required the closer or his principal to guarantee the
estoppel letters, there was no evidence of actual or apparent authority on the
part of the closer to "conduct and accept responsibility for" the satisfaction
of the conditions of the closing. 162 The court of civil appeals had stated that
"the title policy should have revealed the existence of 'dragnet' clauses" in
the prior liens. 163 This statement raised considerable concern regarding the
role of title insurance and title companies with respect to disclosure of the
legal effect of all the detailed provisions of a prior deed of trust. The
supreme court clarified this issue. Under the approach taken by the supreme
court, the issue was not whether there was a duty to disclose, but rather
what was excepted from coverage under the mortgagee policy. Southwest
Title argued that all the provisions of prior deeds of trust, including any
dragnet clauses, were excepted from coverage by the reference to them in
the mortgagee policy. The supreme court stated that, although exceptions
from coverage may be provided by reference to instruments without setting
forth the contents of those instruments, such was not the case here. The
160. 552 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1977).
161. Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Northland Bldg. Corp., 542 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1976).
162. 552 S.W.2d at 428.
163. 542 S.W.2d at 455.
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court examined the language of the exceptions in the policy and concluded
that there was no statement that the coverage was subject to the deeds of
trust, rather the exceptions only specified the indebtedness (i.e., certain
notes) secured by liens. Since the exceptions were limited to liens securing
the listed indebtedness, the court held that there was no exception with
regard to additional unlisted indebtedness which may also have been se-
cured by those liens. Accordingly, the court held that Northland had proved
a defect in its lien against which Southwest Title had insured.
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court considered the damages recoverable
under the mortgagee policy. Southwest Title was bound under the policy to
reimburse Northland for any loss suffered due to an impairment of its
security not listed as an exception in the policy. The court stated that
Northland could have brought suit "for the difference in the market value of
the insured equity less the market value of the actual equity,"' 64 but that
Northland was not limited to that measure of damages. The insured may
always recover the actual loss. In no event, however, is the insured entitled
to recover in excess of its unpaid indebtedness, or the market value of the
equity insured, or the policy amount; and, as the court noted, payment of
the note was not insured. The supreme court then held that the damages
awarded Northland were erroneous because the judgment exceeded the
policy amount and because Northland had failed to prove a loss due to the
undisclosed indebtedness. Accordingly, the claim by Northland on the mort-
gagee policy was severed and remanded for trial.
In the 1977 Property Article it was reported that the State Board of
Insurance considered, but did not adopt, a rule change which would have
prohibited the deletion of the standard printed exception for "discrepancies,
conflicts, or shortages in area or boundary lines, or any encroachments or
any overlapping of improvements" from all future owner and mortgagee
title policies issued in Texas. 165 During this survey period the board did
adopt amendments to the rules which now provide that this exception may
be deleted except with respect to "shortages in area."'" Additionally, the
board is considering proposed Rate Rule R-18 which would provide that
when a mortgagee policy has been issued insuring the lien of a construction
loan which is to be "taken up" by a new loan, the premium for issuance of a
mortgagee policy on the new loan shall be at the basic rate, plus the
minimum premium rate, less the premium paid for the policy on the
construction loan; provided that the charge for the new policy shall in no
event be less than the regular minimum premium rate.
164. 552 S.W.2d at 430. The court stated that this measure determined the effect upon the
market value of the security due to the undisclosed lien or indebtedness.
165. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 39-40. This exception appeared as item 2
in schedule B of both policies. The mortgagee policy, however, added to the quoted language of
the qualification "which a correct survey would show." Until recently this exception could be
deleted in its entirety upon a complete on-the-ground survey by a surveyor acceptable to the
title company and, in the case of an owner policy only, the payment of an additional premium in
an amount equivalent to fifteen percent of the basic rate, with a minimum premium of $20.00.
See Procedural Rule P-2 and Rate Rule R-16, BASIC MANUAL OF RULES, RATES AND FORMS FOR
THE WRITING OF TITLE INSURANCE IN THE STATE OF TEXAS. The Basic Manual is available from
Hart Graphics, P.O. Box 768, Austin, Texas 78767.
166. Procedural Rule P-2. See generally Ring, Title Insurance for the Owner-Or What You
See Is Not Necessarily What You Get! 52 L.A.B.J., July 1976, at 20.
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E. Miscellaneous Title Cases
1. Covenants Running with the Land; Equitable Servitudes.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, as modified, the judgment of the
court of civil appeals167 in Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake
Utilities Co. ,'68 a case discussed in the 1977 Property Article.169 A contract
between the utility company (Utilities) and the predecessor in title of Clear
Lake Apartments (Apartments) granted Utilities "the exclusive right to
furnish water and sewer service" to a certain tract of land and the apartment
project thereon. When Apartments purchased the project, however, it in-
formed Utilities that the contract was being terminated. Utilities then
brought suit for declaratory judgment, contending that its contract rights
constituted a covenant running with the land and thereby bound Apartments
to perform pursuant to the contract. The court of civil appeals rejected this
contention, finding the necessary privity of estate lacking, 17 and the Texas
Supreme Court agreed. 171 Utilities also argued that the contract should be
enforced in equity because the contract was on record at the time of the
conveyance to Apartments, thereby providing at least constructive notice of
the provisions of the contract. 172 The supreme court noted that an equitable
servitude may exist only with regard to promises which affect the use of the
land. 173 The court held that the exclusive service provision in the contract
between Utilities and the predecessor in title of Apartments was not such a
restriction on land use, but rather was a mere limitation on the right of
contract of Apartment's predecessor in title. Such a limitation only collater-
ally affected the use of land and would not give rise to an equitable servitude
or be a convenant running with the land. Accordingly, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the holding of the court of civil appeals that Apartments was
not bound by the exclusive service provision in the contract. 174
2. Slander of Title.
To recover in an action for slander of title to real property, the plaintiff
must allege and prove: (1) the plaintiff possessed an estate or interest in the
167. 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976).
168. 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977).
169. Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 40-41.
170. 537 S.W.2d at 51.
171. 549 S.W.2d at 388.
172. Id. Utilities attempted to invoke the doctrine of equitable servitude under which alandowner's promise binds a subsequent purchaser or possessor who acquires the land with
notice of the promise. See generally Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Equitable
Servitudes, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 194 (1949).
173. 549 S.W.2d at 388. See Montgomery v. Creager, 22 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1929, no writ).
174. With regard to the other issues in the case, the Texas Supreme Court held that, although
under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, §I (Vernon 1971), joinder of persons "who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration" is mandatory, noncompliance with § I 1 is not a jurisdictional defect. 549S.W.2d at 389. The court also considered a separate, exclusive service contract between
Utilities and Clear Lake Water Authority, and held that since Authority was a conservation and
reclamation district under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8280-280 (Vernon 1965), as au-
thorized by TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59, the Authority could not bind itself in such a way as to
restrict the free exercise of its governmental powers. Since the contract stated no termination
date, it was terminable at the will of either party. See Kennedy v. McMullen, 39 S.W.2d 168(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd).
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property; (2) the defendant uttered and published slanderous words about
the plaintiff's title which were false and malicious; and (3) the plaintiff
sustained special damages.175 In Louis v. Blalock 176 the court held that since
the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant publicly uttered a claim of a
prescriptive easement, except by pleading in a prior case, the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover for slander of title.' 77 Additionally, the plaintiff
alleged that the prior suit, which was terminated in the plaintiff's favor, was
maliciously instituted without probable cause. The court held that an action
for malicious prosecution will not lie unless the plaintiff can show that he
suffered some interference with his property by reason of the prior suit. 178
Since no interference was shown, the court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment n.o.v. on this point.
II. PURCHASES AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS
A. Contract Validity and Interpretation
1. Execution, Delivery, and Enforceability.
In Sabine Investment Co. v. Stratton the seller's main defense to a suit
for specific performance of a contract of sale was that the salesman had no
authority to sign the contract on its behalf. The seller was a corporation in
the business of selling residential lots and had employed the salesman for
that purpose. The seller relied upon article 5.08 of the Texas Business
Corporation Act which provides in part that "any corporation may convey
land by deed . . . signed by the president or a vice-president or attorney in
fact of the corporation when authorized by appropriate resolution of the
board of directors or shareholders."' 80 The court held that article 5.08 was
inapplicable if the corporation was in the business of buying and selling land
and the salesman was employed not only for that purpose but also had the
implied authority to sign contracts of sale.' 8' The court also found support in
Donnell v. Currie & Dohoney 82 for the principle that authority to convey
title is not essential for an agent to make an executory contract to convey
land binding upon his principal. Nevertheless, the contract was not specific-
ally enforced because the description of the land was insufficient and the
contract was incomplete. Specific performance of a contract was also de-
nied in Agnew v. Brawner 183 on the basis that the purchaser failed to prove
that the contract had been delivered. The court applied the same standard
for delivery of a contract to convey real property that applies to other
contracts and to deeds;'8 that is, there must be a delivery with the intent and
175. See Walker v. Ruggles, 540 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no
writ); Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 41-42.
176. 543 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. The court noted that a claim asserted in the course of a judicial proceeding could not be
the basis of a civil action for slander of title. Id. at 718.
178. Id. at 719. The court noted that an unsuccessful attempt to have an injunction issued
would not constitute an actionable interference with property. Id.
179. 549 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
180. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.08 (Vernon 1956).
181. 549 S.W.2d at 248-49.
182. 131 S.W. 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1910, writ ref'd).
183. 553 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
184. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 35. On delivery, see generally I S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 210-212 (3d ed. 1957).
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purpose on the part of the seller to relinquish dominion and control over the
contract.
In Bradley v. Bradley8 5 the court held that an oral agreement involving
the acquisition of an interest in real property was not required to be in
writing under the Statute of Frauds186 because (1) the statute does not apply
to an agreement between two or more parties to acquire realty from a third
party, 187 and (2) the consideration had been paid, the vendee had taken
possession, and valuable and permanent improvements had been made on
the property.'88 Other decisions involving the enforceability and interpreta-
tion of contracts to convey real property are discussed in this Article under
the topic Seller's and Purchaser's Remedies.
2. Sufficiency of Description.
An insufficient legal description is probably the most common defense
raised in a suit for specific performance of a contract to convey real
property or for the collection of a real estate commission. The Statute of
Frauds 89 requires that all contracts for the sale of real property be in writing
and signed by the party to be charged. The additional requirement that the
writing furnish the means or data by which the property may be identified
with reasonable certainty has been imposed by the courts. 19 Extrinsic
evidence cannot supply the location or description of the land; it can be used
only for the purpose of identifying the land with reasonable certainty from
the data contained in the writing.' 9 '
An otherwise deficient description may be overcome, or at least supple-
mented, by a recitation in the contract that the land is owned by the seller,
especially if that is the only land owned by the seller in that particular
county, survey, or league. The rule, as stated in Kmiec v. Reagan, 92 is that
"[w]hen the grantor is stated to be the owner of the property to be conveyed
and it is proved that the grantor owns only a single tract answering the
description, the land is identified with reasonable certainty." 93 The seller's
land was described in the contract as a certain quantity located in the
corners of a particular league grant in Robertson County, Texas. The court
185. 540 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
186. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
187. 540 S.W.2d at 510. Texas is in the minority on this point, 72 AM. JUR. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 72 (1974), unless the agreement is in the nature of a partnership or joint venture, 2 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 411 (1950).
188. 540 S.W.2d at 511. See also Harris v. Potts, 545 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. 1976); Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 43.
189. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
190. Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188
S.W.2d 150 (1945). See generally U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1976)
(stressed the importance of reference to a survey, league, or labor); 6 G. THOMPSON, supra note
53, §§ 3020-3086 (repl. ed. 1963); Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 47-48.
191. Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945).
192. 556 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1977), rev'g in part 551 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1977). The court cited Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222 (1949), which held that in
the right circumstances the use of "my property" in a contract "is in itself a matter of
description which leads to the certain identification of the property and brings the description
within the terms of the rule that 'the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to some
other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed may be
identified with reasonable certainty.' " Id. at 210, 223 S.W.2d at 224.
193. 556 S.W.2d at 569.
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said that the only deficiency in this description was the shape of each of the
corner tracts, and held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to cure that
defect and to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, the trial court's
decree of specific performance in favor of the purchaser was affirmed,
except with respect to a small and separate tract that the court held was not
sufficiently described.
Several cases decided during the survey period194 illustrate that a suffi-
cient legal description of the whole tract can be undone by an insufficient
description of a portion that is reserved or excepted by the seller. The lack
of a .beginning point and calls for course and distance in the metes and
bounds description, an inability to locate the four corners of the property,
and an inadequate description of an excepted portion of the tract made the
contract for the sale of realty void in Barham v. Powell. 95 The testimony of
a surveyor that he could locate the land from the description in the contract
was considered extrinsic evidence and therefore could not supply the re-
quired description. 19 In Estate of Eberling v. Fair"9 the entire tract seemed
to have .been adequately described, but the contract left for future determi-
nation an "area sufficient to accommodate the house" which was to be
extracted from the land conveyed. This exception, the court of civil appeals
ruled, made the contract incomplete in its essential terms and could not be
cured by allowing the jury to determine the area for the house. The court
concluded that the contract did not have the required certainty, either as a
matter of contract law'91 or as a matter of sufficiency of the writing to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. 19
Similarly, in Mooney v. Ingram2 0 the court refused to enforce an agree-
ment to share profits from a future sale of land because the portion of land
the owner intended to except from the sale was not sufficiently described.
The owner sold the property without reserving any part of the land. The
court stated that the agreement was clear that the owner did not intend to
share profits on the reserved portion and, therefore, rejected the plaintiff's
argument that he was entitled to share in the profits from the sale of the
entire tract. Ingram attempted to escape the requirement that the land be
sufficiently described by arguing that the contract, rather than requiring a
conveyance of land, only promised him a share of the profits from a future
sale. He relied upon cases holding that in a suit for damages only reasonable
certainty is required. The court stated that this argument would merit seri-
ous consideration if the suit had been one to recover an estimate of damages
based upon the measure of compensation provided in the contract.
194. See also U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1976), which is
discussed in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 47-48.
195. 554 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. Id. at 828-29; see Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 57, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945).
197. 546 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
198. The court said "[u]nder contract law, a contract, whether written or oral, must define
its essential terms with sufficient precision to enable the court to determine the obligations of
the parties." Id. at 333.
199. Id. at 334. An agreement to enter into future negotiations cannot be enforced by the
courts. Radford v. McNeny, 129 Tex. 568, 572, 104 S.W.2d 472, 474 (1937).
200. 547 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Stuart v. Coldwell Banker & Co. 201 was a suit by a real estate broker to
recover a commission arising from the exercise of an option to lease a tract
of land. The commission agreement did not describe the land, but did make
reference to the lease option agreement which, the court found, contained a
legally sufficient description. The lease option agreement provided that the
leased property, which consisted of eight acres out of a larger tract, would
be located by survey. The contract contained a description sufficient for the
surveyor to locate three of the four boundaries and, since the parties
intended the tract to be exactly eight acres, the surveyor could locate the
fourth boundary to enclose the eight acre tract. Although locating the fourth
boundary in this manner required reversing the order of the calls made in the
contract, a court, which is not required to give controlling effect to every
call in the field notes or to follow strictly the ordinary priority of calls, can
harmonize those calls. 20 2 The legal description before the court in Chisholm
v. Hipes,2 3 on the other hand, was not sufficient to permit the broker to
recover a real estate commission. Unlike the contract in Stuart, the contract
in Chisholm merely described the land as being twenty-four acres, more or
less, out of a larger tract, a description which was insufficient. 2° The
contract indicated that the smaller tract was to be located by a future survey,
but the court held that under the facts the survey would be inadmissible
extrinsic evidence. The court distinguished LeBow v. Weiner,2 5 stating that
in LeBow the legal description in the contract was sufficient for one familiar
with the locality to identify the property with reasonable certainty, and the
survey was resorted to only for the purpose of ascertaining the exact
acreage. The court also rejected the broker's effort to reform the contract
because that cause of action was barred by limitations.
The cases decided during the survey period illustrate the difficulty
contracting parties have had with legal descriptions. In order to avoid the
vague legal principles which lead to the results of the cases discussed, the
property lawyer must exercise extreme care in preparing the legal descrip-
tion. Several means available to help shape a sufficient legal description
were discussed in the 1977 Property Article.
206
B. First Refusal Rights and Options
A first refusal right to purchase land limits the owner's right to execute an
oil and gas lease according to Sanchez v. Dickinson.207 A recorded contract,
which had been assigned to Dickinson, gave Dickinson the first option to
201. 552 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Another
issue in this case is discussed in notes 291-93 infra and accompanying text.
202. The court considered the description in the contract to be an "office" survey which
was intended only as a guide to the surveyor. See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 935 (1970).
203. 552 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
204. Id. at 521.
205. 454 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
206. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 48.
207. 551 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ). In another case decided
during the survey period, the oil and gas lease required the optionee to join in the execution of
the lease and subordinate his option to the lease; the optionor was to receive all lease payments




purchase the land when and if the owner decided to convey it. The court
held that, although a first refusal right would not restrict the owner's right to
enter into an ordinary lease of the surface, entering into an oil and gas lease
or mineral deed was a sale of an interest in land 2°8 and, thus, was in
derogation of the first refusal right. The court distinguished the first refusal
right from an option to purchase and held that the holder of a first refusal
right has only a preferential right to purchase the land when the seller
decides to sell and only on the same terms as offered by a bona fide
purchaser. 2 9 The first refusal right is a covenant that runs with the land, 210
requires no definite price to be enforceable, 21' and is an exception to the
merger doctrine. 2 2 Foster v. Bullard213 also involved a first refusal right.
Foster had a first refusal right to buy 47.96 acres of a 2,460-acre ranch for a
price consistent with other offers, but not less than $750 per acre. Bullard
sold the entire ranch to Mutual Savings Institution for $650 per acre. The
court held that Foster was entitled to buy the 47.96 acres of land from
Mutual for $750 per acre.
Several interesting points of law were discussed in Smith v. Hues21 4 in
which the trial court's decree of specific performance of the contract of sale
was affirmed. The court agreed with the seller that a provision which limited
the seller's remedies to retaining the escrow deposit as liquidated damages
made the contract an option contract 15 in which time was of the es-
208. 551 S.W.2d at 487.
209. Id. at 484-86. See also Gochman v. Draper, 389 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966); Stone v. Tigner, 165 S.W.2d 124(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, writ ref'd). See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 1139 (1977)
for a discussion of the condition that the owner first receive an offer from a third party. The
first refusal right becomes an option when the seller decides to sell or receives the third party
offer. The impact of giving a first refusal right was clearly illustrated in Sanchez, and Hender-
son v. Nitschke, 470 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In
Henderson the court held that once the owner decided to sell, the first refusal right became an
enforceable option which could be exercised within the time allowed in the agreement, even
though the third party cancelled its offer to purchase. The right of first refusal should not be
applicable to an involuntary sale such as a condemnation or foreclosure. See Annot., 17
A.L.R.3d 962 (1968). A purchaser on actual or constructive notice of a first refusal right must
make reasonable inquiry to determine whether the owner has complied with the terms of the
contract. Foster v. Bullard, 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
For example a purchaser who has knowledge of even an unrecorded grazing lease may be on
notice of a first refusal right or option given to the tenant in the lease. See Miller v. Compton,
185 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945, no writ).
210. Stone v. Tigner, 165 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, writ ref'd).
211. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Allbritton, 147 Tex. 468, 475, 218 S.W.2d 185, 188 (1949).
212. 551 S.W.2d at 486. The court stated that, at least under the facts in this case, the sale of
land under a contract was only partial performance, and the remaining, independent obligation
under the first refusal right was not merged into the deed. The doctrine of merger is discussed in
8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 53, § 4460 (repl. ed. 1963). See Dallas Farm Mach. Co. v. Reaves,
158 Tex. 1, 307 S.W.2d 233 (1957); Burgess v. Putnam, 464 S.W.2d 698, 700-01 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ dism'd).
213. 554 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. 540 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
215. Id. at 488. See also Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court held that the deletion of the contract provision for
specific performance did not require the seller to accept liquidated damages as his exclusive
remedy. The seller had all available remedies, including the remedy of specific performance.
This factor distinguished Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 163 Tex. 250, 353
S:W.2d 841 (1962), and made the contract a contract of sale rather than an option. Consequent-
ly, to deny the remedy of specific performance, the contract must specifically state that specific
performance is not available or that the remedy provided is exclusive.
The test to distinguish an option from a contract of sale "is whether one party is obligated to
sell and the other to purchase or whether there is conferred a right to purchase if there is an
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sence, 216 but found that the seller had waived the requirement of timely
performance. The seller's limited remedy against the purchaser caused the
contract to lack mutuality of obligaton but, the court ruled, this did not make
the option contract unenforceable. 2 7 The court further rejected the seller's
contention, that an agreement to change title companies as escrow agents
was required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, and held that this
change was an "incidental condition" and not a change in the character or
value of the consideration or in a provision that was even required to be in
writing in the original contract. 2 I Finally, the court held that the price, based
upon acreage shown by survey, the amount of the note, the date and place of
payment of the note, and the provisions for a deed of trust were expressed
with sufficient certanity to permit specific performance. 219
The general rule is that the optionee must strictly comply with all of the
terms of an option agreement. 22 After discussing the equitable principles
that excuse strict compliance, 221 as well as waiver and equitable estoppel as
defenses to strict compliance, the court in Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. Jorda222
found that none of these principles relieved the optionee from giving timely
notice of the exercise of the option.
223
election to do so." White v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ
dism'd). Thus in Miller the condition that the purchaser would have thirty days to obtain
financing made the contract an option. The fact that performance-by one party is conditioned
upon the occurrence of certain events, however, does not necessarily make the contract an
option. See Saunders v. Commercial Indus. Serv. Co., 541 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ayers v. Hodges, 517 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1974, no writ) (upholding a "purchaser satisfaction" contract).
216. Johnson v. Portwood, 89 Tex. 235, 245, 34 S.W. 596, 598 (1896); White v. Miller, 518
S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ dism'd), discussed in Wallenstein & St.
Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 38.
217. 540 S.W.2d at 490. The court further stated that "mutuality of remedy at the inception
of the contract is not an essential element in a suit for specific performance of any contract,
because the required mutuality may be supplied by performance by the party seeking specific
performance." Id. (emphasis added). See also Saunders v. Commercial Indus. Serv. Co., 541
S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Mutual obligations can
furnish the essential consideration for a contract. Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Stovall,
113 Tex. 273, 284-85, 253 S.W. 1101, 1105 (1923).
218. 540 S.W.2d at 490-91. See also Toland v. Azton, 553 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1977, no writ) (change in interest rate for purchaser's financing).
219. 540 S.W.2d at 492. The court stated that the test for determining whether specific
performance may be decreed is that the "essential terms of the contract are expressed with
reasonable certainty." The court overruled the seller's argument that the purchaser had not
properly tendered performance, because the note he delivered contained a provision that note
payments would be applied first to interest and then to principal. The court held that this was
not such a material breach as to preclude specific performance. Id. at 491-92. In fact, if parties
fail to provide otherwise, note payments are usually applied first to accrued interest and then to
principal. See Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 409 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1966).
220. See Zeidman v. Davis, 161 Tex. 496, 499, 342 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1961); White v. Miller,
518 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler, 1974 writ dism'd).
221. The court summarized the equitable principles:
An optionee will be excused from strict compliance where his conduct in failing to
comply was not 'due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the optionee but
was rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake. In addition, equity will
also excuse strict compliance where the strict compliance was prevented by some
act of the optionor such as waiver or misleading representations or conduct.
549 S.W.2d at 33; see Jones v. Gibbs, 133 Tex. 627, 640-43, 130 S.W.2d 265, 272-73 (1939).
222. 549 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
223. A purchase option must be strictly exercised and a tenant cannot deduct needed repairs
from the option price. Harmann v. French, 74 Wis.2d 668, 247 N.W.2d 707 (1976). A willing and
able tenant, however, was allowed to exercise an option after the landlord elected to terminate
the lease due to waste committed by the tenant because the landlord was not damaged by the




C. Performance of the Contract
Contracts for the sale of real property typically contain various conditions
that must be performed at or prior to the closing. If the time for performance
of a condition in a contract is not of the essence and if no exact time for
performance is specified, a reasonable time for performance is implied.
224
What is a reasonable time depends upon "the circumstances of each particu-
lar case including the nature and character of the thing to be done and the
difficulties surrounding and attending its accomplishment." 225 A rather un-
usual contract provision was before the court in Joines v. Burke.22 6 It
required the seller to close the sale upon the entry of a final judgment
establishing limitation title in the seller. The seller was obligated by the
contract to cooperate with the purchaser's effort to obtain the limitation title
judgment so that "this contract may be consummated as rapidly as possi-
ble," but no time was fixed for filing the suit or obtaining the judgment. Ten
months after the contract was executed the seller notified the purchaser that
he had another buyer. Twenty-nine months later the seller requested a quit
claim from the purchaser, and more than three years later the seller filed this
suit to cancel the contract. Although the purchaser still had not filed the
limitation title suit, the court found that the delay was not unreasonable
considering the difficulties involved in bringing suit and the lack of coopera-
tion by the seller.
A very common provision found in contracts of sale, especially those
involving residential property, is one that conditions the purchaser's obliga-
tions upon his ability to obtain financing to purchase the property. The
contract in Toland v. Azton 22 was conditioned upon the purchaser securing
a loan at a rate of interest not in excess of eight percent a year. The
purchaser was unable to obtain such a loan, but orally agreed with the seller
to accept a loan at nine and one-quarter percent a year and made written
application for such a loan. The purchaser later sought to avoid the contract
on the basis that the oral modification violated the Statute of Frauds. The
court, however, held that the change in the interest rate merely changed the
manner of payment of the consideration and, under Garcia v. Karam,228 was
not required to be in writing. The court further held that the purchaser
ratified the oral modification when he signed the application for the loan at
the higher rate of interest.
The contract which the purchaser sought to enforce in B.B. Smith Co. v.
Huddleston229 required the purchaser to submit building plans for the seller's
approval prior to the closing; if the seller disapproved the plans, which it
224. See, e.g., Kleiman v. White, 476 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Alexander v. Murray, 405 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The "time is of the essence" provision is discussed in 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY, § 4460 (repl. ed. 1963). Time is not of the essence unless the contract clearly so
provides. Smith v. Warth, 483 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ);
McKnight v. Renfro, 371 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e).
225. Joines v. Burke, 540 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
226. 540 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
227. 553 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
228. 154 Tex. 240,276 S.W.2d 255 (1955). See also Smith v. Hues, 540 S.W.2d 485,491 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(change of title company).
229. 545 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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did, the contract was to be null and void. The court recited the established
Texas rule that if the closing of a contract is conditioned upon the personal
approval of one of the parties, that party must act in good faith. 230 The court
found that the seller had acted in good faith in disapproving the plans. The
purchaser's building plans showed that he had intended to locate one of his
buildings over a driveway leading to the seller's adjacent shopping center,
but the seller was unwilling to relocate the driveway. In Sentry Development
Corp. v. Norman23 ' the purchaser of a residential lot was successful in his
suit to recover his escrow deposit because a condition in the contract
requiring approval of purchaser's application for membership in the country
club, an inducement offered by the developer, was not satisfied.
If a contract requires the seller to furnish at the closing a current survey of
the property showing the "net acreage" after deducting acreage located
within encroachments, easements, roads, and rights-of-way, the seller is in
breach of the contract if he furnishes a survey showing only the gross
acreage. Thus, in Cramer v. White, 232 the court held that the seller's failure
to furnish the required survey entitled the optionee to recover the con-
sideration paid for the option.
Most contracts for the sale of real property require that the seller convey
good title to the property, usually subject to all recorded or specifically
listed encumbrances. Judgment was rendered for the purchaser to recover
his escrow deposit in Gaines v. Dillard233 because the seller failed to satisfy
the contractual requirement that he furnish abstracts of title showing a
merchantable title of record. The contract merely required the seller to
furnish an abstract to the purchaser; the purchaser then had sixty days to
review it and to deliver title requirements to the seller. The court, however,
construed this provision to require an abstract showing merchantable title of
record. 34 Once the purchaser made objections to title defects which were
disclosed in the abstract,2 35 the burden was upon the seller either to cure the
claimed defects or to show that they did not impair the merchantability of
title. The court stated that title by limitations or by accretion was not
merchantable title,236 and that as a matter of law the seller had failed to
230. Id. at 562 (citing Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex.
1976); Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
231. 553 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
232. 546 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The purchase
price was to be computed on the basis of $3,000 for each net acre. The court held that the
purchaser did not waive the breach when he later inquired about the survey: "It is not a waiver
for a party not in default to make an honest effort to induce the party who has breached his
contract to withdraw the repudiation and perform the contract." Id. at 922 (quoting Haddaway
v. Smith, 277 S.W. 728, 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1925, no writ)).
233. 545 S.W.2d 845, (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Id. at 851.
235. If the objections were based upon title defects not disclosed in the abstract, however,
the burden would be upon the purchaser to show that the claimed defects made title unmer-
chantable. Id. at 851. See Spencer v. Maverick, 146 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1941, no writ).
236. 545 S.W.2d at 852. The court gave the following definition of marketable title:
Marketable title is not dependent upon whether the purchaser, if sued, could
successfully defend such title against those suing. If the record of his title as
shown by the abstract discloses such outstanding interests in other parties than his
vendor, as would reasonably subject him to litigation, or compel him to resort toI
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discharge his burden of proof. If title was unmerchantable, the court
continued, it was immaterial that the purchaser's real reason for refusing to
close was that the value of the property had declined. 237 Furthermore, the
purchaser's silence during a ten-day period in which he could have rejected
title or waived the seller's inability to cure the title defects was not a waiver
of the right to have the escrow deposit returned. 238 In Henry v. Mr. M.
Convenience Stores, Inc. 239 a purchaser under a contract of sale succeeded
in enforcing specific performance against a second, later purchaser, and in
removing use restrictions and a mortgage lien which had been placed upon
the property by the second purchaser. After the contract was signed, the
seller, due to neighborhood opposition to the construction of a convenience
store, sold the property to a neighboring resident who then placed a lien
against the property and recorded an instrument which restricted the use of
the property to residential purposes. Both the vendee 240 and the bank-
mortgagee had knowledge of the contract of sale.2 4'
D. Seller's and Purchaser's Remedies
I. Damages for Fraud or Misrepresentation and for Breach.
Suits brought to recover damages for fraud or misrepresentation arising
out of the sale of real property dominate the remedies section in this year's
survey. Purchasers of real property certainly have not ignored 242 seeking the
remedies available under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 243
and the recent decision in Woods v. Littleton24 will result in even greater
consumer awareness in purchasers as well as tenants245 of real property. In
Woods the purchasers of a new home sued the builder under the Act for
treble the actual damages resulting from mental anguish and the diminished
value of the home. The plaintiffs purchased the home before the Act became
evidence in parol, not afforded by the record, to defend his title against such
outstanding claims, it is not marketable.
Id. Title by limitation or accretion would require resort to matters outside the title records or
abstract in order to establish title, and is, therefore, not merchantable title. See Blomstrom v.
Wells, 239 S.W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1922, writ dism'd); Wright v. Glass, 174
S.W. 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1915, no writ). Merchantable title is synonymous with
marketable title. Ailing v. Vander Stucken, 194 S.W. 443, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1917, writ ref'd).
237. 545 S.W.2d at 853.
238. Id. at 854. The court stated that this provision merely gave the purchaser an option to
accept even unmerchantable title; it did not require him to reject the title again in order to
recover his escrow deposit.
239. 543 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
240. A vendee with knowledge of another's rights under a contract of sale stands in the
position of the seller in a suit for specific performance. Langley v. Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 410-11,
173 S.W.2d 454, 457 (1943). If the property, however, had been sold to a second purchaser who
was unaware of the first contract of sale, specific performance would not be available to the
first purchaser. Compare Kress v. Soules, 152 Tex. 595, 261 S.W.2d 703 (1953), with Maurer v.
Albany Sand & Supply Co., 40 App. Div. 2d 883, 337 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1972).
241. See Campbell v. City of Dallas, 120 S.W.2d 1095, 1097 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1938,
writ ref'd).
242. See Cape Conroe, Ltd. v. Specht, 525 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ); Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 44.
243. Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
244. 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977). The court of civil appeals decision is discussed in Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 51-52.
245. See note 492 infra.
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effective and received a warranty which provided that the builder would
repair any defects arising within a year after the sale. Defects in the sewer
system and septic tank occurred a few weeks after the sale. The builder
made several attempts to correct the problem, and after the date the Act
became effective, he represented that the sewer system was in good working
order. The Texas Supreme Court held that the purchasers were "consum-
ers" within the meaning of section 17.45(4) of the Act, 246 that the builder's
warranty was made pursuant to a sale of "services" within the meaning of
section 17.45(2),247 and that the representation that the sewer system was in
good working order was a deceptive trade practice. The court concluded
that the date on which the deceptive trade practice occurred, which was
after the Act became effective, rather than the date of the sale, which was
before the Act became effective, determined the applicability of the Act.
The court further held that section 17.50(b)(1), 248 which provides that the
consumer "may" recover treble damages, is mandatory rather than discre-
tionary. The court reserved for later determination whether a sale of real
estate prior to May 21, 1973, alone can give rise to a cause of action under
the Act.2 49 It has been suggested that recovery for diminished market value
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act should be based upon the
dimunition in market value resulting from the defect on the date the decep-
tive trade practice occurred.25 0
In Robert v. Sumerour25I a purchaser of residential property was awarded
damages equal to the difference between the market value of the property as
represented at the time 6f sale and its actual value as delivered. The repre-
sentation concerned the quantity and quality of water from a well. The court
stated that the defendant could not avoid the liability for damages which
resulted from his fraud even though the purchaser could have discovered the
truth by the exercise of proper care. 252
King v. Tubb253 was a suit to recover money invested in a real estate
development plan. The court found that King had promised to assist in the
development of the property, which he denied, and that he had repudiated
this promise. Generally, the court observed, in order for a statement to be
fraudulent, it must be a statement as to a present existing fact. But the court
stated that "the present intention of the speaker not to perform in the future
• . . makes the representation a present false statement.1 254 If, as in this
case, the person denies having made the statement, "that alone is sufficient
evidence to support a finding of lack of intent to perform at the time the
statement was made.' 255 Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding of fraud in a real estate transaction within the purview of
246. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
247. Id. § 17.45(2).
248. Id. § 17.50(b)(1).
249. 554 S.W.2d at 668 n.10.
250. 4 CAVEAT VENDOR 5 (1977).
251. 543 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
252. Id. at 892. See also Douglas v. Neill, 545 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed at notes 142-44 supra and accompanying text.
253. 551 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
254. Id. at 441. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 46.
255. 551 S.W.2d at 441.
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section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.25 6 The court also
stated that recovery could be awarded under "assumpsit '25 7 or under a
combination of fraud and assumpsit. Recovery under a different contract
was upheld not only against King, but also against his alter ego, Monarch
Real Estate Corporation.2"' Wise v. Pena259 is another case in which the
purchaser of real property successfully sued to recover actual and exem-
plary damages under section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. Here the purchaser sued the brokers for false representations regard-
ing the purchase price and the income from a hotel. The broker who
appealed argued that the purchaser ratified the fraudulent acts; the court,
however, held that the factual260 issue had not been properly raised.
Unless the contract provides otherwise, the execution of a contract for
the sale of realty passes the risk of loss to the purchaser, at least when the
loss arises after the contract is executed and is not the fault of the seller. 26'
In Fant v. Howell262 the Howells contracted to deed a tract of land to Fant at
a later date, but Fant was entitled to immediate possession and use of the
land. Both the Howells and Fant were aware, when the contract was signed,
that third parties were claiming a portion of the land by adverse possession.
No action was taken to oust the adverse claimants, and three years after the
contract was signed, title to that portion of the land was lost through adverse
possession. Fant subsequently paid the amount on the contract that was
required in order for him to receive the deed. Fant demanded a general
warranty deed to the entire tract, but the Howells were only willing to
warrant title as of the date of the contract. The court of civil appeals 263
placed the risk of loss on the purchaser and held that Fant was not entitled to
a general warranty deed covering the portion of the land which had been lost
by adverse possession. The Texas Supreme Court reversed on the authority
of English v. Jones264 and held that, since there was nothing in the record to
256. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968). The elements of fraud are false
statement, reliance on the statement, action in reliance on the statement, and damages. 551
S.W.2d at 440-41.
257. The court defined assumpsit as "a recovery for the unjust retention of a benefit to the
loss of another, or the retention of money of another against the fundamental principals of
justice and equity." Id. at 442.
258. Id. at 445. A corporate entity will not be disregarded unless compelling reasons exist.
Facts which the court found compelling were the use of corporate funds to make the down
payment on the property while title was in King's name, and use of the corporation by King as
an unfair device to prevent Middlebrook from obtaining the refund of his money.
259. 552 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1977, writ dism'd).
260. The court stated that there was insufficient evidence to establish ratification as a matter
of law. Id. at 200.
261. Whittenburg v. Miller, 139 Tex. 586, 594, 164 S.W.2d 497, 501 (1942); Northern Tex.
Realty & Constr. Co. v. Lary, 136 S.W. 843, 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ ref'd).
262. 547 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1977); see note 22 supra and accompanying text.
263. 537 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976). See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra
note 2, at 51. Another case decided during this survey period involving damages for trespass
was Pentagon Enterprises v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 540 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court held that a purchaser under a contract of
sale had no right to sue for a trespass that occurred before he was entitled to possession of the
property. The effect of this case is to deny a cause of action for any trespass which occurs prior
to closing since the purchaser generally is not entitled to possession until the closing. A cause of
action for trespass is based upon an injury to possession. Id. at 478. The court rejected a
contrary result reached in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Bullard, 127 S.W. 1152 (Tex. Civ. App.- 1909,
no writ), and instead followed Boyd v. Schreiner, 116 S.W. 100 (Tex. Civ. App.- 1909, writ
ref'd).
264. 154 Tex. 132, 274 S.W.2d 666 (1955). The court in English held that the purchaser was
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excuse the sellers from initiating a trespass to try title suit against the
adverse claimants, Fant was entitled to a reduction in the purchase price
equal to the value of the lost land on the date of the contract, the return of
interest payments attributable to that portion of the land, and a general
warranty deed to the remainder of the land. There was some evidence that
the sellers had agreed to file the trespass to try title suit if it became
necessary, and this evidence must have had some influence on the Texas
Supreme Court's opinion. Undoubtedly the result would have been different
had the contract specifically placed the risk of loss by adverse possession on
the purchasers and reflected a price reduction based upon this risk, or if the
adverse possession had begun after the date the contract was executed.
Sellers, too, were aggrieved during the survey period, though not due to
the fraud of their purchasers. The court in Saikowski v. Gage2 65 permitted
the seller to recover $10,000.00 actual damages for the loss of his bargain
after the purchaser breached the contract of sale. The seller, however, was
not allowed to recover damages for the decrease in market value due to the
fact that after the breach he owned a used rather than a new house. This was
because (1) the seller had consented to the occupancy of the house and could
not recover rents or .damages for the occupancy until the date the purchaser
repudiated the contract, 266 and (2) it would amount to a double recovery for
the same loss. The court, citing Brown v. Randolph,267 said that such a
recovery would depend upon a relationship of landlord and tenant, and this
relationship could not arise until the purchaser breached the contract of sale.
The parties to a contract can, and often do, stipulate the amount of
damages that can be recovered in the event of a breach of the contract. If the
stipulated amount was a reasonable estimate of actual damages which were
difficult to determine, the provision will be enforced; 21 on the other hand, if
the stipulated amount was unreasonable it is an unenforceable penalty and
only actual damages can be recovered. 269 If the seller has agreed to accept
liquidated damages for the purchaser's breach, actual damages cannot be
recovered270 and the right to specific performance is waived,2 71 unless liq-
uidated damages is merely an optional or alternative remedy.272 In Brewer v.
entitled to whatever title the seller had and a reduction in the purchase price to reflect the title
he did not have despite the fact that the purchaser knew at the time of the sale that the seller did
not own full title. The court distinguished the two cases relied upon by the court of civil
appeals, Whitaker v. Felts, 137 Tex. 578, 155 S.W.2d 604 (1941), and Leeson v. City of
Houston, 243 S.W. 485 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, jdgmt adopted). Leeson was distinguished
because Fant never went into possession of the tract under adverse possession. This is a
peculiar distinction because of the contract provision stating that Fant was to receive whatever
possession the Howells then had of the property. 547 S.W.2d at 264-65.
265. 549 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
266. Id. at 783. A third party, rather than the purchaser, occupied the house with the seller's
and purchaser's consent. This fact, however, was not relevant to the decision.
267. 62 S.W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ).
268. Indianola Ry. Co. v. Gulf, W. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 56 Tex. 594, 606 (1882).
269. Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 669, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952); Brace v. Dante, 466
S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ). See also American Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Tri-Cities Constr., Inc., 551 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ),
discussed in note 308 infra and accompanying text.
270. Buhler v. McIntire, 365 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
271. Willie v. Waggoner, 181 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd).




Myers2 73 the contract provided that " 'in the event Purchaser is the default-
ing party, Seller shall have the right to retain said cash deposit as liquidated
damages for the breach of this contract.' ,274 The court concluded that the
provision was the seller's exclusive remedy for breach; accordingly, the
seller could not sue the purchaser for actual damages. 275 The court stated
that had the intent been otherwise, it should have been expressed in the
contract.
2. Rescission and Cancellation.
An option given either party to cancel or rescind a contract for the sale of
realty must be exercised in strict compliance with its terms.2 76 Accordingly,
in Stretcher v. Gregg277 the court held that oral notice of cancellation was
ineffective because the contract required written notice.2 78
3. Recovery of Escrow Deposit.
In Chilton v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Co.279 the title company,
acting as escrow agent under a contract of sale, and a stakeholder of the
escrow deposit made by the purchaser, breached its duty to the purchaser by
failing to cash the escrow checks. The purchasers delivered their escrow
checks, payable to the seller, which in turn was then supposed to deliver the
checks to the title company. Instead, the seller cashed the checks and later
delivered its own check to the title company with instructions not to cash it.
The check was subsequently processed and dishonored. The trial court's
directed verdict in favor of the title company was reversed. 2 0
E. Brokerage
Unless the contract requires a closing of a sale as a condition precedent to
the right of a broker to collect the commission, the broker need only procure
a ready, able, and willing purchaser on the terms specified in the contract or
on other terms acceptable to the seller.28 The broker, therefore, was entitled
to recover the commission in Davidson v. Suber,282 even though the pur-
273. 545 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
274. Id. at 237.
275. See Moss & Raley v. Wren, 102 Tex. 567, 120 S.W. 847 (1909); Huffhines v. Bourland,
280 S.W. 561, 563 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, judgmt adopted). See also Smith v. Hues, 540
S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and discussion in
note 215 supra.
276. See Taco Boy, Inc. v. Redelco Co., Inc., 515 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Christi 1974, no writ); G.C. Murphy Co. v. Lack, 404 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus
Cbristi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 408 (1963).
277. 542 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
278. Id. at 957. The court cited Nitzky v. Ohmer, 138 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1955), and Doll
v. Ryder, 118 Pa. Super. Ct. 7, 178 A. 320 (1935).
279. 554 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
280. The court also held that there was evidence the title company had breached an express
or implied trust, and that it was negligent. Id. at 248-49.
281. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 52-54.
282. 553 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ). The court stated the broker is
entitled to a commission "if the vendor may enforce specific performance of the contract." Id.
at 431. The seller's right to specific performance, however, is not generally a prerequisite. In
fact, the lack of an enforceable contract between the seller and purchaser does not preclude the
broker's recovery of his commission under a separate listing agreement. See Del Andersen &
Assoc. v. Jones, 531 S.W.2d 417,419 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975), rev'don other grounds,
539 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1976).
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chaser refused to complete the sale. The court concluded that the purchaser
was ready, able, and willing at the time the contract was signed. Although
the court found no authority on point, it further held that, if a broker makes
the necessary proof to recover attorneys' fees under article 2226,23 the
court is required to award attorney's fees.28
A person who sells real property must be a licensed real estate broker in
order to maintain an action to recover a real estate commission. 285 Similarly,
a person must be licensed under the Texas Securities Act in order to recover
a commission for the sale of securities. 286 If, however, a person merely acts
as a "finder" in the sale of real property or securities, a license is not
required for the recovery of a finder's fee. A real estate broker sometimes
finds himself in the peculiar position of representing a corporate owner of
real property that decides to sell its stock rather than the real property. 28 7 In
this situation the broker can recover a commission if he can show that he
acted only as a finder. The court in Stahl v. Preston288 held that a licensed
real estate broker, who did not have a license under the Texas Securities
Act, went beyond merely acting as a finder 289 and played an active and
significant role in the sale of bank stock and, therefore, could not recover a
commission for the sale of the stock. The opposite situation, that of a person
licensed to sell securities seeking to recover a commission on the sale of real
property, was discussed in the 1977 Property Article. 29°
The broker recovered his real estate commission in Stuart v. Coldwell
Banker & Co.291 by overcoming the arguments of the owner that the
commission agreement was unenforceable because it was executed subse-
quent to the lease option agreement 292 and because it inadequately described
the tenant and the land. The court held that the broker was not required to
prove that the commission agreement was in existence at the time the
services were rendered or that the commission agreement predated the lease
option agreement. The commission agreement contained no description of
283. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
284. 553 S.W.2d at 432. Actually there is by analogy sufficient authority in Woods v.
Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 668-70 (Tex. 1977) to support a holding that the award of attorneys'
fees under article 2226 is not discretionary.
285. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 19 (Vernon 1969). See, however, Coastal
Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
granted), discussed at notes 573-78 infra and accompanying text.
286. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-34 (Vernon 1964); see Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565,
335 S.W.2d 584 (1960).
287. See, e.g., Taylor Communications, Inc. v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., 447 S.W.2d
401 (Tex. 1969); Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 335 S.W.2d 584 (1960). See generally Comment,
The Business Broker and the Oklahoma Real Estate Licensing Code, 12 TULSA L.J. 398 (1976).
288. 541 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
289. A finder is "an intermediary who contracts to find and bring the parties together, but he
leaves the ultimate transaction to the principals, he is the procuring cause, and his function
ceases when negotiations between theprincipals begin." Id. at 278-79. The court stated that the
distinction between brokers and finders had been suggested in only one Texas case, Rogers v.
Ellsworth, 501 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See also Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1160 (1969). The broker in Stahl had been engaged to sell both
real property and bank stock, but was able to sell only the bank stock.
290. Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Sugarland Indus., Inc., 537 S.W.2d 121 (Tex Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 56.
291. 552 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
292. Id. at 908.
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the land, but made reference to the lease option agreement which, the court
found, contained a legally sufficient description.
293
In Taggart v. Crews21 the court held that parol evidence was admissible to
show that a listing agreement was delivered to the broker on the condition
that a sale under the listing agreement would have to be approved by the
seller's banker and tax attorney. 295 The required approvals were not given
and, accordingly, the purchaser could not enforce specific performance of a
contract founded upon the listing agreement and the broker was not entitled
to a commission. In Stitt v. Royal Park Fashions, Inc. 296 the court held that a
sublease which provided for payment of a real estate commission "as
collected from tenant" merely established a time for payment and did not
require collection of the rentals as a condition precedent to receiving the
monthly commission. 2  The broker, the court stated, earned his full
commission for negotiating the lease, and merely agreed to prorate the
commission over the expected term of the lease. The court distinguished
those cases which involved leases that provided for payment of a commis-
sion "for negotiating and collecting the rent. ' 298 Thus, when the landlord
and tenant agreed to terminate the lease, the broker was entitled to receive
the present value of the commissions he would have collected over the term
of the lease.
299
In Castrejana v. Davidson3"' the court held that a promissory note given
to the broker by the purchaser in payment of a portion of his real estate
commission, which was supposed to be paid by the seller, was not subject to
the defense that there was no written agreement between the purchaser and
broker to pay a real estate commission.30' The court held that the note
represented the balance of the purchase price rather than an agreement by
the purchaser to pay a real estate commission.3 °2 Other brokerage cases
decided during the survey period, which are discussed elsewhere in this
293. This issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes 201-02 supra.
294. 543 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
295. See Baker v. Baker, 143 Tex. 191, 183 S.W.2d 724 (1944); Moore v. Wilson, 138 S.W.2d
1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940, writ ref'd).
296. 546 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
297. The lease was terminated in conjunction with the purchase of the property by the
tenant. Even if the collection of monthly rentals had been a condition precedent, the court
would not have barred recovery since "a broker is entitled to his commissions notwithstanding
failure of the condition precedent if the lessor gets the benefit of the obligation to pay the rent
or if the lessor himself is responsible for failure of the condition." Id. at 927. See also West
Realty & Inv. Co. v. Hite, 283 S.W. 481 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 52-53. The court in Stitt added that this was not a case in which
the lessee had defaulted in the payment of rent. 546 S.W.2d at 927.
298. See, e.g., Langman v. Vitallo, 70 Pa. D. & C. 604 (1950).
299. The court relied upon Adams v. Johnson, 298 S.W. 265 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
jdgmt adopted), in which the broker, who had agreed to be paid his commission out of deferred
note payments from the sale of land, was found to be entitled to the balance of his commission
despite the cancellation of the note and reconveyance of the land. See also Don Drum Real
Estate Co. v. Hudson, 465 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ). See
generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 1171 (1974).
300. 549 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
301. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978). This statute
requires that an action for the recovery of a real estate commission be based upon a promise in
writing signed by the party to be charged. The court stated that the broker had fully performed
his verbal agreement; his agreement to defer a portion of his commission in return for the
purchaser's note was, in effect, a portion of the down payment.
302. The court held that § 20(b), merely a rule of evidence, was not designed to impair
contractual obligations. 549 S.W.2d at 468.
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Article, involved the sufficiency of the legal description of the property as a
requirement for the broker to enforce the contract to pay the commission, 30
3
the sale of a joint venture interest as a sale of securities, 3°, and fraud in the
sale of real property. 30 5 Finally, in Texas Real Estate Commissioner v.
Turner31 the court upheld a Texas Real Estate Commission order requiring
the revocation of a real estate license for violations of the Act 307 based upon
splitting commissions with an unlicensed person.
III. REAL ESTATE FINANCING
A. Mortgages
1. Enforceability of Loan Commitments.
In American National Insurance Co. v. Ti-Cities Construction, Inc. 31 the
court of civil appeals held that the lender could retain an $11,000.00 loan
commitment fee as liquidated damages after the borrower breached one of
the terms of the loan commitment. 309 In reversing the trial court, the court of
civil appeals held that the $11,000.00 stipulated damages was not a penalty.
The court stated that the correct test for distinguishing between enforceable
liquidated damages and an unenforceable penalty is the one established by
the Texas Supreme Court in Stewart v. Basey.310 Further, the court indi-
cated that the mere fact that a jury finds the stipulated damages to exceed
the actual damages does not make the stipulated damage provision unen-
forceable. 3t ' The court, however, repeated the warning in Stewart v. Basey
that if the same amount of stipulated damages applies to more than one
breach of the contract the provision may be deemed a penalty if "the
amount stipulated is also found to be unreasonable as it relates to any one of
the possible breaches. 312
Two other decisions involving loan commitments merit brief attention. In
303. Stuart v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 552 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see notes 201-05 supra and accompanying text.
304. McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate Co., 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); see note 556 infra and accompanying text.
305. King v. Tubb, 551 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); see note
253 supra and accompanying text.
306. 547 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
307. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 26 (Vernon 1969).
308. 551 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ). This was the
second appeal of this case. On the previous appeal summary judgment in favor of the lender
was reversed. Tri-Cities Constr., Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 523 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
309. The loan was to be for the permanent financing of a car dealership to be built by
Markland and leased by Chrysler Realty Corp. The mortgage was to give the lender a first right
of refusal in the event the borrower decided to sell the improved property, subject to the prior
right of Chrysler Realty to purchase under its lease agreement. Before the loan was closed,
Markland sold the property and prevented the loan from being made on these terms.
310. 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952). The test is stated as follows: "An agreement,
made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and
does not affect the damages recoverable for the breach, unless (a) the amount so fixed is a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the
harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation." Id. at 670, 245 S.W.2d at 486; see Brewer v. Myers, 545 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
311. 551 S.W.2d at 109. See also Comment, A Functional Approach in Determining the
Validity of a Liquidated-Damages Clause, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 752 (1952).
312. 551 S.W.2d at 110.
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Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Lone Star Life Insurance Co. 313 the interim
lender was held not to be a third-party beneficiary of a loan commitment
between the permanent lender and their common borrower and could not
require the permanent lender to take it out of the interim loan. The court
further held that a letter agreement between the two lenders stating that the
permanent lender agreed "to comply with the terms and conditions as set
out in the commitment letter" did not obligate the permanent lender to
purchase the loan.114 In DLJ Properties/73 v. Eastern Savings Bank, 315 a suit
by the borrower against the permanent lender for specific performance and
damages for their failure to complete the loan under a tri-party agreement,
the court held that the out-of-state permanent lender was amenable to
service of process under the Texas long-arm statute.
31 6
2. Duty to Insure; Right to Insurance Proceeds.
Most deeds of trust require that the mortgagor insure the property against
fire and other hazards for the benefit of the mortgagee. If the mortgagor fails
to name the mortgagee as an insured in the policy, does -the mortgagee have
any claim to the insurance proceeds after fire destroys the improvements on
the property? In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. English317 the trial court
believed not, but the appellate court reversed, saying:
Under the principals of equity, the mortgagor's breach of his agree-
ment to insure the mortgaged property for the benefit of the mortgagee
charges the benefits of any insurance . . . with a lien in favor of the
mortgagee; and the mortgagee may proceed directly against the insurer
a .e-t to recover his pro rata share of any funds payable under the policy
at the time the insurer learned of his interest.
3 8
As previously mentioned, deeds of trust generally require a mortgagor to
insure the property in the full amount of the loan, usually through a policy
naming the mortgagee as a co-insured. A mortgagee under an insurance
policy with a loss-payable clause, however, can only recover the amount of
the indebtedness owed to it. Furthermore, if the loss occurs before foreclo-
sure, the mortgagee can recover only an amount equal to the balance owing
on the indebtedness less the bid price. 319 This was so held in Campagna v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's London.320 The mortgagee argued that, since she
was the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, she was entitled to recover the
313. 546 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). See also Republic Nat'l Bank
v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Briercroft Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Foster Financial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). There are no reported Texas decisions in which the
interim lender has succeeded on this theory. Often the borrower, the interim lender, and the
permanent lender will enter into an agreement under which the permanent lender agrees to
purchase or take the loan if all the requirements of the agreement are met.
314. The court held that neither the commitment letter nor the letter agreement obligated the
permanent lender to purchase the note, and further held that the letter agreement lacked the
essential elements of a new contract. 546 S.W.2d at 953-54.
315. 549 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
316. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
317. 543 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
318. Id. at 414-15. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 138 (1970); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 774 (1976).
319. Under most deeds of trust the full bid price may be reduced by expenses of sale before
being applied to the indebtedness.
320. 549 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also G. OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES § 137 (1970); Note, Insurance of Mortgaged Property, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (1940).
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market value of the property after the fire, rather than on the basis of the bid
price, because no actual consideration was paid at the foreclosure sale. 32'
The court disagreed, holding that the mortgagee was bound by the con-
sideration recited in the trustee's deed. 32 2 A mortgagee has no interest in the
proceeds of the mortgagor's policy in the absence of an agreement to insure
for its benefit. 323 Therefore, it is extremely important not only to include
such a provision in the deed of trust, but also to make sure that the policy is
obtained and maintained in the required amount. The mortgagee's recovery
in Campagna would have been different had she maintained her own insur-
ance or had she sought recovery under the policy prior to foreclosure.
The liability of a mortgagee for failing to insure improvements with funds
which under the deed of trust were paid into escrow for that purpose was
discussed in the 1977 Property Article 324 in connection with Colonial Savings
Association v. Taylor.3 25 This year a case raised the issue of the failure by
the mortgagee to insure personalty when similarly required. In Huckabee v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co. 326 the deed of trust required the lienholder to accept
and hold funds in escrow, for the payment of insurance premiums on the
mortgagor's or borrower's residence.3 27 When the mortgagor's insurance
company cancelled the coverage, the mortgagor obtained identical coverage
on both the improvements and personalty from a different company; how-
ever, the lienholder would not accept the new insurance policy and obtained
insurance from another company which covered only the improvements.
After a fire which damaged the improvements and personalty, the mortgagor
sued the lienholder for wrongfully and negligently not having the personalty
insured. The court of civil appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of
the lienholder and held that the alleged facts, if true, would make the
lienholder liable for wrongful failure to insure the personalty. The Texas
Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate court on another point. 328
321. Typically, as here, the mortgagee merely off-sets the bid against the indebtedness. The
mortgagee conceded that the bid price would be determinative if a third party purchased the
property. See Rosenbaum v. Funcannon, 308 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1962).
322. The court reasoned that in a suit for a deficiency after a foreclosure the mortgagee
would be bound by the consideration recited in the trustee's deed, and that parol evidence could
not be admitted to show any other consideration unless fraud, accident, or mistake was alleged.
549 S.W.2d at 18-19.
323. G. OSBORNE, supra note 318, § 137.
324. Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 59-60.
325. 544 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1976).
326. 550 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), rev'd, 21 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 67 (Nov. 19, 1977).
327. The exact requirement of this clause was not made clear in the civil appeals court's
opinion; a typical provision, however, requires the borrower, if requested by the mortgagee, to
pay monthly an amount equal to one-twelfth of the estimated insurance premiums on the
secured property. Although the typical clause does not expressly require the lienholder to pay
the insurance premiums, the obligation is implied. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at
60 n.215. On the other hand, since the typical deed of trust on a residence only requires the
borrower to insure the secured property, which usually does not include personalty, there is no
obligation to insure the personalty.
328. 21 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 67 (Nov. 19, 1977). The central question before the supreme court
was whether the borrowers had elected their remedies by settling with another defendant
insurer, thus barring them from suing the lienholder. The court of civil appeals held that the
claim for wrongfully failing to insure the personalty was an independent transaction which was
not barred. The Texas Supreme Court found this holding to be in conflict with Seamans Oil Co.
v. Guy, 115 Tex. 93, 276 S.W. 424 (1925), and held that suit against Lomas & Nettleton Co. was
precluded by the election.
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3. "Other Indebtedness" Clauses.
In Magnum Machine & Tool Corp. v. First National Bank32 9 the plaintiff,
who has purchased real property subject to an existing deed of trust lien,
joined many others330 who have been punished by the harsh realities of the
"dragnet clause." 33' The plaintiff failed in its effort to obtain a temporary
injunction against the foreclosure of the property precipitated by a default
by the former owner under a second loan, which was made after the deed of
trust was executed. The plaintiff argued that the foreclosure should not
occur because the second loan was not reasonably contemplated at the time
the deed of trust was executed. The court of civil appeals, while recognizing
the existence of some evidence to support the plaintiff's contention, upheld
the trial court's refusal to halt the foreclosure proceedings.
3 2
4. Subrogation by a New Lender.
Subrogation in this context is the right of a new lender to be substituted to
the position of a prior lienholder whose debt has been satisfied by the
proceeds of the new loan. The result of subrogation is that the new lender
may become entitled to the liens and rights of the prior lienholder, even
against an intervening lienholder. Subrogation can occur either under an
equitable principal333 or, as in two cases decided this year, through an
express provision in the new lender's deed of trust. In Texas Commerce
Bank National Association v. Liberty Bank334 Texas Commerce Bank made
a $140,000.00 loan to Kalil secured by a deed of trust lien which was third in
priority to two existing deed of trust liens. Kalil later sold the property to
Day-Landon Interest which financed the purchase with a $187,000.00 loan
from Liberty Bank. The Liberty Bank loan was used to pay the first and
second lien notes and was supposed to pay in full the Texas Commerce Bank
note. Due to a clerical error, however, Texas Commerce Bank advised the
title company it was owed only $1,319.80 and the balance of the proceeds
were thereupon delivered to Kalil, after which both Texas Commerce Bank
and Liberty Bank foreclosed their liens. In the ensuing lawsuit Liberty Bank
329. 545 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
330. See Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Northland Bldg. Corp., 552 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1977),
discussed at notes 160-64 supra and accompanying text. See also the discussion in Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 62 n.225.
331. The dragnet clause stated that the parties contemplated that the borrower would
become further indebted to the bank in the future and that the same deed of trust would also
secure the future indebtedness.
332. The court distinguished Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.
1966), and Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965), on the basis that those cases dealt with
claims acquired from third parties, not subsequent loan transactions between the same parties.
This is not a complete distinction. There was evidence that the bank made frequent loans to the
former owner, although at the time the deed of trust was executed this particular loan had not
been discussed. The loan described in the deed of trust was for $10,000; the second loan was
made four months later for $350,000. It has a familiar ring; see, e.g., Estes v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970).
333. One who is not a volunteer and not guilty of fraud, who advances money to pay a debt
secured by a deed of trust lien and expects to receive a first lien on the property, is entitled to
subrogation to the prior lien. A different result may occur, however, if there are intervening,
though junior, lienholders known to the new lender. In that case the new lender should obtain
an assignment of the lien. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 318, § 282. See also Lewis v. Investors
Say. Ass'n, 411 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, no writ).
334. 540 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
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took the position that it had been subrogated 33 to the rights of the first and
second lienholder and, therefore, had purchased the property at the foreclo-
sure sale free of the lien held by Texas Commerce Bank. The court agreed
with Liberty Bank, relying upon Providence Institution for Savings v.
Sims.33 6 The court held that "neither actual nor constructive knowledge of
an intervening lien would defeat the right of subrogation where a senior lien
had been discharged pursuant to an express agreement by the debtor that the
lender would be entitled to subrogation. 337 The third lienholder, however,
only escalated ahead of the second lienholder to the extent of the amount of
the first lien which he had paid-just as though he had taken an assignment
of the note and lien.33 If in Liberty Bank the proceeds from foreclosure sale
had exceeded the amount of the two superior liens, Texas Commerce Bank
would have been entitled to the excess ahead of the balance due on Liberty
Bank's fourth lien.3 39 The question of whether an assignment is essential
also arose in Means v. United Fidelity Life Insurance Co. ,3 in which the
court held that "where subrogation arises, it makes no difference whether
the party, on the payment of the money, took an assignment of the mortgage
or a release, or whether a discharge was made and the evidence of the debt
canceled." 341 Thus, the foreclosure of the lender's lien was effective despite
the existence of a homestead claim which arose after the creation of the
prior lien.
5. Notice of Default and Foreclosure.
A requirement in the loan documents that the mortgagee give the mort-
gagor notice of any default and an opportunity to cure the default before
accelerating the maturity of the promissory note or instituting foreclosure
proceedings is a valuable right to the borrower. Two decisions during the
survey period illustrate why the mortgagee is often unwilling to agree to give
such a notice, especially for a default based upon a failure to make a note
payment. The loan document before the court in Investors Realty Trust v.
Carlton Corp. 342 provided that the maturity of the note could not be ac-
celerated unless the mortgagor failed to cure the default within ten days
after written notice was received. The first notice of default contained a
declaration that the note was immediately accelerated. After the mortgagor
335. The Liberty Bank deed of trust provided that "in the event the . . .indebtedness
secured hereby . . . are used to pay off and satisfy any liens. . . then Beneficiary is, and shall
be subrogated to all of the rights, liens and remedies of the holders of the indebtedness so
paid." Id. at 556.
336. 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969).
337. 540 S.W.2d at 557. Texas Commerce Bank argued that subrogation should be denied
because Liberty Bank had been negligent in ascertaining the correct amount of the balance due
on Texas Commerce's note. The court observed that while this argument might have some
appeal in a case where subrogation is based upon equitable principles, it has none in a case
where subrogation is based upon a provision in the deed of trust. See also Providence Inst. for
Sav. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516, 519-20 (Tex. 1969). For a good general discussion of the question
of negligence in an equitable subrogation situation, see G. OSBORNE, supra note 318, § 282.
338. Pugh v. Clark, 238 S.W.2d 980, 984 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
339. 540 S.W.2d at 557.
340. 550 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
341. Id. at 309. The court cited Kone v. Harper, 297 S.W. 294, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1927), aff'd sub nora. Ward-Harrison Co. v. Kone, I S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928,
jdgmt adopted). See generally G. OSBORNE, supra. note 318, §§ 281-82.
342. 541 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
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filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure sale, a second notice of default was given
which allowed ten days to cure the default. The court of civil appeals held
that the second notice complied with the requirements in the loan document
and dissolved the temporary injunction granted by the trial court, holding
that the mortgagor could have cured the default within the allowed ten day
grace period. 34 3 The court further held that a modification of the loan
agreement following one default, and negotiations for an adjustment of the
indebtedness following another default, did not constitute a waiver or estop-
pel of the right to accelerate and foreclose. 44
The effectiveness of a notice of default in a promissory note and deed of
trust was also in. issue in Joy Corp. v. Nob Hill North Properties, Ltd.3 45
Written notice was given to the mortgagor that note payments had not been
received and that foreclosure proceedings would begin immediately. The
mortgagee later refused to advise the mortgagor of the amount required to
cure the default. After the mortgagee posted notice of a foreclosure sale, the
mortgagor sought and obtained a temporary restraining order and a tempo-
rary injunction. The notes and deeds, construed together, expressly re-
quired written notice of any default before the maturity of the notes could be
accelerated. The court of civil appeals found that the written notice did not
declare the entire debt to be due or "constitute unequivocal action indicating
that the entire debt was due.''346 If the loan documents require notice of
default before acceleration, the court said that "it is incumbent upon the
mortgagee, in order to avail himself of this right of acceleration, to make a
clear, positive, and unequivocal declaration in some manner of the exercise
thereof, followed by an affirmative action toward enforcing the declared
intention."-347 If notice of acceleration is not provided for in the loan docu-
ments, however, and if in fact the borrower waives such a notice, then
notice need not be given and demand for payment need not be made.3"
Bankruptcy court historically has been a popular forum for mortgagors in
default to avoid foreclosure under a deed of trust. 49 Bankruptcy rules under
various chapters automatically impose a stay against the enforcement of
343. The second notice stated if the default were not cured within ten days, the noteholder
"intends to accelerate," which seems to contemplate that a further notice of acceleration would
be given. Would the first notice have been effective if it had stated that "unless the default is
cured within ten days, you are hereby notified that the entire balance of the note will be due on
the eleventh day hereafter?"
344. Id. at 291. The court distinguished Vaughan v. Crown Plumbing & Sewer Serv., Inc.,
523 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no writ).
345. 543 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
346. Id. at 695.
347. 543 S.W.2d at 695 (quoting Crow v Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis in original)).
348. See Sylvester v. Watkins, 538 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See also Pruske v. National Bank of Commerce, 533 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976, no writ). In Purnell v. Follett, 555 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, no writ), the court held that the note must contain an express waiver of notice of
intent to accelerate; a provision waiving notice of demand and presentment is insufficient. If
the noteholder merely has the option to accelerate on default and there is no waiver of notice,
then demand for payment must first be made. Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1975).
349. See Draper, Stays of Mortgage Foreclosure-A Proposal for Reform, 93 BANKING L.J.
133 (1976); Werth & Reed, The Chapter XI Stay Order and the Secured Creditor, 38 OHIo ST.
L.J. 33 (1977). For an excellent general analysis see What Every Lawyer Must Know About
Bankruptcy, 12 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 435 (1977).
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liens during bankruptcy proceedings. Despite the stay, can a mortgagee
accelerate the maturity of the promissory note? Some of the bankruptcy
courts have taken the position that it cannot when the bankrupt is in fact the
maker of the note.350 In Melcer v. Warren351 the purchaser of property who
had assumed the payment of the note filed a bankruptcy petition. The
mortgagee notified the maker of the note of his election to accelerate. The
bankruptcy court subsequently ordered the property abandoned. The mort-
gagee took the position that the bankruptcy stay order did not preclude him
from accelerating the maturity of the note against the maker. The court of
civil appeals agreed with the mortgagee, holding that: "We do not find that
the Federal courts have construed Rule 601 with respect to facts under
which collection of a secured debt is sought by a creditor against a debtor
who is not the bankrupt but who himself is a creditor of the bankrupt. '352
The court concluded that "the Rule would not operate to stay appellant from
taking such steps as were necessary to accelerate the note and bring suit
against Warren [the maker] on the Note to recover personal judgment, '353
since the note and deed of trust specified that in the event of default the
noteholder could accelerate the note and then could sue for personal judg-
ment without resort to the lien.
Article 3810, 35' as amended effective January 1, 1976, requires that a
twenty-one day notice of foreclosure sale be given to each debtor obligated
to pay the debt, addressed to the most recent address shown on the notehol-
der's records. In the first reported decision under this amendment, the court
in Burnett v. Anderson35  held that the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon
the address of the divorced husband according to its records, in the absence
of evidence that it had a more current address. 3 6
6. Wrongful Foreclosure Under Deed of Trust.
A very complex factual setting produced somewhat clouded legal rea-
soning in Carruth v. First National Bank. 57 Carruth owned a tract of land
that was security for a $70,000.00 promissory note under a deed of trust. The
note was guaranteed by Adams who had arranged for the financing from
First National Bank of Fort Worth. Carruth later sold a part of the land to a
company owned by Adams, which assumed the $70,000.00 note. When the
Adams company later sold the land to a limited partnership, the bank
released part of the land from its liens in return for payment of $30,000.00 on
the $70,000.00 note, and made a new construction loan to the limited part-
350. Compare In re Atlanta Int'l Raceway, Inc., 513 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1975) with In re
Fontainbleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975), In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 91
F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1937), and Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 86 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1936).
351. 550 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
352. Id. at 762.
353. Id. at 763.
354. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
355. 543 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
356. Since the issue was not properly raised, the court did not decide whether the foreclo-
sure sale was defective because it was conducted before the substitute trustee received his
appointment. Id. at 17-18. Most deeds of trust, however, require that the appointment of a
substitute trustee be made in writing; any action by the substitute trustee prior to the appoint-
ment probably is ineffective.
357. 544 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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nership. When the Adams company failed to pay the balance of the
$70,000.00 note, the liens against the remainder of the Carruth tract were
foreclosed and the land was sold to the bank at a foreclosure sale. The bank
then sold the foreclosed tract to Adams and financed his purchase with a
new loan. The court of civil appeals found that there was evidence to
support the jury's finding (which was disregarded by the trial court) that the
bank and Adams conspired in the foreclosure of the property.358 The court
stated that although "the purpose to be accomplished is lawful and no
unlawful means are used, there can be no conspiracy," '359 and though the
bank argued that it had only exercised its legal right to foreclose, the
foreclosure was nevertheless "unlawful." The court's reasoning is difficult
to follow, and its conclusion, although probably correct, seems to be based
upon a false premise. The interpretation that the foreclosure was unlawful
was based upon the court's interpretation of the law of principal and sure-
ty,36 from which the court concluded that "the mortgagee bank could not
lawfully release the middle tract from the lien without the knowledge or
consent of Carruth."-3 61 This interpretation is incorrect because principal-
surety law provides only that such a release might release Carruth from any
further liability on the note,3 62 not that it would therefore be unlawful.
The proper rationale for holding the foreclosure to be unlawful is that the
true value3 63 of the released tract should have been paid to the bank which
would have then discharged the debt and the liens on the remainder of the
property. The court also more properly could have said that had it not been
for the conspiracy, Adams would have paid the balance of the $70,000.00
note and Carruth would have received title to the balance of the property
free of the bank's liens. If a finding of a civil conspiracy was necessary, and
if an unlawful act was an integral part of that finding, the court could have
reached the same holding without having to stretch the principal-surety law.
The bank's penalty for the conspiracy was an award to Carruth of
$200,000.00 damages. 3" The result in this case probably would have been
358. Adams and the bank had many previous dealings. The bank had an understanding with
Adams that it would foreclose, and that Adams' lawyer would be appointed substitute trustee
under the deed of trust. The amount of the bid, the resale to Adams, and the financing of the
purchase by the bank were all discussed in advance and Adams was aware that the only way he
could get the remainder of the land was through a foreclosure sale. Id. at 680-81.
359. Id. at 682.
360. The court reasoned as follows: (1) when Adam's company assumed the $70,000 note, it
became the principal and Carruth became the surety; (2) Carruth had the right to have the
security applied to the debt to the extent necessary to protect him against personal liability; (3)
if the bank released a part of the debt, Carruth was relieved of liability to the extent of the value
of that security; (4) and the bank could not release the security or otherwise deal with Adams so
as to destroy the security and enlarge the personal liability on the debt. 544 S.W.2d at 682. This
much of the court's reasoning was based upon sound principal-surety concepts. See, e.g., G.
OSBORNE, supra note 318, §§ 262, 269-270. The court, however, then jumped to the conclusion
that the release was "unlawful." 544 S.W.2d at 683. The court stressed the fact that Adam's
company had assumed the note. This raises the question of whether the result would be
different if the sale had been subject to "the note and liens." See G. OSBORNE, supra note 318,§ 515.
361. 544 S.W.2d at 683.
362. Carruth had no further liability on the note because the property was sold at foreclosure
sale for the full balance due on the $70,000.00 note. Id. at 680.
363. The jury found that the value of the released tract exceeded the balance due on the
note. Id. at 682.
364. The court's holding that the partial release caused the release of the remainder of the
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different if Carruth had joined in or consented to the bank's partial release,
since the court based its holding that the foreclosure sale was unlawful upon
the unauthorized release. Furthermore, most deed of trust forms contain
provisions that the mortgagee can deal with a successor or release any part
of the security without releasing the mortgagor.36 5 This case should serve as
a reminder to mortgagees that care must be exercised in the handling of
foreclosure sales, including the making of advance arrangements with third
parties who will bid at the sale. 366
Persons named as trustees in deeds of trust must, as a matter of contract
and practicality, act at the direction of the mortgagee. The mortgagee
generally selects the trustee, most often the mortgagee's attorney or em-
ployee. Texas courts have sanctioned this procedure by holding that a
foreclosure sale cannot be set aside merely because the trustee is the
mortgagee's employee. 367 This does not mean, however, that the trustee has
no obligation or responsibility to the mortgagor. In Hammonds v. Holmes368
a suit for wrongful foreclosure was filed against the bank president and the
bank vice-president, who was the trustee under the deed of trust. The Texas
Supreme Court held the trustee's responsibility to the mortgagor to be as
follows: "The trustee has a separate capacity [than that as officer of the
bank] and is imposed with a particular legal responsibility. He must act with
absolute impartiality and fairness to the grantor in performing the powers
vested in him by the deed of trust." 369 Similarly, in FLR Corp. v.
Blodgett,370 the court refused to set aside a foreclosure sale merely because
the trustee who had conducted the sale was the mortgagee's agent and
attorney. The court also stated the familiar rule that a mortgagee which
purchases property at a void or irregular foreclosure sale may nevertheless
retain possession of the property until the mortgagor pays the debt.
Attempts by mortgagees to foreclose for technical, non-payment defaults
under deeds of trust are not generally favored by Texas courts. 37' In Sara-
Nec v. Slape372 the court of civil appeals upheld a temporary injunction
tract is important only with respect to the damage issue. Carruth did not sue to set aside the
foreclosure sale. d. at 679.
365. Compare C. & G. Coin Meter Supply Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) with Casey-Swasey Co. v. AnderSon, 83 S.W. 840
(Tex. Civ. App. 1904, writ ref'd).
366. In at least some situations advance arrangements have been held not to make the
foreclosure sale invalid. See French v. May, 484 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
367. See American Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 588 (Tex. 1975). See also
Hart v. McClusky, 118 S.W.2d 1077, 1081 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ ref'd).
368. 21 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 51 (Nov. 12, 1977).
369. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 52 (citing First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902(Tex. 1962) (holding that the trustee abused his discretion in not allowing a bidder at foreclosure
sale to have until 4:00 p.m. of the day of the sale to tender his cash bid), and Fuller v. O'Neal,
69 Tex. 349, 6 S.W. 181 (1887)). The main issue before the court in Hammonds was whether a
previous suit for wrongful foreclosure against the bank was res judicata. The court held that it
was res judicata as to the bank president, who had acted only in his capacity as an employee,
but not against the vice president, who had acted in his separate capacity as trustee.
370. 541 S.W.2d 209, 214-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-E! Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a further
discussion of this case see notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., Redman v. Whitney, 541 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
372. 546 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ). Compare Black Lake Pipe
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against foreclosure for defaults based upon the following: (1) failure to
furnish a life insurance policy (which was obtained after the closing, and no
time for furnishing it was required); (2) failure to furnish a separate assump-
tion agreement (not required, and deed specified an assumption); (3) failure
to furnish a prepaid hazard insurance policy (furnished, although not fully
prepaid); (4) late payments of tax and insurance escrow (deed of trust only
required payments "each month"); and (5) failure to maintain and repair to
the "personal satisfaction" of the mortgagee (which had to be exercised in
good faith, and here it was not).373
Pachter v. Woodman,37 4 discussed in the 1977 Property Article, held that
an attorney's affidavit stating that the mortgagee's attorney had promised to
give him notice of any foreclosure sale and that he had found no notice of
sale posted at the designated place raised material issues of fact which made
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee improper. In
Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp.3 75 the court upheld a
temporary injunction restraining a trustee's sale under a deed of trust,
reasoning that, where a substantial claim of usury is asserted by the mort-
gagor, the trial judge has discretion to preserve the status quo until the net
amount of the indebtedness can be determined at a trial on the merits. The
court rejected the mortgagee's assertion that the right to sue for damages
and usury penalties is an adequate remedy at law, saying: "[w]hen own-
ership of real estate is at stake, [the] existence of a right of action for
damages is not [a] ground for denying equitable relief. '376 The court chas-
tised the mortgagee for wasting its time with an appeal, saying that a trial on
the merits with a preferred setting would have been the more appropriate
way to resolve the issue.
377
7. Use of Proceeds from Foreclosure Sale.
The general rule seems to be that the sale proceeds cannot be used to
discharge a prior lien unless the deed of trust so provides or the mortgagor
so agrees.378 The trustee, in Canfield v. Foxworth-Galbraith Lumber Co. ,379
used proceeds from a foreclosure sale of property under a second lien deed
of trust to pay off the first lien, and then paid the balance to the mortgagors.
Canfield, who after the foreclosure sale took an assignment from the mort-
gagors of any of their rights to any additional sale proceeds, sued the second
lienholder on the basis that the trustee had no authority to pay off the first
Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976) with B.B. Smith Co. v. Huddleston,
545 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
373. 544 S.W.2d at 705-06, 708. See Leipziger, The Mortgagee's Remedies for Waste, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1086 (1976).
374. 534 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976), rev'd, 547 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. 1977).
Pachter is discussed in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 64.
375. 544 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Smith v. Vial,
555 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
376. 544 S.W.2d at 688.
377. Id. at 689.
378. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5% (1949). Query whether the following clause in a deed of
trust would change the result: "the excess [of sales proceeds], if any, to Grantor or such other
person or persons entitled thereto by law"? Unless the prior note had been called, the result
would not likely change.
379. 545 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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lien and that he, as assignee, was entitled to those funds. The court agreed in
principle that the sale powers granted to the trustee under a deed of trust
must be strictly followed, 380 but held that, although there was no provision in
the deed of trust that expressly permitted the trustee to pay off the first lien,
the evidence nevertheless showed that the mortgagors waived any right to
the proceeds paid to the first lienholder and ratified the payment. Canfield,
the court believed, stood in the mortgagors' shoes and was likewise es-
topped from claiming those funds.
381
8. Attorneys' Fees.
Article 2226382 has been amended, effective August 29, 1977, to permit a
claimant to recover attorneys' fees in a suit on an oral or written contract.
Prior to the effective date of the amendment the court of civil appeals ruled
in Hodges v. Star Lumber & Hardware Co. ,383 a suit to recover the deficien-
cy on a promissory note after a foreclosure sale, that ten percent attorney's
fees could be recovered only on the amount of the deficiency. The note
contained the standard provision that, in the event of a default and place-
ment of the note in the hands of an attorney for collection or if suit were
filed, the makers would pay ten percent "on the amount of principal and
interest then owing, as attorney's fees." The trial court agreed with the
plaintiff that the words "then owing" meant owing at the time the note was
placed in the attorney's hands for collection. The appellate court, however,
apparently concluded that the words meant the amount owing at the time
suit was filed. 384 Would the result of this decision be different if suit were
filed on the full note balance before the foreclosure sale? Would the amend-
ment to article 2226 change the result of this decision? What if the note had
permitted the recovery of "reasonable attorney's fees" rather than ten
percent attorney's fees? 38 5 The court noted that the deed of trust was not
placed in evidence at the trial, and it did not know whether that instrument
contained a separate provision for the recovery of attorney's fees. 386 The
deed of trust contained, however, a provision that five percent "trustee's
380. Id. at 586.
381. Id. at 586-87. The defendant's bid at the foreclosure sale was conditioned upon the
trustee delivering a general warranty deed free of any encumbrances which, of course, the
trustee did not have the power to give. An alternative procedure would have been to buy the
property at the foreclosure sale subject to the first lien and then arrange to pay off the first lien.
In either case the purchaser should make certain that the first lien can be discharged, i.e., the
indebtedness can be repaid, if he wants his title to be free of that lien.
382. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
383. 544 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
384. Id. at 187. It is not clear in the opinion whether the court made this determination, or
whether it was simply limiting the attorney's fees on equitable principles.
385. The answer would be different only if the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees would
exceed ten percent of the deficiency. Under either provision, however, only reasonable attor-
neys' fees can be recovered. See Kuper v. Schmidt, 161 Tex. 189, 338 S.W.2d 948 (1960);
International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
386. 544 S.W.2d at 186. Deeds of trust sometimes contain provisions for attorneys' fees, but
recovery under such provisions is limited to attorneys' fees incurred by the mortgagee in
enforcing the deed of trust. There was no indication in the opinion in Hodges that any fees had
been incurred for this purpose; such a finding was fatal to the recovery of attorney's fees under
a deed of trust in American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Schenck, 85 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1935, no writ).
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fee" would be deducted from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale before
determining the amount of the deficiency, which probably more than
compensated the noteholder for any attorney's fees or expenses in excess of
the ten percent figure.
9. Substitution of Collateral.
Tax law developments are beyond the scope of this Article, but one recent
revenue ruling deserves special mention. In Revenue Ruling 77-294387 the
Internal Revenue Service ruled that an irrevocable escrow arrangement
entered into six months after an installment sale3"' will cause the seller's gain
to be accelerated. The escrow was arranged to allow the purchaser to
substitute cash in escrow as security for his promissory note in order that
the land could be released from the deed of trust lien. Under the, terms of the
escrow the seller could not accelerate the payment of the future note
installments. This ruling means that the seller owes income tax on the money
paid into escrow even though he does not actually receive the money until
the next installment payment becomes due. Revenue Ruling 77-294, how-
ever, further provides that if the escrow arrangement incident to a sale
imposes a "substantial restriction, in addition to the payment schedule,
upon the Seller's right to receipt of the sale proceeds," the sale may still
qualify for the installment sale election.
10. Mortgage or Deed.
In Carter v. Converse38 9 the court held that under the facts of the case a
deed was a mortgage, and that a subsequent purchaser had a duty to inquire
into the nature of the seller-mortgagee's title. The duty to inquire was based
upon the unusual facts of the case. The court cautioned:
[w]e are not prepared to say that in each real estate transaction, the
purchaser or his agent [attorney] should inquire directly to the seller, or
the seller's predecessor in title. There is no uniform standard of dili-
gence in checking title beyond the usual record title search. Beyond the
usual record title search, purchasers must use that diligence which fits
the situation.39°
If the deed is intended as a mortgage, the mortgagor-grantor has an equity of
redemption after paying the debt, at least in the absence of intervening rights
of innocent third parties. 391
B. Usury
The most significant usury decision during the survey period was the
supreme court's opinion in Tanner Development Co. v. Ferguson.392 The
387. 1977-34 I.R.B. 10. Rev. Rul. 68-246, 1968-1 C.B. 198, which had reached the opposite
result, was revoked. But see Jay Earl Oden, 56 T.C. 569 (1971).
388. See I.R.C. § 453(b) for the tax treatment of installment sales.
389. 550 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also First Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Avila, 538 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
discussed in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 59.
390. 550 S.W.2d at 330; see note 48 supra and accompanying text.
391. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Atwood, 150 Tex. 617, 244 S.W.2d 637 (1951). See also
Bradshaw v. McDonald, 147 Tex. 455, 216 S.W.2d 972 (1949).
392. 21 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 25 (Oct. 22, 1977).
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opinion of the court of civil appeals393 was discussed and criticized in the
1977 Property Article, 31 thus only the essential facts will be repeated.
Tanner Development Co. sold land to Ferguson in 1973, at which time the
purchaser paid in advance one year's interest on the purchase money pro-
missory note at the rate of nine and one-half percent a year as stipulated in
the note. In addition the note required quarterly interest payments in adv-
ance, beginning with the first quarter following the sale. The one year's
prepaid interest was to be credited to the note beginning in July of 1977.
When the purchaser defaulted in the note payments, Tanner Development
Co. moved to foreclose the lien against the property, and the purchaser filed
suit to restrain the sale and to recover usurious interest and penalties. The
trial court found the note not to be usurious, but the court of civil appeals
disagreed. Five months after it was filed by Tanner Development Co. the
Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error, and six months later the
supreme court reversed and rendered for Tanner Development Co.
The court in Tanner Development Co. was faced with the issue of whether
the one year's prepaid interest should be deducted from the face amount of
the note to arrive at the "true" principal amount of the note on which the
interest was charged. 395 The trial court had treated the stated face amount of
the note as the true principal amount, while the court of civil appeals had
deducted the amount of the one year's prepaid interest from the stated face
amount to arrive at the true principal amount of the note. The trial court, in
accordance with the savings clause39 in the note, credited the unaccrued
portion of the one year's prepaid interest to the principal balance of the
note. The court of civil appeals, however, included the one year's prepaid
interest in its calculation to determine if excessive interest had been charged
on the reduced true principal amount. The Texas Supreme Court agreed
with the trial court, holding that the stated face amount of the note was the
true principal amount; the one year's prepaid interest was not principal and
should have been applied to the note as provided in the savings clause.319
The decision in Tanner Development Co. with respect to the proper
determination of the true principal balance of the note is important in
another respect. The note signed by Ferguson was a wrap-around note: it
included the principal balance of a note secured by a prior lien in addition to
the deferred portion of the purchase price payable to Tanner Development
Co. Tanner Development Co. is the first Texas decision to construe a wrap-
around note in a usury context. Prior to this decision there was a question
393. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976), rev'd, 21 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 25 (Oct. 25, 1977).
394. Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 71-73.
395. At issue before the court was whether the insistence of the appellee to make a one year
prepayment of interest for tax reasons would excuse the usurious interest. The court held that it
would not.
396. The savings clause provided that "[i]n the event of the prepayment of principal. . . or
accelerated maturity . . . any interest paid on this note which is in excess of the maximum
lawful rate permitted by the usury laws . . . shall be considered for all purposes as payment on
principal, and so credited to the note." 21 TEX. Sup. CT. J. at 25.
397. The court stated that the court of civil appeals compounded its error not only by
deducting the prepaid interest from principal but also by including it in computing the amount of
interest charged. Id. at 27.
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whether a Texas court would consider the full amount of the note or only the
portion attributable to the deferred purchase price, in determining the true
principal amount of the note for purposes of a possible usury violation.
Tanner Development Co. seems to have settled this question, at least when
there are similar facts, by treating the entire amount as the true principal
balance of the note.
In addition to resolving this question the Texas Supreme Court also dealt
with the appellee's argument that under the holding of Commerce Trust Co.
v. Ramp398 the note was usurious. In order to resolve this issue, the court
had to decide whether it would adhere to the adopted opinion in Commerce
Trust Co. or would follow its earlier decision in Nevels v. Harris.399 In
Commerce Trust Co. the court held that if the payment of interest during
any one year of the loan exceeded ten percent the loan was usurious, even
though the total interest payable over the full term of the loan was less than
ten percent. Nevels, however, stands for the proposition that the loan will
not be usurious if the interest charged, when spread over the full term of the
loan, is less than ten percent. The Texas Supreme Court resolved the
conflict4 in favor of the position in Nevels, at least in fact situations that
fall within the limited scope of Tanner Development Co., and stated:
Since the contract in question provided Ferguson, the payor, with the
full use of the consideration represented by the actual face amount of
the note (the ten acres of land) for the entire term of the contract, and
since usury penalties are now applied to the entire contract, we are
compelled to hold that the advance interest payable under the present
note should be spread over the entire term of the contract. To do
otherwise would be manifestly unfair and unjust under the law as it
existed when the Ferguson-Tanner contract was executed. In our opin-
ion, it would be beyond the obvious intent of the Legislature in the
enactment of Article 5069-1.06 to impose its severe penalties solely
upon proof that one year's interest payments exceeded the statutory
limit, where over the effective period of the contract, interest payments
were not, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount authorized by law.
We hold, therefore, that the note in question was not usurious. 4
On motion for rehearing the court further reiterated that its decision does
not authorize the allowance of deductions on money loans, saying: "in cash
loan transactions from which the lender deducts interest, fees, commissions
or other front-end charges, the amount of dollars actually received or
retained by the borrower is held to be the 'true' principal. In such cases the
amount of the stated principal is reduced accordingly in testing for us-
398. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940). Ramp was followed in Southwestern Inv. Co. v.
Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd
n.r.e., per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (1974).
399. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937). Nevels was followed in Imperial Corp. of
America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972).
400. The court candidly observed: "It must be conceded that during the decade of 1930 to
1940 this Court was not entirely consistent in its writings on this phase of the usury law." 21
TEX. SuP. CT. J. at 28.
401. Id. at 31. The court was persuaded that the spreading provision enacted in 1975 in TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a) (Vernon 1975) adopted the Nevels doctrine of spreading
interest over the whole term of the loan, whether it is judicially determined to be interest or so
stipulated by the parties and regardless of the form it takes. Id. at 30-31.
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ury."402 The supreme court further limited its holding to contracts covered
by article 5069-1.06(1) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, where the
stated rate of interest in the contract does not exceed ten percent a year and
where the stated interest and judicially determined interest is no greater than
the principal debt would produce at ten percent a year during the full time
the debtor has use of the principal debt or land. This case raises a question
of whether a lender can escape this result by funding the full loan amount
and shortly afterward collecting fees or other "front-end" charges. Evi-
dence of the probable answer may be found in the following statement made
by the supreme court on the rehearing of Tanner Development Co.: "Clearly
this transaction is distinguishable from a loan of money, and there was no
reason to judicially reduce the principal of the note so long as Ferguson had
use of the land and forbearance on the stated principal during the entire term
of the note." 3 Tanner Development Co. does not answer all questions on
the points discussed in its opinion. It is not authority that, for purposes of
testing for usury, the face amount of the note is the true principal amount, if
subsequent to the date the face amount is delivered to the debtor, he is
required to pay the lender "front-end charges" (interest). Nor is it authority
for spreading interest under a note with a stated rate of interest that exceeds
the maximum lawful rate in one year (e.g., twelve percent), although the
stated rate for that year when spread over the full term would be less than
the maximum lawful rate. Nor can it be said with certainty that the court
would treat the face amount of a wrap-around note as the true principal
amount in a transaction not involving the sale of real property. Further
questions raised which are not answered by the court's language are whether
the Nevels doctrine can be applied to a loan which is not secured by real
property, and whether a "savings" clause is essential to bridge the gap, if
one exists.
Miller v. First State Bank0 considered some of the same issues as were
considered in Tanner Development Co. and may answer some of these
questions. In Tanner Development Co. the borrower received the full use
and benefit of the "loan" in the form of the land he purchased and the court
held that the transaction was not a loan of money from which any fee,
commission, or interest was withheld from the borrower. Miller, on the
other hand, involved a loan of $70,000, of which $14,000 was "frozen" to
pay the first two year's interest on the note; thus, Miller only received the
use and benefit of $56,000.405 Miller may depart from Tanner Development
Co. in another respect. Tanner Development Co. permits the spreading of
interest over the entire term of the loan, something which the court of civil
appeals seemingly refused to do in Miller, although it is not entirely clear
how the court reached the result it did without spreading. The facts in
Tanner Development Co., however, involved three important factors not
402. 21 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 104 (Dec. 10, 1977).
403. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
404. 551 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ granted). [Editor's note: aff'das
modified, 21 Tex. Sub. Ct. J. 236 (March 4, 1978).]
405. The court stated that "the Bank comingled the $14,000.00 in the frozen account with its
own funds and has loaned all or portions of it to other customers at interest as if it were its own
funds." Id. at 94.
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present in Miller: (1) the maker of the note received the full use and benefit
of what it bargained for (i.e., the land); (2) the loan was secured by real
property while the loan in Miller was secured by a collateral assignment of a
lien on real property;' and (3) the note in Tanner Development Co.
contained a "savings" clause 7 (but not a "spreading" clause) while the
note in Miller did not. The court in Miller concluded that: "absent a savings
clause in a loan agreement requiring what would have otherwise been
usurious interest in any one year to be spread over the term of the loan, the
prepayment of interest in excess of 10% per annum in any one year is a
violation of the usury statute." 40 The plaintiff was awarded penalties of
$42,000, or twice the interest charged, recovered the $14,000 in interest
already paid, and was excused from the payment of future interest on the
note. It is difficult to distinguish the frozen account involved in Miller from
a non-interest bearing compensating balance account which has not specific-
ally been classified as interest, or an amount required to be deducted to
arrive at the true principal amount of a loan.Q
Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply,41° although not a real property case,
is noteworthy because it further clarifies the meaning of "charges" under
article 5069-1.06.41 A retailer had charged to a customer's open account
one and one-half percent of the balance per month as a "finance charge,"
even though there was no agreement with the customer that he would pay
the charge, and in fact he did not pay the charge. In reversing the appellate
court the Texas Supreme Court held that article 5069-1.06 does not require
that interest be charged pursuant to an agreement. The court held: "By
unilaterally charging the one and one-half percent per month 'finance
charge', the retailer in this case charged more than ten percent per annum,
and is, therefore, liable for penalties. 41 There has been some question as to
whether cases such as Windhorst and Moore v. Sabine National Bank,43
both involving finance charges on consumer loans, are authority for cases
involving loans on real property. They appear to be such authority since the
supreme court, in overruling Ferguson's motion for rehearing in Tanner
Development Co., distinguished these cases only on the basis that the
406. This apparently is not an important distinction; it is unclear whether the Texas Supreme
Court in Tanner Development Co. intended, when stating that article 5069-1.07(a) merely
codified Nevels, to draw a distinction between loans secured by real property and those that are
not. The court said "[t]his opinion is limited to contracts covered by Article 5069-1.06(1)...,"
which pertains to all loans. 21 TEX. SuP. CT. J. at 31.
407. The note in Tanner Development Co. disclaimed any intent to collect usurious interest,
and provided that any interest in excess of the lawful rate would be credited to the note as a
payment on principal. See note 396 supra.
408. 551 S.W.2d at 98. The court in Miller found an implied intent to charge usury and, as in
Tanner Development Co., held the fact that the borrower's attorney conceived the loan plan
was irrelevant. Id. at 100-01. The court also held that penalty interest could be recovered on
interest contracted for as well as interest actually collected. Id. at 100.
409. In an interview published in the January 26, 1977, edition of The Houston Post, Judge
Spurlock is reported as having said that the court in Miller did not want to get into the issue of
compensating balances which he acknowledged was a "first cousin" of the frozen account
involved in Miller. See also Greig v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
410. 547 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1977), rev'g 542 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976).
411. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
412. 547 S.W.2d at 261. See also Wall v. East Tex. Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.
1976), and the attendant discussion in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 72.
413. 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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"charge" made by Tanner Development Co. was for the unpaid principal
balance, thus implying that any unearned interest would be credited to
principal in accordance with the terms of the note. 414 Lawyers and their
clients should heed the warning which is again sounded, in Windhorst and
Tanner Development Co. and be careful about the demands for interest
which are made in collection letters.
Boyd v. Life Insurance Co. 415 clearly settles the issue that a penalty
charged by a noteholder for the right to prepay a promissory note is not
interest. Hutchison v. Commercial Trading Co.416 is another case in a
growing line in which an individual unsuccessfully alleged that he was the
alter ego of a corporate borrower in an effort to claim that interest in excess
of ten percent a year was usurious. The court in Hutchison observed that
Texas courts have approved the lender-imposed requirement that the bor-
rower incorporate before a loan is granted, and the rule that the borrower
must show fraud or illegality to avoid the transaction. If, however, the court
predicted, "a lender utilized his superior bargaining position to require an
inexperienced borrower to incorporate for a loan known to be personal and
necessitous, Texas courts would likely ignore the corporate form and find
usury." 417 Walker v. Ross 418 has been remanded for a new trial to determine
whether a fee charged by a person who had obtained a loan for the ultimate
borrower was interest or compensation for services separate and apart from
the loan. The court of civil appeals determined that Ross was a lender rather
than a broker, since he actually obtained the loan from the bank and made a
loan in the same amount plus the "fee" to Walker.
Various constitutional questions have been raised recently regarding the
Texas usury laws. First, it has been suggested that article 5069-1.07419
violates the Texas Constitution42 because effective ceilings on interest rates
under the usury laws are eliminated. 42' On another point the Texas attorney
general has opined that a proposed amendment to section 3.15 of the usury
statute, 422 which would authorize the state finance commission to establish
maximum interest rates for small loans, would be an unconstitutional dele-
gation by the legislature of its power to establish maximum interest rates. 423
A third front for constitutional attack on Texas usury statutes may have
been suggested in an unpublished notice of intended decision of a California
court in Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v. California .424 The
414. 21 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 103, 104-05 (Dec. 10, 1977).
415. 546 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd). See also Gulf
Coast Inv. Corp. v. Pritchard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e.,
per curiam, 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1969).
416. 427 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The borrower was an existing corporation. Other
Texas decisions on this point are discussed in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 66-69
and in Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 46-47.
417. 427 F. Supp. at 666.
418. 548 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 554 S.W.2d
189 (Tex. 1977).
419. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
420. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
421. See Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748,
764-65 (1975). Contra, Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 45 n.151.
422. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.15 (Vernon 1971).
423. Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 146 (May 30, 1977).
424. No. C 158,433 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1977). See Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1977, at 11, col.
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1934 amendments to the California constitution that were tested in this case
limited to ten percent a year the interest rate that could be charged by
lenders. California banks, saving and loan associations, finance companies,
and thrift and loan companies, however, were exempt from this ten percent
limitation. The court held that the 1934 constitutional amendments violated
both the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, 425 by impeding
the flow of money between California and other states, and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 42 6 by permiting exempt
lenders to charge higher rates of interest than non-exempt lenders in non-
consumer loan transactions. A valid question is raised as to whether the
reasoning in the California case has any application to various Texas stat-
utes that permit lenders in certain classes to charge higher rates of interest
than other classes of lenders.
427
IV. MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
Once again the survey period was an active one in the area of mechanic's
and materialmen's liens as the courts continued to clarify and interpret the
Texas mechanic's and materialmen's lien statutes.
428
A. Perfecting the Lien
1. Sufficiency of Affidavit.
Although the mechanic's and materialmen's lien statutes of Texas are
liberally construed in favor of protecting laborers and materialmen, 429 the
Texas courts, as evidenced in Perkins Construction Co. v. Ten-Fifteen
Corp. ,430 continued to follow the general rule that a purported lien affidavit
containing only an acknowledgement, and no jurat, is fatally defective, and
does not constitute an affidavit within the meaning of article 5453.43
1
2. Sham Contractor Statute.
The sham contractor statute, article 5452-1 (1),432 provides that whenever
an owner enters into a construction contract with a corporation which the
owner can "effectively control," any subcontractor under such contract
shall be deemed to be in a direct contractual relationship with the owner, and
as such may perfect the lien of an original contractor against the property. In
425. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
426. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
427. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (Vernon 1964), which excepts
from the definition of "interest" certain charges made by savings and loan associations, and
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978), which permits all lenders to
charge interest of 1 1/2% a month to all borrowers on certain real estate loans of $500,000 or more.
Article 852a, § 507 is discussed in Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 73-74.
428. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-5472e (Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally Urban
& Miles, Mechanic's Liens for the Improvement of Real Property: Recent Developments in
Perfection, Enforcement and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283 (1976).
429. See Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972). Under this rule substan-
tial compliance with the statutory requirements is generally sufficient to give rise to a valid lien.
Texcalco, Inc. v. McMillan, 524 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
430. 545 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
431. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See Conn, Sherrod & Co. v.
Tri-Electric Supply Co., 535 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 74.
432. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5452-1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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Shaw v. McPhail Electric Co. 433 the undisputed evidence showed that the
subcontractor was first contacted by one of the owners of the property who
showed the subcontractor around the project and acted for the corporation
in pointing out the work which needed to be done. Additionally, the corpora-
tion's name contained the name of the particular owner involved. The court
of civil appeals held that this evidence was sufficient to support the conclu-
sion that the corporation had some contact with the landowners and that the
owners had control of the corporation within the meaning of the sham
contractor statute. Accordingly, the subcontractor could perfect his lien by
taking the steps prescribed for original contractors in article 5453(l), 434
without complying with the additional requirements applicable to subcon-
tractors in article 5453(2). 435 Additionally, the court held that it was proper
for the lien claimant to mail notice of the lien to the owner of the property as
of the time the notice was sent, rather than to the former property owners as
of the time the materials were furnished.436
B. Priorities
1. Inception of the Lien.
Section two of article 5459437 provides that the inception of a mechanic's
and materialmen's lien is the occurrence of the earliest of the following: (1)
actual commencement of construction or delivery of material to be used in
construction to the land if either is actually visible from inspection of the
land; (2) the proper recording of the written agreement, if any, to perform or
furnish materials; or (3) the proper recording of a sufficient affidavit by the
lien claimant of an oral agreement for construction. Several cases decided
during the survey period shed further light on what gives rise to the incep-
tion of a lien. 438
One of the most important of these cases is Blaylock v. Dollar Inns of
America, Inc. ,43 in which the court of civil appeals considered what consti-
tutes "commencement of construction" or "delivery of material." The
court noted that these questions must be determined on the facts of each
particular case, with the key inquiry being whether the commencement of
construction or delivery of materials was of sufficient visibility that upon
inspection of the land a person would have been put on notice that construc-
tion had commenced or that materials had been delivered." 0 The court also
held that the term "materials""' under the lien statutes includes "stakes,
433. 544 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
434. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
435. Id. art. 5453(2). See Da-Col Paint Mfg. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 517 S.W.2d 270
(Tex. 1974), discussed in Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 56.
436. Presumably the new owners were on notice of the ongoing construction on the proper-
ty. See Inman v. Clark, 485 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
437. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
438. During the previous survey period this issue was discussed in Justice Mortgage Inves-
tors v. C.B. Thompson Constr. Co., 533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 77-78. See generally Comment, Mechan-
ic's Liens-Priority Over Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, 42 Mo. L. REv. 53 (1977).
439. 548 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ granted).
440. Id. at 93 1.
441. The term "materials" is defined in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5452, § 2(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1978) to include any "material, machinery, fixtures or tools" incorporated in the work or
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iron rods, concrete pipe and lumber for batter boards."" ' 2 Accordingly, the
court held that when, prior to the execution or recording of the deed of trust
in question, the contractor had delivered wooden stakes to the site, survey-
ed the property, placed the stakes at various points on the site, delivered
lumber, begun the erection of batter boards, and started the excavation
work, the mechanic's lien had its inception prior to the deed of trust lien." 3
The court did not state the precise date on which the mechanic's lien
commenced; rather, the court held only that there was sufficient work and
delivery of materials prior to effective date of the deed of trust lien.4"
Certainly it would be good policy for the lender to conduct an inspection of
the property just prior to the closing of the loan and to photograph the
property.
Nevertheless, the court of civil appeals held that, although the deed of
trust lien was created subsequent to the inception of the mechanic's lien, the
deed of trust lien was superior to the extent of the purchase money lien to
which it was subrogated.445 The court relied on Irving Lumber Co. v. Alitex
Mortgage Co. 446 which held that a vendor's lien will always have its incep-
tion prior to a mechanic's lien. In Blaylock, however, there was no express
vendor's lien, but the court of civil appeals extended the Irving Lumber
decision by holding that a lien for purchase money is to be treated as a
vendor's lien for purposes of determining priorities." 7 This priority extends,
however, only to the extent of the purchase money advanced. Furthermore,
although all mechanic's liens were cut off by the foreclosure under the deed
of trust, the court held that mechanic's lienholders were entitled to have
their liens satisfied out of any consideration received at foreclosure which
exceeded the purchase money loaned by the grantee of the deed of trust.
This holding implies that the lender could cut off all rights of lien claimants
merely by bidding in at foreclosure no more than the amount of the purchase
money advanced.
Hagler v. Continental National Bank'6 raised many of the same issues
dealt with in the Blaylock case. In Hagler the contractor argued that his
consumed in the direct prosecution of the work, or ordered and delivered for such incropora-
tion or consumption.
442. 548 S.W.2d at 931.
443. Compare the result in Blaylock with the results in Perkins Constr. Co. v. Ten-Fifteen
Corp., 545 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (clearing job site not
sufficient to constitute commencement of construction), and Justice Mortgage Investors v.
C.B. Thompson Constr. Co., 533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(placing tool shed on property and preliminary staking not sufficient).
444. Although the lien claimant was an original contractor, the court did not mention the
inception standards under the constitutional lien provided in TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 37.
445. Where money is advanced with an understanding or under circumstances giving rise to
an understanding that the advancement shall be secured by a first lien upon the property, the
lender will generally be subrogated to the prior liens discharged by the money so advanced. See
Perkins Constr. Co. v, Ten-Fifteen Corp., 545 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976,
no writ). See also Ferris v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 545 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1976, no writ); Whiteselle v. Texas Loan Agency, 27 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894,
writ ref'd). See also notes 333-41 supra and accompanying text.
446. 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971).
447. Actually the Texas Supreme Court opinion in the Irving Lumber case suggests this
result. 468 S.W.2d at 343; see Youngblood, Mechanics'and Materialmen's Liens in Texas, 26
Sw. L.J. 665, 697 (1972).
448. 549 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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mechanic's lien was superior to the deed of trust lien, except to the extent of
purchase money advanced. The construction contract, however, was not
recorded as required by article 5459; and, therefore, the court held that
although the contract was executed prior to the deed of trust, the lien could
not relate back to the date of contract. The court of civil appeals affirmed
the trial court's judgment that the point in time when construction or
materials became actually visible from an inspection of the land was subse-
quent to the deed of trust, and thus the deed of trust lien was superior." 9
During the survey period two cases were decided which concerned the
difficult question of whether the inception of each original contractor's lien
must be determined separately, or whether all such liens relate back to the
inception of the first lien applicable to the property. 50 Perkins Construction
Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp.451 and Ferris v. Security Savings & Loan Associa-
tion452 apparently adopted the rule that one original contractor cannot relate
its lien back to the inception date of the lien of another original contractor.4 53
In the Ferris case the court held that the owner's contract with a supplier to
furnish air conditioners did not relate back to the time of the original
construction contract because the supplier was not a subcontractor under
the original contract nor was the obligation incurred under the original
contract. Interestingly, the facts arose prior to the 1971 revision of article
5459454 and the Ferris decision appears to be in conflict with the single lien
theory suggested in the well known case of Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths4 5
and other cases decided prior to the revision.45
6
Even though the original contract price has been paid in full, the contrac-
tor generally may still perfect a lien for extra work.45 7 The court in Perkins
Construction Co. v. Ten-Fifteen Corp.458 held, however, that the inception
date of the lien for extra work done after the completion of and payment for
the original work does not relate back to the date of the original contract. 9
2. "Whirlpool Doctrine."
A mechanic's and materialmen's lien is given preference over all prior
recorded liens unless the prior lien will be "affected" by the enforcement of
the mechanic's lien4 60 Under the doctrine announced in First National Bank
449. The Hagler case also failed to discuss the possibility of different inception standards
under the constitutional lien.
450. See Woodward, The Hardeman Act-Some Unanswered Questions, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1 (1974). See also Youngblood, supra note 447, at 694-96.
451. 545 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
452. 545 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
453. The court in Perkins cited McConnell v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d
280 (1957), a case which was decided prior to the 1971 revision of TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5459 (Vernon Supp. 1978), and which does not seem to support the conclusion reached by
the court.
454. The 1971 amendment is compatible with the single lien concept which appears to have
been the prior law. See Youngblood, supra note 447, at 694-95.
455. 88 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1896).
456. Irving Lumber Co. v. AlItex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); University
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1967).
457. Herron v. Lackey, 554 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977), aff'd as reform-
ed, 556 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1977) (rate of interest on judgment reformed).
458. 545 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
459. Id. at 496.
460. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § I (Vernon Supp. 1978). See Heath & Bentley
(1977), supra note 2, at 79.
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v. Whirlpool Corp. ,461 a prior lien will be affected if the removal of im-
provements will cause material injury to the land, to pre-existing im-
provements, or to the improvements to be removed. The court in Ferris v.
Security Savings & Loan Association462 held that certain air conditioning
units were so affixed to the realty that they were a part of the realty; thus, a
prior deed of trust lien was held to be superior to the mechanic's lien as to
such units. The court, however, made no mention of whether the units could
be removed without damage, and this is generally the key inquiry in such
cases.
463
3. Trust Fund Statute.
In Stone Fort National Bank v. Elliot Electric Supply Co. 465 the court held
that, although a materialman of a subcontractor had failed to send notices
within the required thirty-six days after the tenth day of the month following
each month during which materials were supplied,' the materialman
nevertheless could recover under the trust fund statute ten percent of the
contract price which had been retained by the original contractor from the
subcontractor. The court also held that under article 5472e, 67 the mate-
rialman had priority over the security interest of a bank as to the accounts
receivable of the subcontractor. 46
C. Performance and Payment Bonds4 69
Article 5160470 provides that no suit shall be brought on a performance
bond after one year from the date the contract is finally completed. The
court in Bayshore Constructors, Inc. v. Southern Montgomery County Mu-
nicipal Utility District 47 1 held that because the contractor had agreed to
correct any defects which appeared within one year after acceptance of the
work, the contract was not finally completed until the one year "remedy"
period had elapsed; therefore, suit on the performance was not statutorily
prohibited.
V. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Construction of Lease Agreements
1. Renewal Options.
Lease agreements frequently give the tenant an option to renew the lease
461. 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974). See also Hammann v. McMullen & Co., 122 Tex. 476, 62
S.W.2d 59 (1933); see Wallenstein (1975), supra note 2, at 48-49.
462. 545 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
463. See Houk Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 593 (Tex Civ.
App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
464. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Vernon Supp. 1978). The statute declares funds
borrowed for the improvement of real property to be trust funds for the benefit of suppliers and
laborers. See Heath & Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 80.
465. 548 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
466. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453-2(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
467. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Vernon Supp. 1978).
468. 548 S.W.2d at 446. See Panhandle Bank & Trust Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 492 S.W.2d
76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
469. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5160-5160a (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1978). See also
id. art. 5472d (Vernon Supp. 1978).
470. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon 1971).
471. 543 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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for an additional term. Inflation makes it very difficult for landlords to
predetermine the exact rental rate for the renewal period, which has resulted
in their attempts to couch the provisions for renewal at the then prevailing
rate for similar properties, "at a rate to be agreed upon by the parties," or
some similar provision. The indefiniteness of the renewal rate in such a
provision opens the provision to attack. In Stephenson v. Chrisman,411
discussed in the 1977 Property Article, the court concluded that there is a
division of authority on the question, but postponed a decision on the
enforceability of a lease renewal option provision which leaves the rental
rate to the future agreement of the parties. One Texas court473 has held that a
lease provision giving the lessee the "first right to renew this lease at a price
to be agreed upon or to meet any bona-fide offer" is indefinite, uncertain,
and unenforceable, although the court might have enforced the provision if
the language "or to meet any bona-fide offer" had been omitted. Another
Texas court4 4 refused to enforce an option to renew "at the price the party
of the first part is willing to rent to any one else," but the Texas Supreme
Court in refusing error 475 disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion that
the renewal provision was void for uncertainty.
The question again arose in Aycock v. Vantage Management Co. 476 which
involved the following lease renewal option: "The rental for the renewal
term shall be based on then prevailing rental rates for properties of equiva-
lent quality, size, utility and location, with the length of the lease term and
credit standing of the Lessee to be taken in account."477 The court held that
this option provision was not void for uncertainty. In Aycock the court
endorsed section 2.305(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides:
"The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though
the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the
time for delivery if . . .(2) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and
they fail to agree .... .- 478 Although the Uniform Commercial Code is
inapplicable to leases of real property, the court nevertheless found the
principle established in section 2.305(a) to be sound. The most recent draft
of the proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act 479 incorporates this same
provision with respect to leases of real property. In addition the court in
Aycock said the renewal option did establish some standards for determin-
ing the rental rate for the option period. The landlord contended that the
renewal provision was less indefinite than a provision for a "reasonable"
472. 537 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ). See Heath & Bentley
(1977), supra note 2, at 85-86.
473. Schlusselberg v. Rubin, 465 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). This appears to be the majority rule. See 2 M. FRIEDMAN, LEASES § 14. 1, at 562 (1974).
But see Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).
474. Pickrell v. Buckler, 293 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), writref'dpercuriam, 116
Tex. 567, 296 S.W. 1062 (1927).
475. Pickrell v. Buckler, 116 Tex. 567, 296 S.W. 1061 (1927) (per curiam).
476. 554 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
477. Id. at 236.
478. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.305(a) (Vernon 1968). The court also cited
numerous decisions of courts in other states, most of which involved some standard for
determining the renewal rate. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 500 (1974).
479. Section 2-203(a). The Uniform Land Transactions Act is discussed in Heath & Bentley
(1977), supra note 2, at 102-103, and in this Article in the section "Legislation."
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rental rate because it provided that the credit standing of the tenant could be
considered. The court rejected this contention as there was no evidence that
the tenant's credit standing was weak or would be a material factor in
determining the rental rate. The court also held that the provision in the
lease allowing the landlord to set the proposed renewal rate required that its
determination be made in good faith and consistent with the standards
provided in the renewal provision. 480 Finally, although the lease renewal
option clause before the court in Aycock provided standards for determining
the renewal rental rate, there is language in the court's opinion indicating
that the court would have enforced the option even if it had only provided
that the renewal rate would be the rate agreed upon by the parties. 4 1
The court in Hampton v. Lum 482 held that a lease provision calling for an
automatic renewal for a "like term" was unambiguous. Furthermore, the
court believed that the requirement that thirty days' notice be given in order
to avoid the automatic renewal483 meant notice prior to the end of the
original term. The court stated that a provision of this type should be treated
as a present lease for the full original and renewal terms, subject to an option
to terminate the lease at the end of the original term by giving the required
notice .484
2. Services Provided by Landlord.
Leases of office space now commonly limit the landlord's obligation to
furnish air conditioning and heating to regular office hours, and require an
additional charge for use at other times. A lease agreement signed before the
recent energy crisis, considered by the court in Gihls Properties, Inc. v.
Main LaFrentz & Co.,485 provided that the landlord would keep the heating
and air conditioning units "in good and substantial repair and in tenantable
condition." After the energy crisis in 1974 the landlord notified the tenant
that air conditioning or heating services would be provided after noon on
Saturdays and on Sundays at a charge of $10.34 an hour. The court of civil
appeals stated that air conditioning and heating obviously would be required
480. The court referred to TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.305(b) (Vernon 1968), which
requires that if the price is to be set by the seller it must be set in good faith. The same provision
appears in the proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act § 2-203(c). For an analogy to a sale of
land, the court cited Young v. Warren, 444 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court, under somewhat unusual facts, enforced an agreement to sell
land for a "fair price."
The court in Schlusselberg avoided the supreme court's pronouncement in Pickrell on the
grounds that the rental rate under the renewal option before the court inPickrell was not to be
set by the agreement of the parties, but by the choice of the lessor. The lessor could, the court
in Schlusselberg concluded, under an option allowing him to set the renewal rate, simply set the
rate higher than the lessee would be willing to pay. One court, however, has held that if the
lessor chooses a renewal rate that is unconscionable, the court will set a proper rate. Tai On
Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 App. Div. 2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1970).
481. 554 S.W.2d at 237.
482. 544 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
483. Automatic renewal clauses are discussed in 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 473, § 14.4.
484. 544 S.W.2d at 840. Statutes in New York and Wisconsin make automatic renewal
clauses inoperative unless advance written notice is given to the tenant before the end of the
original lease term. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-905 (McKinney 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.15
(West 1975). California requires that such a provision in a printed lease is void unless printed in
at least eight-point type. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1945.5 (West 1954).
485. 542 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
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to keep the premises in tenantable condition as provided by the lease, but
that since the services were made available there was no basis for issuance
of a temporary injunction pending trial.
3. Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases.
Texas courts have consistently rejected the concept of implied warranty
of habitability in leases of residential real property. Two decisions during
the survey period followed this well-established rule, but a very significant
writ of error has been granted in one of those cases. In Kamarath v.
Bennett486 the apartment tenant argued that a month-to-month oral lease
carried an implied warranty of habitability and, along with it, a duty to repair
in order to bring the property into compliance with city building code
standards. The court of civil appeals was of the opinion that: "[t]he rule is
well-settled in Texas that in the absence of fraud or deceit, there is no
implied covenant that the demised premises are fit for occupation, or for the
particular use which the tenant intends to make of them. A landlord is not
bound to repair unless there be a covenant or agreement on his part to do
SO."487 The court in Kamarath refused to extend the holding of Humber v.
Morton488 to a lease of residential property. In Humber the Texas Supreme
Court discarded the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of a new house and
found an implied warranty that the house had been constructed in a good
workmanlike manner and was suitable for human habitation. 4 9 The court in
Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments4 likewise followed the estab-
lished rule, and held that even if Texas adopted a rule of implied warranty of
habitability, it would not operate to impose a requirement that the landlord
provide mail delivery facilities for his tenants. In a concurring opinion
Justice Guittard acknowledged the well-established rule, but questioned
whether the present Texas Supreme Court will follow it: "[t]his rule has
recently lost its vigor with the strong trend of decisions and legislation
toward protection of consumers. It has collapsed and been pronounced dead
in the case of sales of new houses. . . .Caveat emptor seems to me equally
moribund as applied to residential leases." '49' Additionally, the Texas De-
486. 549 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ granted). The city building inspector
notified the landlord that he would have to repair the property or close down, and the landlord
chose the latter.
487. Id. at 786 (citations omitted). An implied warranty of habitability under residential
leases also was rejected in Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 558 P.2d 563 (Colo. 1977) (en banc),
although many jurisdictions are holding that the warranty exists. See, e.g., Goggin v. Fox
Valley Constr. Corp., 48 III. App.3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1977). In Kirsner v. Reid, 98 S. Ct.
119, 54 L. Ed. 2d 94 (1977), petition for certiorari was denied on the plaintiff's challenge to the
constitutionality of a City of Baltimore code which provides that every written or oral lease of
dwellings must contain an implied warranty of fitness for human habitation. See generally
Krieger & Shurn, Landlord-Tenant Law: Indiana at the Crossroads, 10 IND. L. REV. 591,599-
635 (1977); Line, Implied Warranties of Habitability and Fitness for Intended Use in Urban
Residential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 161 (1974); Rose, Responsibility of Landlords for
Conditions of Habitability, I REAL EST. L.J. 53 (1972).
488. 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
489. See also Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977). The
court held that a manufacturer of a mobile home is liable for economic loss to the purchaser
under the implied warranty of merchantability, the lack of privity between the manufacturer
and the purchaser notwithstanding.
490. 552 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
491. Id. at 496.
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ceptive Trade Practices Act may offer the tenant a misrepresentation theory
of recovery against a landlord who fails to disclose to the tenant defects in
the premises which could not have been discovered by a reasonable inspec-
tion or who misrepresents the condition of the premises.4 92
4. Delivery.
The delivery of a written lease was in issue in Scroggins v. Roper.493 The
purchasers of a restaurant filed a forcible entry and detainer action against
the lessee, alleging that the month-to-month lease had been terminated. The
lessee claimed she was occupying the restaurant under a five-year written
lease made with the former owner. The evidence showed that the former
owner had asked his attorney to prepare a written lease in order to satisfy
the lessee's banker's requirement that there be a written lease before the
bank would loan the lessee money to buy inventory and fixtures for the
restaurant. Although the former owner denied that the written lease had
been executed and delivered, the court found that the written lease had been
signed by the lessor and lessee at the time the bank loan was closed, and,
therefore, that there had been a sufficient delivery to create a binding
written lease. 494 The court held that manual delivery of a lease was not
necessary and that "delivery may be proved by evidence of acts or words
showing that the grantor [lessor] intended to pass title, and by evidence that
after execution the grantor treated and recognized the property as belonging
to the grantee [lessee] although possession of the deed [lease] was retained
by the grantor. 495
B. Mortgages and Liens
The relative priorities between a contractual and statutory landlord's lien
and a bank's perfected security interest in the same personal property was
determined in a case of first impression, Bank of North America v. Kru-
ger. 49 The landlord had filed neither a financing statement under the Uni-
form Commercial Code nor an affidavit under article 5238.49 7 The court of
civil appeals reversed a district court judgment in favor of the landlord, and
held that only statutory landlord's liens are excepted, under section 9.104(2)
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 498 from the filing requirements of section
9.302 of the Code, and since the landlord did not perfect his lien by filing it,
the bank's perfected security interest was superior to the prior unrecorded
492. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.45(1), (6), 17.46(a), (b)(7), (b)(13), 17.50(a)(2),
(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), discussed in
the text accompanying notes 244-50 supra. See generally Comment, Texas Landlord-Tenant
Law and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act-Affirmative Relief for the Tenant, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 807 (1977).
493. 548 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
494. The lessee did not produce the written lease because her testimony showed that the
only signed copy of the lease had been retained by the lessor. The court apparently based its
holding that the lease had been delivered upon the finding that the lease had been executed and
retained by the lessor and that the lessor thereafter had threatened to break the lease. The only
authority the court could cite regarding the acts necessary to constitute delivery were cases
involving deeds, which the court found to be indistinguishable from a lease situation.
495. 548 S.W.2d at 780.
496. 551 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
497. TEX. Rvv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5238 (Vernon 1962).
498. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODF ANN. § 9.104(2) (Vernon 1968).
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landlord's contractual lien. 499 Further, the court held that the bank's actual
knowledge of the prior contractual landlord's lien did not estop the bank
from asserting its perfected security interest. The landlord's statutory lien
under article 5238, however, was, in the court's opinion, superior to the
bank's security interest only with respect to rentals which accrued during
the lease year in which the bank's security interest was perfected, and those
which were not more than six months past due, because the landlord had
failed to file an affidavit under article 5238 with respect to rentals that were
more than six months past due.5°° Additionally, the court held that the bank
was not liable to the landlord for conversion since, at the time of the bank's
foreclosure, the landlord's lien was inferior. Finally, the bank was not liable
to the landlord for damage to the leased property caused by the removal of
the personal property; the bank did not participate in the negligence of the
sheriff's deputies who were acting under a writ of sequestration. In sum-
mary the statutory landlord's lien need not be filed under the Uniform
Commercial Code, but an affidavit must be filed under article 5238 in order
to have priority over bona fide purchasers or secured or unsecured creditors
with respect to rentals more than six months past due. Also, no filing is
required to maintain the statutory lien as to rentals which accrue during the
lease year in which the third party security interest has been perfected or
with respect to rentals that are not more than six months past due.
An owner who leases his land to a tenant who plans to build on the land
may be asked to subordinate his title to the mortgage which finances the
tenant's improvements. In order to protect his title, the landowner may
either require the mortgagee to give him notice of any default under the
mortgage and to allow him the opportunity to cure the default, or impose
other requirements to assure that the mortgage payments are made. Addi-
tionally, he may require the tenant to indemnify him against loss in the event
of foreclosure. The landlord's remedies in the lease before the court in
Rodriquez v. Dipp ° l were to terminate the lease 02 or to cure the default on
499. The court found some support for its holding in the pre-Code decision of Skwiff v. City
of Dallas, 327 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which held that a
landlord's contractual lien is a chattel mortgage which must be perfected by filing under the
then applicable registration statute. The court relied upon decisions under the Uniform
Commercial Code in other states for direct authority.
500. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 5238 (Vernon 1962) states in part that "the lien for rents
to become due shall not continue or be enforced for a longer period than the current contract
years, it being intended by the term 'current contract years' to embrace a period of twelve (12)
months, reckoning from the beginning of the lease or rental contract, whether the same be in the
first or any other year of such lease or rental contract." The lien under this provision has
priority only for rents which accrued during that particular lease year, whether it is the first year
of the lease or a subsequent year. After a security interest is filed by another creditor on the
same property, the landlord's lien: (I) has absolute priority with respect to all rentals that
accrue during the lease year in which the security interest is perfected; (2) has an absolute
priority with respect to rentals that are not more than six months past due which would extend
beyond the end of that lease year; and (3) has an absolute priority over bona fide purchasers or
unsecured or lien creditors of the tenant for rentals that are more than six months past due only
if he files an affidavit in accordance with article 5238 for that six-month period (i.e., an affidavit
should be filed for each six-month period). See Industrial State Bank v. Oldham, 148 Tex. 126,
221 S.W.2d 912 (1949).
501. 546 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
502. If a lease is terminated and makes no provision for damages for the breach, the landlord




the mortgage and hold the tenant liable; the lease agreement, however,
contained no contractual obligation for the tenant to pay the mortgage. After
the mortgagee foreclosed on the land and improvements, the landlord sued
the tenant in tort for interference with a contractual relationship, electing to
forego any recovery on the lease. The court of civil appeals held that the
failure of the tenant to pay the mortgage was at most a breach of contract
which would not have been grounds for damages in tort even if there had
been a contractual obligation to the landlord to pay the mortgage. The failure
to pay a note when due, the court said, was not a breach of a legal duty
constituting tortious conduct nor was it negligence.50 3 Although it is unclear
whether it was of any importance in the court's decision, the evidence
showed that the landlord had received $40,000 to agree to an extension of
the loan and to deliver a deed to the land to a third party after the foreclo-
sure, although that amount appears to have been substantially below the
market value of the land. The court also denied recovery on the theory of
conversion. Conversion technically applies only to personal property and
not real property; the theory is, however, sometimes applied to a wrongful
foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust.5 4
C. Remedies for Breach
Late payment of rentals resulted in litigation in three cases during the
survey period, each involving a different theory of recovery. The practice of
accepting late rental payments may be difficult to overcome, as the landlord
learned in Wendlandt v. Sommers Drug Stores Co. 505 Although rent was due
under the lease agreement on the first day of each month, the tenant
customarily mailed the rental checks several days after the first day of each
month. For more than a year the landlord allowed this practice without
complaint. On November 4, 1974, however, the tenant was notified that the
November rent had not been received and was reminded that rent was due
on or before the first day of the month. The tenant testified that the
November rent check was mailed on November 4, although the landlord
denied receiving it. On December 4, 1974, the landlord gave the tenant
notice that the lease had been forfeited for failure to pay the November and
December rentals. The court held that the November 4th notice was not
sufficient to serve either as a demand for payment or a notice of default,
saying: "[n]otice of default in payment of rent must convey a message that
the notifier is initiating steps necessary to finally assert his legal rights that if
default is not cured, he may take final action as provided in the contract." 506
The court held that the tenant did not waive the requirement that the
landlord demand performance as a condition precedent to forfeiture. Waiv-
503. The court cited Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros., 109 N.E.2d 556 (Ohio App. 1952), and
decisions from other states. In Bowman the court stated the rule that "the mere omission to
perform a contract obligation is never a tort unless the omission is also the omission to perform
a legal duty."
504. See Donnelly v. Young, 471 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
505. 551 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
506. Id. at 490. The court cited Moore v. Richfield Oil Corp., 233 Ore. 39, 377 P.2d 32
(1962); Hocker v. Heins, 231 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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er, the court held, was the only exception to the rule that a landlord cannot
forfeit a lease for failure to comply with its provisions without first making
demand upon the tenant for performance. 07 Furthermore, the court said
that the practice of accepting late rental payments precluded the landlord
from treating the late payment of November's rent as a breach of the lease.
Thus, the thirty day period provided in the lease for curing any default did
not begin to run until the December notice was given. The tenant did not,
however, have to cure a default based upon the failure to pay the November
rental because the court accepted the tenant's testimony as to its general
practice of mailing checks, and the November check in particular, over the
landlord's testimony that the check was not received. 8
In Kaiser v. Northwest Shopping Center, Inc." the tenant, whose rental
checks were dishonored, answered the landlord's suit for recovery of the
rentals with the contention that the landlord's failure to present the checks
within a reasonable period of time caused the underlying debt to be dis-
charged under the provisions of sections 3.601 and 3.802 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.5 10 The court disagreed, however, holding that:
"[r]etention of the check, even beyond a reasonable time, does not dis-
charge either the check or the underlying debt under § 3.601(b) or under §
3.802."sI1 The question before the court in M.L.C. Loan Corp. v. P.K.
Foods, Inc. 512 was whether the tenant had abandoned the leased property,
allowing the landlord to terminate the lease. The landlord notified the tenant
that rentals were delinquent and that it had ten days to pay the rentals or to
vacate the property. A few days later a second notice was given to the tenant
stating that the lease was being terminated because the property had been
abandoned for more than five days in breach of the lease agreement. Within
ten days of the first notice the tenant tendered the delinquent rentals, but the
landlord refused to accept the payment. The court of civil appeals held that
the required intention to abandon was lacking in this case; the tender of the
rental payments negated any such intention, and evidence of nonuse alone
would not support an abandonment.
In Frank v. Kuhnreich5 3 the landlord argued that the tenant's failure to
carry liability insurance on the leased premises was an obvious breach of the
lease agreement, and since the tenant knew of the breach the landlord was
excused from giving notice of default required by the lease agreement. 1 4
507. 551 S.W.2d at 490. The rule is stated in Gray v. Vogelsang, 236 S.W. 122 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1921, no writ), and in Shepherd v. Sorrells, 182 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex. Civ.
App.-1944, no writ). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 321 (1953).
508. 551 S.W.2d at 490. The court stated that American courts have long recognized the
impracticality of requiring proof of mailing only by direct proof of proper address, stamping,
and mailing and have allowed circumstantial evidence for this purpose. 2 C. MCCORMICK & R.
RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1514 (2d ed. 1956). This does not mean that the tenant escaped
payment of the November rent if, in fact, it was never received by the landlord.
509. 544 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
510. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.601, .802 (Vernon 1968).
511. 544 S.W.2d at 787.
512. 541 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
513. 546 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
514. The landlord was completing repairs of damage caused by fire, as he was required to do
under the lease, and had attempted to negotiate a new lease at a higher rental rate, when the
notice of forfeiture was given to the tenant. The tenant obtained the liability insurance within
fifteen days, the time given to cure a default, after the notice of forfeiture. In EVCO Corp. v.
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The court noted the historical judicial disfavor of forfeiture and recognized
the principal that any doubt in the meaning of a lease will be resolved most
strongly against the landlord who prepared it, and, therefore, the court
rejected the landlord's argument. The court did hold, however, that the
evidence of the tenant's lost profits from the landlord's delay in returning
the premises to the tenant were too uncertain and speculative. 15 The evi-
dence presented by the tenant was based upon profits from another business
he owned. The court of civil appeals also reversed the trial court's award of
damages based on the difference between the rental rate paid to the landlord
and the greater rate that was to be paid to the original tenant under a
sublease to a company owned by the tenant; the court so reversed because
(1) a tenant had a duty to mitigate damages; (2) there was no showing that the
rental rate paid under the sublease had any relationship to market value; and
(3) there was no showing that the tenant suffered any real lOSS.5 16
The purpose and effect of a forcible entry and detainer action was fully
explored in Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments.5"7 The tenant on
appeal challenged a summary judgment founded on a holding by the trial
court that a judgment of possession for the landlord in a forcible entry and
detainer action constituted an estoppel by judgment of the tenant's suit for
damages for wrongful eviction. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding
that the action for damages was not barred. The appellate court based its
decision on the clear language of afticle 3994,518 which states: "[t]he pro-
ceedings under a forcible entry, or forcible detainer, shall not bar an action
for trespass, damages, waste, rent or mesne profits." The court analyzed
the effect of article 3994 as follows:
when properly construed, article 3994 prevents any issue in the detainer
action, other than immediate possession, from acting as an estoppel byjudgment in a subsequent action in the district court with respect to a
determination of the adverse parties' rights under a lease even though
this determination may very well result in a different ultimate disposi-
tion of possession of the premises. This conclusion is consistent with
numerous decisions holding that the forcible entry and detainer action is
cumulative of other remedies.
Our holding, here, is consistent with the theory that a forcible detain-
er action is for the primary purpose of resolving who is entitled to
immediate possession of the premises. It is cumulative of other reme-
dies, rather than exclusive. Thus, a judgment of possession is not
intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is wrongful
or not; rather, it is a final determination only with respect to the right of
Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1975), the landlord was held to be obligated to rebuild after total
fire destruction because the lease made him responsible for all major repairs and he had agreed
to carry fire insurance. Circumstances permitting the tenant to recover in tort for intentional
inferference with tenant's business arising from the landlord's breach of duty to repair were
found in Cherberg v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 88 Wash. 2d 595, 564 P.2d 1137 (1977) (landlord's
failure was for purpose of ousting tenant so a better use could be made of the property). See
generally Committee Report, Fire Insurance and Repair Clauses in Leases, 5 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 532 (1970).
515. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1963).
516. 546 S.W.2d at 850.
517. 552 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). The court also found that an
implied warranty of habitability did not arise from the landlord-tenant relationship. See discus-
sion of this point at notes 490-92 supra and accompanying text.
518. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3994 (Vernon 1966).
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immediate possession, which determination by a county court at law is
not appealable. Consequently, the judgment of possession in a detainer
suit does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties with respect to
any other issue in controversy regardless of whether this other issue
results in a change of possession of the premises." 9
In reaching this decision the court either distinguished or declared erroneous
a line of Texas cases holding that a final judgment of possession in a forcible
entry and detainer action was a bar to a subsequent suit concerning the
validity of the lease. 20 The court found precedent in House v. Reavis .121 To
reach the opposite conclusion, the court in Johnson would have been re-
quired to read article 3994 to mean that a forcible entry or detainer action is
not a bar to an action by the landlord for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or
mesne profits, but that it is a bar to a similar action brought by the tenant.
There may be some basis for reaching this opposite conclusion. 22
Damages for conversion of leasehold improvements was the issue before
the court in Fenlon v. Jaffee.123 The lessee of space in a shopping mall had a
retail outlet called a kiosk constructed in the leased space. Before any
rentals were paid, however, the tenant was adjudicated a bankrupt. The
landlord paid the balance due to the contractor and took possession of the
kiosk. The lease agreement permitted the tenant to remove leasehold im-
provements at the end of the lease term if all rentals were current. The
tenant's bankruptcy receiver refused the landlord's offer to return the kiosk,
and sued the landlord for the value of the kiosk. The court held that, having
not complied with the condition precedent of paying the rentals, the tenant's
right to remove the kiosk had been forfeited along with his right to recover
damages for conversion. In Catania v. Garage De Le Paix, Inc. 524 the court
held that the original tenant who had assigned the lease and sold the personal
property used on the leased premises no longer had title or right to posses-
sion of the personalty, and, therefore, could not maintain an action against
the landlord for conversion of the personalty.
Article 5236e 525 defines a "security deposit" to be "any advance or
deposit of money, regardless of denomination, the primary function of
which is to secure full or partial performance of a rental agreement for a
residential premises" and, with certain exceptions, requires the landlord to
refund the deposit to the tenant within thirty days after the tenant surrenders
519. 552 S.W.2d at 495-96 (citations omitted).
520. See Glau-Moya Parapsychology Training Inst., Inc. v. Royal Life Ins. Co., 507 S.W.2d
824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ). See also Slay v. Fugitt, 302 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Hair, 165 S.W.2d
238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Rankin v. Hooks, 81 S.W. 1005 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1904, no writ).
521. 89 Tex. 626, 35 S.W. 1063 (1896). The House case is certainly not direct authority
because it involves a suit for trespass to try title, which the court held was not barred by the
forcible entry and detainer judgment. The holding in House seems to rest primarily upon the
proscription of former arts. 2529 and 3984, now TEX. R. Civ. P. 746, which states that in a
forcibly entry or detainer action "their merits of title shall not be inquired into." The court held
that "trespass" as used in art. 3994 means trespass to try title and that the right of possession
"as a matter of title should not be thereby adjudicated." 89 Tex. at 635, 35 S.W. at 1067.
522. Compare Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 805-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ) with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3975b, § 3 (Vernon 1966).
523. 553 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
524. 542 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
525. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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the premises. In Holmes v. Canlen Management Corp. 5 26 the tenant contend-
ed that a "non-refundable painting and cleaning fee" of $40 was in fact a
security deposit which had the primary function of securing performance of
the lease. The court held, however, that the painting and cleaning fee was
either an advance payment of rent or consideration for the execution of the
lease, and therefore was not governed by the statute providing for security
deposits. The court said that article 5236e
is only concerned with a deposit which purportedly must be returned to
the tenant upon his compliance with the terms of the lease. It is settled
that a landlord can agree with his tenant for any amount of compensa-
tion for the use of the property. There is no requirement that prohibits
the landlord from stating in the agreement the use to which he intends to
put this consideration .... 527
A landlord should be cautioned, however, from freely analogizing his situa-
tion to the Holmes decision, especially when the fees or deposits are to
cover damages to the leased premises only if damages actually occur.
VI. RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE
A. Private Restrictive Covenants
As in past years there were several cases involving private restrictive
covenants in residential areas. One recurring issue, the scope of prohibitions
against trailers, was again considered by the Texas Supreme Court in Lassi-
ter v. Bliss.528 The restriction at issue provided that "no trailer . . . or
temporary quarters shall at any time be used as a residence ..... The
supreme court held that
the intention of the restrictive covenant in the present case was to
prohibit trailers from being used as residences 'at any time,' whether as
a temporary or permanent residence. Under the Bullock and Zmotony
cases, we hold that the mobile home in this case was a 'trailer' and was
prohibited by the restrictive covenant.
52 9
Justice Johnson dissented, arguing that there is a distinction between a
"mobile home" and a "trailer," and since the structure in question was a
mobile home, it was not prohibited by the restrictive covenant. 30
Another recurring issue concerned restrictions which limit the use of lots
in subdivisions to single family residences and prohibit businesses, apart-
526. 542 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
527. Id. at 201; see Comment, The Residential Tenant's Security Deposit-A Protected
Interest Worth Litigating, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 829 (1977).
528. 21 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 85 (Dec. 3, 1977).
529. Id. at 86. The cases referred to are Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Phillips v. Zmotony, 525 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd per curiam, 529 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1975), discussed in Heath &
Bentley (1977), supra note 2, at 94 n.437, and in Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2,
at 65. See also Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 111. 2d 168, 334 N.E.2d 131 (1975),
noted in 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 553 (1976).
530. The dissenting opinion discussed the nature of mobile homes in light of the National
Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (Supp. V
1975) and the Texas Mobile Homes Standards Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f
(Vernon Supp. 1978), and concluded that a "mobile home" is a distinct type of a structure
which was not even known in 1948 when the restrictive covenant was imposed. Accordingly,
Justice Johnson reasoned that the parties could not have intended the term "trailers" to cover a
mobile home such as the one in question. 21 TFX. SuP. CT. J. at 91.
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ments, or duplexes. The particular restrictive covenant involved in South-
ampton Civic Club v. Foxworth3' provided that no part of the property
could ever be used for a wholesale or retail business and that "no apartment
house or duplex will be permitted in the Additions; the object of this
provision being to prohibit multible [sic] housing throughout the entire
addition. '532 The plaintiff brought suit claiming that the defendants had
violated the covenant by renting a garage apartment to a Rice University
student. The trial court denied the temporary injunction, but the court of
civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The appellate
court reasoned that although renting a room within a private residence
would not have violated the restriction the rental of the garage apartment
separate and apart from the dwelling house was a violation. 33
In Mathis v. Wallace534 the plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requir-
ing the defendant to remove the defendant's house from the subdivision.
The facts showed that, although the defendant owned twenty-four acres, in
erecting the house in question only one acre surrounding the house had been
mortgaged. The plaintiff contended this violated a restriction that no house
be placed upon a lot of less than three acres. The court disagreed, however,
noting that mortgaging less than three acres was not prohibited and that the
twenty four acres owned by the defendant were not resubdivided. The
plaintiff additionally argued that the defendant's method of construction,
whereby he had the house partially pre-assembled off the premises, cut into
halves, then moved onto the property and later joined together, violated a
prohibition against moving a building onto a lot. The court held that no
building had been moved onto the property; rather, parts of the building had
been erected upon the property, the whole of which formed a complete
structure.
In Lovelace v. Bandera Cemetery Association535 the two original devel-
opers of a commercial project had died and no committee of owners had
been elected to supervise the project as provided in the restrictions. The
surviving spouse of one of the original developers, therefore, had been
acting as the committee, and the court held that she was entitled to function
as the committee until a new committee was elected in accordance with
restrictions. The court, however, held that, since such surviving spouse had
created a cemetery on certain lots on which commercial use was permitted,
she was precluded from obtaining an injunction against the planned use of
certain residential lots for another cemetery. 3 6
Two cases in the survey period concerned suits to have certain restric-
tions declared unenforceable. In Jones v. Young5 37 the court held that an
531. 550 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
532. Id. at 152.
533. The court relied on Southampton Civil Club v. Couch, 159 Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516
(1958).
534. 553 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
535. 545 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
536. The court's rationale was that the surviving spouse had "unclean hands" because of
her prior development of a cemetery on the commercial lots, and it is an established rule that
one who seeks equity must come before the court with clean hands. Omohundro v. Matthews,
161 Tex. 367, 341 S.W.2d 401 (1960).
537. 541 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
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action for a declaratory judgment removing restrictions as a cloud on the
title was an appropriate means for a landowner to seek relief against restric-
tive covenants which would limit his use and enjoyment of the property.5 3 8
In Underwood v. Webb5 39 a landowner attempted either to show an intention
on the part of the property owners to abandon the general scheme of a
residential subdivision, or to establish a waiver of the restrictions imposed
on landowners due to the existence of violations in the subdivision. The
evidence showed only two nonresidential uses in the subdivision, a tele-
phone company repeater station and a credit union office. The court held
that when a landowner who had never used his property for business sought
to have the restriction removed based on violations in existence elsewhere in
the subdivision, such landowner must show extensive violations throughout
the entire subdivision. Since the telephone company had the right of eminent
domain, the court held that the presence of the repeater station could not be
considered an abandonment or waiver of the restrictions by the property
owners. 45 ' Further, the court held that the presence of the credit union office
was not sufficient to constitute such extensive violations throughout the
subdivision as to indicate an intention on the part of the property owners to
abandon the general scheme of the residential area, or to establish a waiver
of the right to enforce the restrictions.
B. Public Restrictions: Zoning
There was much litigation involving zoning restrictions during the survey
period. Additionally, article 101 le, 541 requiring three-fourths vote of a city
council to change a zoning ordinance, was amended during the survey
period by deleting the provision which included within the protest area
owners of lots directly opposite to the proposed change or those within 200
feet from the street frontage of such opposite lots. Article 101 le was further
amended by the addition of a provision allowing the legislative body of a
municipality to provide by ordinance that a vote of three-fourths of all its
members be required to overrule a recommendation of the zoning commis-
sion that a proposed change be denied.
During the survey period two cases were decided which concerned article
101 le prior to its amendment. In City of San Antonio v. Lanier542 the court
of civil appeals held that a city ordinance placing the burden upon the
landowners to obtain a three-fourths favorable vote in order to override the
recommendation of the planning commission that a zoning change be disap-
proved was an unlawful delegation by the city of its legislative power. 543 The
538. See Anderson v. McRae, 495 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
See also Simon v. Henrichson, 394 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
539. 544 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
540. Id. at 190; see Lebo v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
541. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 le (Vernon Supp. 1978).
542. 542 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
543. The court reasoned that cities are confined to the express authority delegated to them
by the legislature and that there was no statutory authorization for the city to require a three-
fourths favorable vote because of the disapproval of the planning commission.
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1977 amendment to article 101le now expressly provides the legislative
authorization for ordinances such as the one in question in City of San
Antonio v. Lanier. Midway Protective League v. City of Dallas5" also dealt
with the requirements of article 101 le. In this case an association of land-
owners brought suit attacking the validity of a city ordinance that re-zoned a
portion of a tract for use as a "dry" shopping center. Among other points
the landowners urged that the ordinance was void since it was not passed by
a three-fourths majority of the city council. The court, however, held that
twenty percent of the owners of land within 200 feet of the shopping center
had failed to protest the change . 4 5 Additionally, article 101 If 5" requires that
the city council receive a final report from the planning commission before
holding hearings or taking action on a zoning ordinance. The court held that
this rule does not mean that a zoning amendment must actually have been
discussed by the commission, but only that an opportunity has been afford-
ed for discussion. The court recognized that there is authority that this rule
may only apply to minor zoning changes,547 but held that there was no
evidence that the zoning change in question was major.
In Goode v. City of Dallas548 a landowner sued, contending that a Dallas
zoning ordinance which prohibited the storage of motor vehicles within a
residential district when storage is not incidental to the use of the property
as a residence was unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the term
"motor vehicle" as used in the ordinance refers to a means of transporta-
tion, and that if stored on a residential lot to provide transportation for the
residents, such storage is "incidental to the use" of the property as a
residence.54 9 Accordingly, the court held that the ordinance was not uncon-
stitutionally vague. Finally, the court of civil appeals in Hitchcock v. City of
Killeen55 ° affirmed a temporary injunction against the defendant's operation
of a "theatre" featuring nude dancing in violation of a zoning ordinance.
The defendant challenged the validity of the ordinance arguing that the city
had failed to give proper notice prior to the adoption of the ordinance as
required by article 101 Id.551 The court held that the validity of the ordinance
had been previously determined in Wells v. City of Killeen ,552 and that this
determination was binding on the defendants.553
544. 552 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
545. Apparently the developers of the shopping center owned the balance of the tract
surrounding the center and thus precluded the possibility of a protest by twenty percent of the
adjoining landowners.
546. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 If (Vernon 1963).
547. 552 S.W.2d at 173; see City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd).
548. 554 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
549. Id. at 757. The court also held thatTEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 lh (Vernon 1963)
is merely an enabling statute which authorizes cities to define violations of zoning ordinances as
misdemeanors. 554 S.W.2d at 758.
550. 553 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
551. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101Id (Vernon 1963).
552. 524 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
553. The court held that a judgment for or against a county or municipality is binding and
conclusive upon all residents, citizens, and taxpayers in regard to matters actually adjudicated




A. Real Estate Partnerships and Ventures
Interests in real estate limited partnerships, joint or profit sharing real
estate ventures, and certain real estate general partnerships generally have
been thought to be securities under both section 2(1) of the Federal Securi-
ties Act of 19331"4 and section 4A of the Texas Securities Act.555 A recent
Texas case discussing the definition of a security in the context of real estate
is McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc. ,56 in which the
purchaser of a joint venture interest brought suit under the Texas Securities
Act against the organizer of the venture, its president, and the salesman,
seeking to rescind his purchase. The court held that the interest in the joint
venture was not an investment contract55 7 or a certificate in or under a
profit-sharing or participation agreement as defined by the Texas Securities
Act. With regard to question of whether the interest constituted an invest-
ment contract, the court held that, although there was an investment of
money in a common enterprise, there was no expectation of profits solely or
substantially from the efforts of others. The court stated that the term
"efforts of others" means operational, managerial, or developmental ef-
forts, and not "the mere holding of property in anticipation of appreciation
in value,"5 58 citing Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc. ,59 Happy Investment
Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc. ," and Contract Buyers League v. F. &
F. Investment Co. 561 All three cases involved the direct purchase of lots in a
subdivision rather than the purchase of an interest in a partnership or other
venture which in turn owned lots. The court, therefore, in McConathy
ignored the fact that there was an additional layer of investment in the
business enterprise, not just a purchase of the underlying assets. The court
554. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970). See generally Burton, Real Estate Syndications in Texas:
An Examination of Securities Problems, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 239, 243 (1973); Long, Partnership,
Limited Partnership and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 581 (1972). See
also 3 BLOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.12[2] (1975). Moreover,
this is the position taken by the SEC:
Under the Federal Securities Laws, an offering of limited partnership interests
and interests in joint or profit sharing real estate ventures generally constitutes an
offering of a profit sharing agreement or an investment contract which is a
security within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4877 (Aug. 8, 1967), [1966-67 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,462.
555. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon 1964).
556. 545 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
557. An "investment contract" as defined in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946),
is "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,
.. . This definition of investment contract has generally been adopted by the courts in Texas.
In Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), the court held that an investment
contract "is any contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the third party;" however, the
court went on to point out that mere token participation by an investor would not prohibit the
transaction from being an investment contract. See also Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis,
Inc. v. Mouer, 520 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975), controversy dismissed, 531
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1975); King Commodity Co. of Tex., Inc. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
558. 545 S.W.2d at 875.
559. 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
560. 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
561. 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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in McConathy stressed that there was no investment contract involved
because "[t]here was no reliance on the developmental, managerial or
operational skills of a promoter or third party in attempting to make a profit
. ... '562 Curiously, the court went on to state that "neither would the
evidence justify a conclusion that Appelants [sic] investment was a certifi-
cate in or under a profit-sharing or participation agreement as included in the
Securities Act." 5 63 No reason was given for this holding, and it seems to be
contrary to the position taken by the SEC 5M and the Texas Securities
Commissioner . 65
An interesting decision involving the common practice of placing title in
the hands of a "trustee ' 566 for undisclosed beneficiaries is Spiritas v.
Robinowitz.5 67 In this case Spiritas and Robinowitz had entered into a joint
venture agreement to purchase a tract of land. Each party signed the agree-
ment as "trustee," and the agreement provided that it was to be governed by
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act.5 61 When the tract was purchased, title
was taken in the name of Robinowitz as "trustee." Later, Robinowitz
personally purchased a second tract adjacent to the first tract, and in
financing the purchase of the second tract, Robinowitz granted a second lien
covering the first tract. Spiritas brought suit to have the second lien declared
invalid because Robinowitz had no authority to grant the lien. The lender
argued that its second lien on the first tract was protected by the Texas Blind
Trust Act569 which provides in part that when a conveyance is made to a
trustee and the names of the beneficiaries are not disclosed, the trustee has
the power to encumber the title. The court held, however, that the mere
designation of a party as trustee did not in itself create a trust, and that no
trust existed unless there was an actual trust which complied with the
requisites of the Texas Trust Act.5 70 The court held that there was no trust
created by Robinowitz, and, thus, the lien on the first tract was not protect-
ed under the Blind Trust Act. This aspect of the decision raises some
interesting questions as to whether title companies will continue to rely on
the Blind Trust Act in issuing title policies in connection with conveyances
made by so-called "trustees."
562. 545 S.W.2d at 876. See also Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)(court held that certain general partnership interests were either "investment contracts," or
participations in a "profit-sharing agreement" and thus were securities under § 2(l)of the 1933
Act, because the general partnership agreement indicated that there would be substantial
reliance on central management).
563. 545 S.W.2d at 876.
564. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4877 (Aug. 8, 1967), [1966-67 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,462.
565. See Regulations of Texas Securities Board, Chapter IX; Burton, supra note 554, at 244-
45.
566. See generally Comment, A Device for Texas Land Development: The Illinois Land
Trust, 10 Hous. L. REV. 692 (1973).
567. 544 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
568. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970).
569. Id. art. 7425a (Vernon 1960).
570. See id. art. 7425b-7. The court stated that the use of the term "trustee" was merely
descriptive and without legal effect. Compare Hudson & Hudson Realtors v. Savage, 545
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ) with Gorme v. Axelrad, 519 S.W.2d 139(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ), which inferred that use of the term
"trustee" is indicative of the interests of others.
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The court held, however, that the transaction was governed by the Texas
Uniform Partnership Act. Section 10(3) of the Act provides that the partners
in whose name title is held may convey the property subject to the right of
the partnership to recover the property "if the partner's act does not bind
the partnership under the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 9, unless the
purchaser or his assignee, is a holder of value, without knowledge.
571
Section 9(1)572 provides that every partner is the agent of the partnership for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership,
unless the partner so acting actually has no authority to act for the partner-
ship and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of such lack of
authority. In light of these provisions the court held that since Spiritas had
permitted another venturer, Robinowitz, to hold legal title to the partnership
property, Spiritas had the burden of proving that Robinowitz did not have at
least apparent authority to place the lien on the partnership property. The
court held that Spiritas had failed to meet this burden and the lien, therefore,
was declared valid.
Developers of promotional subdivisions and recreational property fre-
quently employ an outside sales force to handle the advertising and sale of
the lots under an arrangement allowing the sales agent to receive a percent-
age of the total sales proceeds. The sales program typically requires the
purchaser of a lot to make a small down payment under an installment land
contract, in which event the sales agent is allowed to receive all or a part of
the down payment. A similar arrangement was involved in Coastal Plains
Development Corp. v. Micrea, Inc. 573 in which the sales agent was to retain
the first twenty percent of all of the down payments on lots, with the
developer agreeing that if the down payments were insufficient to pay the
sales agent's expenses, the developer would reimburse the sales agent
monthly for the deficiency. After all expenses of development .were paid,
the profits were to be divided equally between the developer and the sales
agent. Based primarily upon the agreement to share profits, the court held
that the developer and sales agent were in a joint venture.5 74 In so holding
the court disregarded a provision in the agreement negating the creation of a
partnership or joint venture.5 75 Although the sharing of losses was not an
571. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10(3) (Vernon 1970).
572. Id. § 9(1).
573. 553 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ granted).
574. Id. at 817-18. The court cited Ives v. Watson, 521 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Lane v. Phillips, 509 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for the characteristics of a joint venture. But see Tex-Co.
Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 934, 936-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976, no writ) (court refused to find a joint venture between a cattle owner and a feedlot,
despite the provision in their agreement that they were "to engage in a joint venture" and were
to share any profits, although losses were to be borne entirely by the feedlot).
575. Justice Keith dissented on the basis that the intention of the parties not to create a joint
venture, as stated in the agreement, should be observed. Justice Keith, to whom the cases cited
by the majority in support of the existence of a joint venture were attributed, retorted as
follows:
In his immortal work 'Through the Looking-Glass,' Lewis Carroll finds Alice
puzzled with Humpty Dumpty's 'unbirthdays.' Being questioned by Alice, Hump-
ty said: 'When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more
nor less.' But, objected Alice: 'The question is, whether you can make words
mean so many different things.' To which Humpty replied: 'The question is,
which is to be master-that's all.' Do the words mean what the parties said or do
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
issue before the court, the court held that the sales agent would have been
liable as a matter of law for one-half of the losses57 6 of the joint venture. The
court, however, upheld the jury verdict awarding the sales agent $109,695.00
in damages for losses from the developer's failure to complete the devel-
opment, and upheld the jury finding that the developer suffered no loss as a
result of the sales agent's acts. After finding the sales agent to be a joint
venturer, the court decided that the sales agent was selling the property for
its own account and, therefore, was not required to have a license to sell real
estate. After all the court's labor to find the existence of a joint venture, it
concluded that this was not a suit to recover a real estate commission; it was
a suit for breach of contract.577 Writ of error has been granted by the Texas
Supreme Court. 78
B. Legislation
The Sixty-fifth Legislature enacted an array of new legislation affecting
real property, and declined to enact much more. Although the impact of
much of this legislation will appear minor to most lawyers, there are several
legislative developments which will have an obvious and significant impact
on real property. Some of the legislation listed in this section covers matters
other than real property, but only the real property application is discussed.
This section is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the legisla-
tion, and only a few of the new laws are discussed in any detail.
I. Building Requirements and Zoning.
Article 1446d, 57 9 which prohibits a city after January 1, 1978, from issuing
any permit, certificate, or other authorization for the construction or occu-
pancy of a new apartment house or for a conversion to a condominium,
unless the plan provides for individual metering or submetering of electricity
was added. Under the same statute any rental increase attributable to
electricity which is made during the ninety days preceding the installation of
individual meters or submeters must be retracted. The statute further re-
quires the Public Utility Commission to promulgate rules, regulations, and
standards for submetering. The language of the new statute is unclear as to
whether there will be any difficulty after January 1, 1978, in obtaining a
permit for construction, other than for construction of an apartment house,
a conversion, or a certificate of occupancy because the project does not
have individual metering or submetering. Another question was whether
they mean what the court has said? Or, more importantly, who is to be the
master?
553 S.W.2d at 819 n.1.
576. The court, although clearly in error, felt that an agreement to share losses is a prerequi-
site to the existence of a joint venture. Rather, the sharing of losses is a consequence of a joint
venture, unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. Was the provision in the agree-
ment that disclaimed the existence of a joint venture tantamount to an agreement not to share
losses? See generally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, PARTNERSHIP § 14(e), at 72 (1968); Comment,
Joint Adventurers-The Sharing of Losses Dilemma, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 429 (1963).
577. See Mooney v. Ingram, 547 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), discussed at note 201 supra.
578. 21 TEx. SuP. CT. J. 101 (Dec. 10, 1977).
579. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446d (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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cities could issue permits or certificates of occupancy prior to January 1,
1978, if the project would be completed after that date and would not be in
compliance with the statute. The Texas attorney general ruled that this new
statute does not prohibit the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for an
apartment building or a conversion which lacks individual metering or sub-
metering completed after January 1, 1978, as long as a building permit was
issued prior to that date5 80
Two amendments concerned physically handicapped persons and their
access to housing and private facilities. Article 4419e 581 was amended to
prohibit discrimination in access to housing against physically handicapped
persons; however, "access" does not require modification of the property.
On the other hand amendments to article 687582 added a considerable list of
building criteria pertaining to the use of facilities by handicapped persons
that are applicable to certain private buildings. 83
Formerly, subdivision A of article 516051 and section 2 of article 5472585
provided that a "prime contractor" entering into a formal contract with the
state in excess of $15,000.00 was required to give a statutory bond. The
amount has now been increased to $25,000.
There were also two legislative amendments relating to zoning. The legis-
lature repealed article 976a 586 which formerly required a vote of the residents
of an annexed area in order to change a zoning ordinance which existed in
that area prior to the annexation. Additionally, article 101 le 587 was amended
by the addition of a provision permitting a municipality to require a three-
fourths vote of the council to override certain planning or zoning commis-
sion recommendations.
2. Deceptive Trade Practices.
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act 88 was
again amended during the survey period. In particular section 17.45589 has
been broadened by deleting from the definition of "services" the restriction
"for other than commercial or business use" and by expanding the defini-
tion of "consumer" to include any "governmental entity." Additionally, the
amendment added a definition of an "unconscionable action or course of
action," thus bringing this type of conduct under the ambit of the Act. The
combination of these new amendments with the 1975 amendments, 9° ex-
580. TEX. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-1049 (1977).
581. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e (Vernon Supp. 1978).
582. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 678g (Vernon Supp. 1978).
583. The requirements apply to all buildings, building elements, and improved areas that are
open to the public for education, employment, transportation, or acquisition of goods and
services and which are constructed on or after January 1, 1978, in counties with a population of
50,000 or more.
584. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160(A) (Vernon 1971).
585. Id. art. 5472d, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
586. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 976a (1963).
587. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. lolle (Vernon Supp. 1978). This amendment is
discussed in greater detail at note 541 supra and accompanying text.
588. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
589. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
590. The 1975 amendments were apparently in response to Cape Conroe, Ltd. v. Specht, 525
S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). See Wallenstein & St. Claire
(1976), supra note 2, at 43-44.
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panding the definitions of "consumer" to include a "partnership or corpora-
tion" and "goods" to include "real property purchased or leased for use,"
could have the effect of bringing most commercial real estate transactions
within the scope of the Act. Additionally, section 17.46(b)191 of the Act was
amended to expand the definition of "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices" to include the filing of a suit on a contract for consumer goods,
services, or loans intended for personal or agricultural use in any county
other than either the county in which the defendant resided at the time of the
action or the county in which the defendant signed the contract.
3. Attorneys' Fees.
Three legislative enactments concerned the recovery of attorneys' fees.
Article 2226 was amended to permit recovery of attorneys' fees in suits
founded upon all oral or written contracts, except certain contracts of
insurers. 92 Further, the amended article deleted the former reference to the
State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule. New article 5523b 9 3 has been added to
entitle the prevailing party in an adverse possession case to recover attor-
neys' fees.5 94 Finally, new article 1239b595 has been added to permit recovery
of attorneys' fees in a suit for breach of a restrictive covenant.
4. Loans and Interest.
There were a number of legislative developments in the area of loans and
interest rates. New article 5069-1.091% provides that certain federally in-
sured loans may bear interest or be discounted at rates permitted by federal
law. Article 5069-1.07597 was amended by the addition of subsection (c),
providing that any borrower may pay the same rate as corporations on loans
of $500,000 or more made for certain oil and gas development costs, "pro-
vided that the value of the collateral securing such loan is reasonably
estimated by the lender at the time of making the loan to be in excess of the
amount of the loan." Also, an exhaustive effort was made in the legislature
to amend article 5069-1.07(a) and (b). After many revisions an abridged
version was submitted to the legislature, but it failed to pass since it could
not be brought to a vote by the final day of the session. Article 5069-6.05598
was amended to permit retail installment contracts or charge agreements for
the sale or construction of a residence which place a first lien upon real
property, provided the time-price differential does not exceed an annual rate
of ten percent.
Article 21.48A of the Insurance Code' 99 was amended to expand both the
591. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
592. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
593. Id. art. 5523b.
594. Attorney's fees are recoverable from the "party unlawfully in actual possession" if the
prevailing party has given written notice and demand to vacate at least ten days prior to filing
suit. The written demand must include notice that a judgment for costs and attorney's fees may
be entered.
595. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1239b (Vernon Supp. 1978).
596. Id. art. 5069-1.09.
597. Id. art. 5069-1.07.
598. Id. art. 5069-6.05.
599. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.48A (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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definitions of "lender" and "borrower" and the subject matter covered.
The subject matter includes both real and personal property subject to a
mortgage, deed of trust, lien, security agreement, or other security interest.
The amendment also prohibits a lender from using information on an insur-
ance policy for the purpose of soliciting business. Additionally, no lender
may require a borrower to furnish evidence of insurance more than fifteen
days prior to the policy expiration date, although a lender may provide full
insurance coverage to the extent of its security interest upon the borrower's
failure to provide an adequate policy within this fifteen-day period. This
provision should be of interest to mortgagees who are using one of several
popular printed deed of trust forms that require evidence of insurance thirty
days before the existing policy expires. A lender may also require the
borrower to designate an insurance agent, except in case of a policy renew-
al, furnish insurance information to another who has a lien on the same
property, or process an insurance claim.
Other legislation relating to loans and interest rates included an amend-
ment to article 342-508600 which provides that on loans of $100.00 or more for
a period of one month or more, a bank, in lieu of all other interest charges in
connection with the loan, may charge the reasonable value of services
rendered, not to exceed fifteen dollars for each loan transaction. 6° 1 Also,
article 1302-2.066 2 of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws was
amended to expand the authority of a corporation to guarantee the indebted-
ness of any subsidiary, parent, or affiliated corporation. Article 342-507, 6o
which limits the liability of any one borrower to twenty-five percent of its
capital and certified surplus, was amended to exclude from the limitation
liability under an agreement by a third party to repurchase from the bank an
indebtedness guaranteed by the United States Government to the extent of
the value guaranteed. Articles 5069-8.01,4 8.026o and 8.040 relating to
the civil liability and penalties for contracting for, charging, or receiving
certain interest, time-price differential, or other charges, and for failing to
perform certain duties in consumer credit transactions were amended. 6o7
600. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-508 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
601. The amendment also prohibits banks from permitting any person or husband and wife
to be obligated under more than one loan contract with the effect of obtaining a higher charge
than otherwise authorized. This special charge in lieu of interest, however, does not apply to
any renewal, extension, or refinancing from the same lender of a loan on which the charge has
been imposed.
602. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. art. 1302-2.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
603. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-507 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
604. Id. art. 5069-8.01.
605. Id. art. 5069-8.02.
606. Id. art. 5069-8.04.
607. The amendments to art. 5069-8.01 provide penalties (forfeiture of an amount equal to
twice the time-price differential or interest contracted for, charged, or incurred, not to exceed
$2,000, if the loan amount is $5,000 or less and not to exceed $4,000 if the loan amount is in
excess of $5,000 plus attorney's fees) for failing to perform any duty or requirement specifically
imposed by this subtitle of chapter 14 or for committing any act prohibited by this subtitle of
chapter 14. The amendments also provide for a 60-day period, from the effective date of the Act
or from the date of the violation, to cure any violations, provided the violator gives written
notice of the correction to the obligor before the obligor has filed an action. Any correction
made after the 60-day period, but prior to the filing of an action by the obligor, will reduce the
penalties to an amount equal to the interest charged, not to exceed $2,000. Article 5069-8.02
was amended to reduce the maximum fine from $1,000 to $100 for any violation of the terms of
an injunction issued under this subtitle.
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The amendments also provide venue rules and alter the limitations periods
for bringing actions.
6°8
5. Foreign Limited Partnerships; Assumed Names.
The Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act6° 9 was amended to permit the
voluntary filing by a foreign limited partnership of a petition to transact
business in Texas by paying the same substantial filing fee charged to Texas
limited partnerships. After filing, the foreign limited partnership now enjoys
the same rights and privileges and is subject to the same duties, restrictions,
and liabilities as a Texas limited partnership. Its internal affairs, however,
and the liability of its limited partners are governed by the laws of the state
of its formation. There has been some question as to the liability of limited
partners of a foreign limited partnership for Texas obligations. 610 The
amendment to the UPA provides a method for receiving limited liability
status in Texas if it is accorded under the foreign law. The amendment
expressly provides, however, that no inference is intended with respect to
the law governing a foreign limited partnership that does not qualify under
the Texas act.
The assumed name statute also has been expanded and clarified.6 1' Any
person, other than a corporation, who regularly conducts business or ren-
ders professional services under an assumed name now must file a certifi-
cate in each county where a business or professional service is maintained or
where business or services are conducted. "Any person" includes an indi-
vidual, joint venture, partnership, estate, real estate investment trust,612 and
company. A corporation which regularly conducts business or renders pro-
fessional services in Texas must file a certificate with the Secretary of State
and, if it is required to maintain a registered office in Texas, in the county
where its registered office and principal office are located. If a certificate
becomes "materially misleading" a new certificate must be filed. Certifi-
cates filed under the prior law become void on December 31, 1978, unless a
new certificate is filed under the new statute. Civil (inability to sue) and
criminal (fine up to $2,000) penalties now are imposed for noncompliance.
6. Miscellaneous.
The legislature enacted the Licensed State Land Surveyor's Act of 1977613
to provide for examination and license requirements of state land surveyors
608. Article 5069-8.04 now restricts venue to the county where the transaction was entered
into or where the defendant resided at the time the action was filed. The periods of limitation
are now two years from the date of the occurrence of the violation or four years from the date
of the loan or retail installment transaction, whichever is later, and in the case of open end
credit transactions, to two years from the date of the violation.
609. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon 1970).
610. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 576, § 26, at 146 n.31.
611. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 36.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
612. A real estate investment trust is not defined in the statute, and it is unclear if this term
includes only a trust qualified as such under Texas law or one qualified as such under the
Internal Revenue Code. Many real estate investment trusts, as defined in the Internal Revenue
Code, have recently elected not to qualify under the Code; but some states have amended their
statutes to recognize a trust as a real estate investment trust even though it no longer qualifies
for that purpose under the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Act 526, 1977 La. Sess. Law Ser.
(West).
613. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4282-6 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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and for the establishment of a Board of Examiners of Licensed State Land
Surveyors. The filing fee requirements for certain legal papers, including
real property records, were amended." 4 Article 1396-2.02 of the Texas
Non-Profit Corporation Act 615 was amended to allow non-profit corporations
to hold real property donated to them and articles 1302--4.01 and 4.02 of the
Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act 16 were amended to permit
certain non-profit corporations to acquire and hold "surplus" real property.
Five major amendments were passed in the area of water law, most
notably the consolidation of the Texas Water Development Board, the
Texas Water Rights Commission, and the Texas Water Quality Board into a
single agency called the Texas Department of Water Resources.6 1 The other
four amendments related to the authority to set water rates;6t 8 construction
bids on contracts for water control and improvement districts; 619 levee
improvement districts ;620 and local elections for weather modification per-
mits. 621
The 1977 Property Article reported that three significant uniform acts
involving real property had been approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-the Uniform Land Transactions
Act, the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, and the Uniform
Condominium Act. Substantial revisions have been made to all of these
uniform acts since the 1977 Property Article was written. It is anticipated
that these uniform acts will receive final approval within a few months and
will be presented to various state legislatures shortly thereafter. 622 Also, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Veterans Administration,
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and Federal National Mortgage
Associations have joined to propose uniform condominium policies, 623 and
Congressmen Minish and Reuss introduced House Bill 3519 dealing with
national standards to protect purchasers of units of condominiums and
planned unit developments. The growing popularity of condominium and
planned unit developments is certain to bring about greater restrictions on
developers 624 and protection for purchasers. Professor Casner is chairing a
committee that is proposing a Model Buyer's Title Protection Notice Act
614. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3930a-1, 3930(b), 3930(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
615. Id. art. 1396-2.02.
616. Id. arts. 1302-4.01 to 4.02.
617. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
618. Id. § 51.140.
619. Id.
620. Id. § 57.
621. Id. § 14.0641.
622. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Ass'n gave its approval to all three
articles on Feb. 14, 1978, although its approval of the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the
Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act was by a narrow margin. Recent articles dealing
with the Uniform Land Transactions Act before the latest revisions include Bruce, Mortgage
Law Reform Under the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64 GEO. L.J. 1245 (1976); Maggs,
Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Article Two of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 1 I
GA. L. REV. 275 (1977); Comment, Secured Transactions Under Article 3 of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 899.
623. 4 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 844 (Feb. 7, 1977).
624. See Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1977), which suggests that condominium
management agreements may be unlawful tying arrangements under section 1 of the Sherman
Act if the sale of units is conditioned upon the purchaser's acceptance of an exclusive
management agreement.
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which requires that purchasers of residential property receive notice if a title
policy or title opinion is being issued only for the mortgagee's benefit. Texas
has a similar requirement, 625 but it applies only to title policies and not to title
opinions.
625. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 4 9.55 (Vernon 1963).
